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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the genesis of the derogative ‘emo kid’ representation and considers the 
latent functions it initially served in being applied to visible categories of  adolescent 
subculturalists on the behalf of participants within the wider punk subculture.  Pulling from the 
work of Stanley Cohen in arguing that the ‘emo kid’ representation be conceptualized as a 
subcultural ‘folk-devil’, this thesis argues for the applicability of a Bourdieuian theoretical 
framework in understanding the means in which subcultural ‘authenticity’ is not only distributed 
throughout ‘fields’ of subcultural participation, but within those spheres of communicative 
entertainment media in which subcultural knowledge is created, legitimized and disseminated. In 
offering a Foucaultian genealogy of the niche-mediated ‘emo’ pseudo-genre, and highlighting its 
correlation with concurrent movements perceived as facilitating the mainstream colonization of 
the punk subculture, this thesis argues that the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil was constructed and reified 
by virtue of an array of discursive measures – based largely in online, ‘micro-mediated’ forums - 
through which punk subculturalists vied to marginalize those ‘emo kids’ so perceived as 
threatening the exclusivity of the punk subculture and the long-established ‘symbolic economies’ 
contained therein.  Finally, this thesis demonstrates the process through which this subcultural 
folk-devil was annexed into a wider socio-discourse concerning dangerous youth populations 
and, thus, came to be utilized in collusion with mass-mediated campaigns meant to perpetuate 
the political disempowerment of adolescent populations through the endorsement of 
‘representational politics’.  
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Chapter One: An Introduction 
  
1.1:  A Preamble:  the ‘Emo Reports’ and the Inventory 
 
 In part, this thesis concerns itself with a relatively new manifestation of music and fash-
ion-based youth subculture that has, to date, most notably come to garner recognition (and noto-
riety) as the emo culture.  This emo culture, perceived as being constitutive of ‘emo kids’ and 
alternately regarded as the ‘emo movement’ in some cases, has ostensibly gained gradual popu-
larity with largely Caucasian, middle-class North American adolescent men and women over the 
course of the past seven years.  Like those manifestations of youth subculture with which it is 
most oft associated – most notably the punk and Goth subcultures - the ‘emo culture’ is most 
easily associable with a collective affinity for a certain bloc of contemporary ‘alternative’ musi-
cal styles and a curious sense of fashion that, in this case, appears to pull from a plethora of 
styles once deemed indicative of one’s affiliation with the punk, Goth, new wave, indie-rock, 
glam rock, and ‘hair metal’ subcultures.  Unlike the punk and Goth subcultures, however, the 
‘emo culture’ would not appear to be endowed with anything resembling the ideological dimen-
sions that so imbued the former with a particular world-view that, to some degree, rendered their 
conventions and particularities of dress susceptible to ‘substantive’ interpretation.  In so many 
words, then, the ‘emo culture’ can arguably be characterized as one that is largely based around 
aesthetics (in dress as well as musical taste).   
 While I wish not to contend that the emergence of a subcultural fashion that pulls its sty-
listic particularities from a multiplicity of (sometimes antagonistic and contradictive) sources 
does not potentially speak volumes on the (arguably) postmodern climate of contemporary youth 
(and North American) culture, I must admit, at the very onset of the argument to follow, that the 
‘emo culture’ of which I have just spoken is neither the phenomenon – nor even the subculture – 
of my primary focus. Instead, this thesis concerns itself with the genesis, evolution and rein-
forcement of a derogatory representation of the ‘emo kids’ and their wider culture.  It details the 
emergence of a pejorative stereotype whose authorship I largely trace back to the contemporary 
punk subculture and, more importantly, its largely invisible struggle for the power requisite in 
maintaining its independence from the wider ‘mainstream’ culture.  It argues that the ‘emo kid’ 
representation – and, to be sure, it is this representation which has indelibly shaped the manner 
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in which the emo culture is perceived within the wider social milieu – was initially constructed to 
serve as a punk subcultural ‘folk-devil’; a highly sensationalistic (and stereotypical) representa-
tion meant to condemn the onset of certain practices within (and the migration of certain popula-
tions into) the subcultural field.  For the time being, however, I wish to introduce those readers 
who might be largely unfamiliar with either the ‘emo kid’ or the ‘emo culture’ to our population 
of interest in the very same manner as an untold number of broadcast news audiences had the 
‘emo culture’ introduced to them in early 2007.    
On the evening of February 23rd
And so it was that that population of young subculturalite which had come to be known 
as ‘Emos’, ’Emo kids’, and ‘Emo scene kids’ throughout the threads of any number of music-
based subcultural websites had effectively made their first network television appearance. The 
WDAZ report would, however, be neither their last nor most renowned. A Fox News Los Ange-
les ‘Undercover Report’ airing on the third of May gave investigative reporter Leila Strogoff li-
cense to deduce that, though anyone aged over twenty-five would most likely be rendered com-
pletely ignorant to the pervasiveness of the ‘Emo scene kid’ movement, “the music is embraced 
by millions of kids struggling with deep, intensely personal emotional issues”. ABC Utah’s Reed 
Cowen primed viewers for his report, airing on the 22
, 2007, Grand Forks’ WDAZ TV Evening News fea-
tured a report concerning the emergence of an unnerving trend of self-mutilation among select 
pockets of area youth. Armed with the expertise of Eddy County Sheriffs Department Deputy 
Brandon Maygra and the testimony of two duly informed high school students, journalist Lacey 
Crisp correlated the ostensible wave of embodied teenage depression with a recent youth move-
ment spurred on by “a type of music [that] has warped into a lifestyle” and, in collusion with the 
evils inherent in unsupervised adolescent internet use, had finally come to constitute “a fashion 
turned deadly”. Deputy Maygra described the fashion as being “not what you’d say ‘gothic’, but 
close to it. There’s no boots, there’s no chains, stuff like that - but its all black hair, hair that cov-
ers half your face, that covers one eye…and the point of that is to only see the world in half 
view”. In reporting from ground zero, so to speak, Sophomore Tracey Weber described the prob-
lematic population as “people who are expressing their pain through their actions; whether it be 
cutting, writing lyrics, music…” before adding, “I don’t think we understand it, ‘cause we don’t 
have that pain. We don’t have those imbalances”. Central High School student Chelsey Wentz 
added that she knew “that some of them cut themselves, and that they like to wear tight clothes”.  
nd of the same month, by warning parents 
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that “there are some dangerous elements to this culture psychologists say you need to know 
about - and, we want to warn you that some of what you are about to see is created by teens and 
may be just a little bit disturbing”. A CBS Investigative report, airing two months later on July 
9th
Shared musical taste: Though the WDAZ report traces the genesis of the culture in rela-
tion to “a type of music” and does nothing more, the Fox, ABC, and CBS broadcasts pepper their 
pieces with video and sound clips from bands deduced to be flagship representatives of the Emo 
culture. Fox 11’s Strogoff, who traces the genre’s roots “from early punk rock to Goth to Emo: 
short for emotional hardcore”, describes the music as an “intense” genre which succeeds in “giv-
ing voice to raw teen angst” while a montage of video clips courtesy of such bands as Thursday, 
Underoath, As I Lay Dying, and My Chemical Romance (the only band singled out by name) 
disarmingly segue into one another. Though the ABC report offers little direct commentary on 
the music propelling the movement, My Chemical Romance serve as the soundtrack to a slide-
show of images alternating between images of alleged ‘Emo kids’ and bands such as The Used 
and AFI
, carried a similar, albeit less condescending, disclaimer. Momentarily foregoing any measure 
of critique , we might briefly adopt the position of those to whom such reports were initially de-
signed to cater: those parents, likely oblivious to the presence of the ‘emo culture’ and of the dire 
risks posed to those adolescents participating within it. We might consider each in turn. 
1
Shared trends in fashion: While both Fox and ABC serve to substantiate Deputy May-
gra’s account of the Emo culture’s affinity for black clothing and hair styles meant to obstruct 
half the face (be it through witness testimony or imagery), each assigns themselves the duty of 
delving deeper into the specificities of Emo style. While Strogoff comparatively restrains herself 
in noting that “girls wear huge buckles on their waists, double piercing in their lips, and band 
 - the latter of whom soon later serve to soundtrack a fictionalized depiction of an ado-
lescent engaging in self-mutilation. Rebecca Lindstrom’s CBS 47 report, without question, as-
signs those bands associated with the Emo genre - described to be releasing music “about pain, 
agony, and dying” - the most culpability in delegating who best is to be blamed for the practices 
inherent to Emo culture. An anonymous young woman admits that she believes that “its the mu-
sic, too, that kind of brainwashes [Emo kids], that helps them do that” while the camera focuses 
on the scars criss-crossing her wrists. 
                                                          
1 Granted, it is unlikely that few save ardent music connoisseurs would be able to tell the difference between the 
alleged ‘emo kids’ and the band members themselves. 
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rags in their pockets” while boys typically “wear their band shirts tight and pants even tighter 
[and wear] make-up from powder to eyeliner”, Cowen and Lindstrom eschew any such subtext. 
Cowan bluntly deduces that “gender-bending is also part of the Emo culture. Boys wear girl 
pants and make-up”; Lindstrom ups the ante in claiming that “Emo is often associated with gen-
der-bending…and even drugs”.  
Emotional instability: All three newscasts purport that Emo culture serves to attract 
teenagers vying for an outlet through which to vent what are differentially referred to as “teen 
angst”, “mental imbalances”, and “deep, intensely personal emotional issues”. One clip un-
earthed online and featured on ABC’s broadcast depicts an adolescent exuberantly asking, “what 
am I supposed to do with all these Emotions I have inside?”. Another features a monotone voice, 
in the spirit of a mid 1950s instructional video, which serves to claim that participants must 
“avoid happiness. Happiness is a carnival sin to Emo culture”. In demonstrating that “some [par-
ticipants] take [their emotionality] to extremes”, the Fox piece counters the testimony of a seem-
ingly balanced young woman who attributes the appeal to the music defining the culture to the 
fact that “everyone, at some time, wants to scream out” with a snippet of a web-log in which a 
seemingly unbalanced young woman clad in black morosely asks her audience to consider the 
fact that “birds are dying…birds are dying”. Lindstrom cautions that “most teens who call them-
selves Emo don’t feel like they belong - even if they have other Emo friends” before returning to 
her anonymous informant for confirmation: “because…we’re, like, kind of worthless together”. 
Tendencies toward self-harm: Both WDAZ and ABC primarily concern themselves 
with the fact that Emo culture avidly promotes self-mutilation among its members. The central 
concern of the WDAZ piece is the fact that Emo culture entails a point system “where the more 
depressed you look, the more points you earn”. Crisp uncovers the fact that there is an online 
“Emo-scale” whereby participants “earn a point or two for wearing tight, worn sweaters; more 
points if you cry a lot, and a few more if you cut yourself. And you hit the jackpot if you commit 
suicide” - an act rendered all the simpler by the fact that “you can even buy cutting boards online 
that show you exactly how to cut your wrist”. ABC’s Cowen is also careful to note the “disturb-
ing dynamic” lurking within “the deepest levels of the Emo lifestyle…points for pain”. The re-
port cuts to an image of a youth, subsequently identified as fifteen year-old Ridge Tanner, before 
Cowen deduces that “advanced Emo kids cut themselves. This teen denies being an Emo, but his 
friends say he is one…and the proof is etched on his arms”. Though Crisp is quick to remind 
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concerned viewers that “there’s no prize for gaining all these points; it’s just bragging rights kids 
use on their friends and on their web-blogs”, Cowan subtly attributes the high suicide rate among 
Utah adolescents to the prevalence of Emo culture in referring to self-injury and suicide attempts 
as “Emo pitfalls”. A prologue to the ABC piece reveals that Ridge Tanner went missing several 
days prior to the broadcast of the piece in which he was so prominently featured. “His father is 
very worried about his son,” explains Cowan, “because he says he does exhibit some of the traits 
of Emo that are disturbing to psychologists and parents alike”.  
Risk of external hostilities: Strogoff’s Fox News report renders itself unique in two dis-
tinct ways. First, it resolves to direct its focus less to the dangers that Emo scene kids pose to 
themselves than the dangers posed to them by other groups of youth subculturalites. The threat 
posed by the punk subculture is articulated by a young woman with day-glow pink hair - “we 
would all jump them over there, kick their ass ‘till they start to bleed to death” and seemingly 
accredited by a quick clip of a fervent mosh pit. A representative from the Goth subculture - who 
also serves as the co-creator of an online video series entitled “Goth Assault Squad” wherein 
‘Emo’ kids are tracked down and ‘beaten’ in a slapstick manner meant to parody the reality tele-
vision series Cops - is quoted as claiming that “Emo is kind of like a pansy version of the Goths, 
so in a way its almost our duty to give them a little bit of crap”. “Heavy Metal Rockers” also 
pose a threat, as evidenced by the fact that “The band Vesuvious, from Riverside, gained national 
attention for their anti-Emo festival called ‘Emocide’”. An assumed organizer of the event is 
quoted as saying, “If you are Emo, I wouldn’t show up”. Herb Moyer, creator of the website 
Emo Scene and of the impression that Emo culture is coming to constitute “a social movement, 
so to speak”, substantiates Strogoff’s claim that the ridicule other adolescents have long directed 
toward cultural participants “has even turned to rage [as cited by] calls for violent assault…and 
other efforts to target scene kids” in admitting that “kids have been just constantly harassed 
online…and it has turned into violence”. 
The Fox report is also the one broadcast which does not explicitly profess to be target-
ing a specific audience. WDAZ, ABC, and CBS attribute their inspiration in exposing the darker 
recesses of Emo culture to a dire need to educate parents who might unwittingly be housing at-
risk youth. Cowan’s report aggressively drives this theme home via the inclusion of footage in 
which “Moms Liz and Debbie”, both of whom have teenagers but aren’t at all familiar with the 
term, are urged to call their children. Upon receiving the inventory - “emotional, dramatic, they 
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cut themselves? What else did you say? Black clothes?” - Debbie becomes incensed; “Why 
didn’t I know about it before?”. When an oblivious parent admits that she was “thinking ‘Elmo’” 
when initially faced with Lindstrom’s question, a voice-over condescendingly asks “would Elmo 
sing this?” and transitioning to a clip of a From First To Last video promoting the album Dear 
Diary, My Teen Angst Has A Body Count.2
The manner through which ‘Emo culture’ came to find itself subject to mass media 
problematization was not unique: perceptively threatening manifestations of unorthodox youth 
subculture - most oft centred around shared affinities for a musical style and a correspondingly 
oppositional fashion - have traditionally been subjected to some degree of media stigmatization 
ever since the concept of the ‘teenager’ gained currency as a social category with post-world war 
II Western societies (Savage, 2007).  Subcultural groups such as the Teddy Boys, Mods, and 
Rockers each gained attention (academic and otherwise) by virtue of the fact that they were 
taken to signal the onset of a nihilistic predisposition, born of idleness and boredom, that might 
corrupt all youth as if transmitted virally (Cohen, 2002). Other collectivities, such as the Punk 
and early Hell’s Angels subcultures, were granted condemnation by virtue of their endorsement 
 The lyrics, lest they be misconstrued, run across the 
bottom portion of the screen in subtitle: “Your body will never be found. I’ll wear your skin as a 
suit”. All three reports inevitably recommend that parents intrude upon the lives of their children 
to varying degrees. Lindstrom recommends that parents “tell your kids what you saw on CBS 47 
and ask them how they would define Emo. If they really seem into it, them maybe you should 
ask them more about their music” - a tactic perhaps best facilitated by visiting the affiliate’s 
website where, aside from other “helpful links”, parents can “also find a list of bands often asso-
ciated with Emo”. Crisps’ WDAZ report would seem tailored toward suggesting that concerned 
parents should familiarize themselves with how their children spend their time on the Internet. 
Cowan’s piece urges parents to physically check their children for signs of self-mutilation, which 
kids who cut “often hide…under clothing or bracelets” while “[trying] not to react with fear, al-
though that is the first reaction”. 
 
1.2 In Keeping with Tradition: Media Problematization and Youth Subculture 
 
                                                          
2 A title lifted from a line of dialogue from the 1986 film Heathers; itself arguably meant to parody problematic 
adolescent stereotypical representations. 
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of an ideological radicalism meant, in large part, to stand in opposition to the commonsensicality 
of those value systems that bolstered inequitable class stratifications and facilitated the disem-
powerment of blue-collar, and adolescent, populations (Hebdige, 1979; Thomson, 1995). The 
media pundits and socially conservative moral entrepreneurs of the mid to late 1980s looked to 
the burgeoning Heavy Metal and Rap subcultures as a means of denoting pronounced patterns of 
moral decline amongst young populations: a line of indictment which not only succeeded in ad-
vancing the perception that controversial musical artists were single-handedly responsible for 
rearing a generation of morally corrupt (and potentially dangerous) young men and women 
(Binder, 1993), but re-emerged to successfully condemn the Gothic subcultures which emerged 
with the mid-90s popularity of self-proclaimed ‘Antichrist Superstar’ Marilyn Manson (Goodlad 
and Bibby, 2007; Manson and Strauss, 1998).  
Media narratives concerning the symbolic dangers posed by unorthodox youth cultures 
fell beneath the treads of those concerning the concrete dangers posed by unorthodox youth cul-
tures as the 1990s drew to a close. Initial media reports attempting to deduce what might have 
inspired Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold to orchestrate the Columbine High School massacre in-
stantly implicated Goth culture - and, quite specifically, the influence of Marilyn Manson - even 
though the pair had no verifiable affiliation with the subculture and most likely took their stylis-
tic inspiration - the infamous black trench coats which instantly led to the pair being pegged as 
Goth youths - from the initial Matrix film (Lenson, 2007). Though granted significantly less at-
tention than those attempting to account for the crime, reports pertaining to the fact that adoles-
cent tendencies toward anti-sociality and subcultural affiliation had effectively come to consti-
tute transgressions warranting school expulsion began to emerge shortly thereafter (Goldberg, 
1999). When combined with the concurrent panic surrounding the popularity of Rave culture - 
primarily propelled by reports concerning the rampant use, and potentially lethal effects, of ec-
stasy and other narcotics (Wilson, 2002) - it might have seemed as though the landscape of youth 
culture housed few manifestations that did not render adolescents a viable risk,  be it to them-
selves or others.  
The mediated representation of the Emo scene kid might be said to exhibit many of the 
elements serving to define each distinct era of youth problematization while adding a unique, and 
distinctively modern, dimension of its own. Like the Goth subculture, black clothing, anti-
sociality, and an unhealthy obsession with death are assumed to serve as prerequisites for indoc-
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trination into the culture. Though the adoption of a sexually ambiguous style would also be in 
keeping with Gothic fashion, the aforementioned reports serve to frame such as an ideological 
affront: be it against the tropes of hegemonic gender performances or, like some elements of 
early punk fashion, an attempted offensive against the institution of normalized heterosexuality 
itself (Hebdige, 1979). Like Metal before it, Emo music is alleged to possess such a sway over its 
admirers as to inspire (self-induced) violent tendencies and suicide (Stack, Gundlach, and 
Reeves, 1994). Finally, the contagion narrative made popular among the press and policy offi-
cials of the 1960s finds resurrection and revision: given an ample degree of emotional instability 
and a reasonable degree of unsupervised internet access, ’Emo’ is virtually characterized as 
something that adolescents can catch, but need not leave the comfort of their own homes to do 
so. Indeed, the emergence of the Emo scene kid might be the first opportunity for which the dis-
course surrounding problematic youth populations might so conveniently be merged with that 
concerning the nefarious nature of living in a web-dependent society.  
 
1.3 In Breaking with Tradition: The Problematized Population (publicly) Reacts 
In considering the extent to which each report indirectly problematized the manner in 
which adolescent populations had come to utilize the internet (be it in the process of becoming 
involved in the movement or reacting against it), it is somewhat ironic that the world wide web 
has actively ensured that the greatest audience for these reports has been the very adolescent 
populations with whom they concern themselves. Youtube.com users ‘jarrettm‘ and ‘happytime-
harry’ each posted the WDAZ report to the popular video sharing website, the latter under the 
title “Funniest TV report about Emo ever!”, within the week of its initial broadcast. The similar 
uploading of the remaining three reports each managed to warrant attention from the 
Punknews.org website, a well established underground music news resource. In posting a news 
bulletin entitled “More Emo hysteria, this time from Utah”, the anonymous poster declares that, 
“A local Utah ABC affiliate has assembled the latest in a series of reactionary reports ‘alerting’ 
parents to the dangers of ‘Emo’. Like most stories, it focuses on the perceived fears and ostensi-
bly discusses the "cutting" and suicide undercurrents of the scene”. Replete with a link to the re-
port in question, the poster offers the comment that “The piece relies heavily on Internet reports, 
but also like many of these reports, it doesn't properly distinguish between genuine Emo and 
those making fun of Emo and presents a perfectly surreal account” [grammatical errors in origi-
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nal]. By the time the CBS report surfaced online, the news contributor felt the presence of suffi-
cient precedence to take the liberty of duly prefacing the notification: “since we know how much 
you guys enjoy these, here's another interesting news report which could be described as ‘Emo is 
the devil’”. 
Weeding through the Youtube.com user comments posted in response to each broadcast 
renders it readily clear that that the alleged web-based subcultural artefacts featured in the 
WDAZ, ABC, and CBS reports - the cutting boards, how-to-become-Emo guides, and the Emo-
scale points system - were actually widely renowned efforts meant to parody, ridicule, and an-
tagonize those who might be identified as Emo. “These reporters went to some kind of journal-
ism school, got jobs, and take themselves very seriously”, comments you tube user ‘braniac123’ 
(2007), in responding to the WDAZ report, “Yet they can't distinguish printouts of joke websites 
from actual investigative reporting”. In replying to the video himself, ‘Happytimeharry’ (2007) 
claims that “I just really love how they used every ironic example they could find as ‘actual re-
search’ into this story, particularly the points system (if you attempt suicide, you hit the jack-
pot)”. “Stupid,” writes you tube user ‘Silent Apprentice (2007), in responding to the CBS report. 
“‘your teens may be at risk’[…] they talk like it's a disease worse than HPV (sic)…they're trying 
to control parents to fully control their kids. It's all misleading and downright complete bullshit”. 
Even Newsday contributor Rafer Guzman (2007) devoted a column to the ABC broadcast, which 
he deduced as being a report that “relentlessly tries to strike terror into the hearts of parents, 
painting Emo teens as depressed, out of control and prone to suicide.” Guzman notes that, “the 
whole ‘story’ is an outdated throwback to the early days of punk, when the mass media vilified 
that subculture as a kind of alien germ infecting America's youth. Then as now, the media missed 
the self-mocking humor in the music and among the fans” before keenly noting that the report 
features “several kids [explaining] the dark philosophy of Emo in somber tones [while] clearly 
struggling to keep a straight face.”  
In opening with an ironic word of warning - “Look out, you Emos! The media finally 
heard about you, and they're looking at you like you're the next Columbine killers” - Guzman’s 
column encapsulates the same air of exuberance to be found in the Youtube.com discussion fo-
rums. Many would not only appear to pride themselves on the fact that they had caught the 
broadcast media in the process of attempting to usher in a climate of panic, but so too with their 
participation in facilitating a counter-discourse meant to assassinate its credibility. Quoted at 
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Spin.com (2007), Everybody Hurts: An Essential Guide to Emo Culture co-author Leslie Simon 
even went so far as to suggest that “it seemed like the news team, or the local station, or 'the man' 
had an objective for the story before they even started their research”. 
 
1.4 Representational Politics and Adolescent Disempowerment 
 
Indeed, the inspiration to air reports detailing the emergence of a movement appearing 
to grant young men and women the ability to celebrate the emotional (and mental) imbalances 
purportedly characteristic of modern day adolescence could be correlated to a broader political 
agenda. In concerning himself with the manner in which youths are characterized in popular en-
tertainment media, Giroux (1996) attributes the unsavoury fashion in which adolescent popula-
tions are characterized as “criminal, sexually decadent, drug crazed and illiterate” to incidents of 
“representational politics” vying to “[deny the young ] opportunities for self-definition and po-
litical interaction”. Giroux believes that disseminating representations of the young as “the em-
bodiment of alienation, anger, and potential danger” not only reinforces those discourses sur-
rounding the immaturity intrinsic to adolescence, but justifies the continuation of their political 
disempowerment. In concerning himself with the derogatory nature through which youths are 
characterized in crime reportage, Schissel (2006) has similarly outlined the manner in which the 
continued political disempowerment of the young facilitates the Western economy. As young 
men and women constitute both a plentiful reservoir of potential low-wage service industry 
workers and expendable fodder for militaristic operations, there is a great deal of tactical reason 
behind prohibiting adolescents the rights extended to the adult workforce: without that easily ex-
ploitable resource pool, profits might decline, young men and women might be less inclined to 
resign themselves to military duty, and Western economies would be dealt a considerable blow. 
Côté and Allahar (1994) suggest that the social construction of the emotionally unbalanced ado-
lescent has also facilitated the process whereby the “custodial professions” - such as “teachers, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers” - have rendered the young “‘clients’ to be ser-
viced for an ever-increasing period of time” (1994: 151); a jurisdiction over the normalization of 
adolescence that also facilitates proper “gender conditioning” (1994: 95) and traditional patterns 
of racial stratification. All four authors, to some degree, insinuate that perpetuating the aura of 
potential dangerousness surrounding the adolescent is just one means of reinforcing the notion 
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that the young lack the mental faculties requisite for the rational utilization of political agency; 
and there is no question that the ‘Emo reports’ serve to characterize those adolescents with 
whom they concern themselves as emotionally unhinged, sexually confused, potentially danger-
ous, and undeserving of any measure of political (not even to speak of personal) agency. 
It is equally likely, however, that the reports filed by Crisp, Cowan and Lindstrom serve 
to evidence less the presence of an agenda tailored toward perpetuating the political marginaliza-
tion of adolescent populations than a justifiable naivety on the part of each individual broad-
caster. Though the majority of web artefacts concerned with Emo culture exist for the sole pur-
pose of ridicule, I would posit that this fact might only resonate clearly for those endowed with a 
certain degree of familiarity with how adolescent culture has adapted some of its less congenial 
practices to a web-mediated world. Fox 11’s Strogoff stands as the sole reporter evidencing a 
cognizance that “scene kid culture has been savaged by lampoons… which [are] all over the net” 
and, by extension, architect to the only report devoid of allusions to self-mutilation, a ‘point-
system’, or the potential for an epidemic of teenage suicide. In time, I will argue that Strogoff 
also succeeds in brushing against the source of such parodic artefacts in detailing the fact that 
‘scene kids’ have come to be targeted by adolescent culture and, most specifically, by rival youth 
subculturalites. The nature and severity of such threats might, however, take on an air of sensa-
tionalism for those taking note of the subtle details. The young punk woman testifying her com-
pulsion to beat scene kids “ ‘till they start to bleed to death”, for example, can barely keep a 
straight face as her cohort break into laughter as she delivers each threat, and the mastermind be-
hind the Goth Assault Squad video clips sounds less like a viable threat than a slightly disgrun-
tled older sibling in testifying to the fact that he feels it his “duty to give [the Emo kids] a little 
bit of crap”. 
Should we peel away the blatantly inaccurate characteristics included in the inventory 
provided by the mediated representation of the ‘emo kid’, the only traits remaining are, once 
again, a shared taste in an identifiable genre of music and the shared adoption of a discernable 
fashion of dress. While it will be shown that it is difficult to bring the existence of an ‘Emo style’ 
into question, there would appear to be a great deal of debate - internal to those producing and 
supporting those bands having effectively been invoked as flagship representatives to the genre - 
as to whether they warrant being affiliated with the genre. The majority of the Youtube.com user 
posts responding to the ABC and CBS reports consist of irate tirades concerning how each 
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broadcaster grossly erred in the choice of bands they opted to affiliate with the movement. With 
the publication of Nothing Feels Good: Punk Rock, Teenagers, and Emo (2007) - a work which 
will later be granted a significant amount of attention - Spin contributor Andy Greenwald spoke 
to the impossibility of finding any groups willing to endorse the term as a means of describing 
their music. To date, figures ranging from Guy Piccioto of the band Rites of Spring (the very 
band alleged to inspire the term’s creation in the mid-1980s) to Gerard Way of My Chemical 
Romance have vehemently denied that justifiable grounds on which to affiliate their music with 
the genre exist (Prindle, 2003; Sowerby, 2007). If Fox 11’s Strogoff is correct in claiming that 
“[Emo] music is embraced by millions of kids”, the determination that the likes of Piccioto and 
Way exude in attempting to disassociate themselves with the genre would appear curious.  
 
1.5 Emo: Toward a Genealogical Analysis  
 
When subjected to a superficial analysis, the emergence of the Emo culture might ap-
pear a most unusual social phenomenon. Both the term and the inferred youth culture are subject 
to more satire than substantiation, renounced by those most widely renowned as its progenitors, 
and seemingly rarely used in processes attuned to self-declaration. Indeed, ‘Emo’ would seem 
less a descriptor reflexively adopted by a burgeoning youth subculture than a pejorative designa-
tion levelled against groups endowed with particularistic tastes in music and fashion. The ‘emo 
kid’ representation itself would seem less meant to denote the characteristics endorsed by an au-
thentic breed of youth subculturalite than to stereotypically affiliate those who might participate 
within the culture with acute over-emotionality and tendencies toward self-harm. Though the 
‘emo reports’ succeeded in introducing this sensationalistic representation to wider audiences, 
they cannot be attributed authorship over its construction, for the ammunition utilized in stigma-
tizing, problematizing, and condemning any adolescent who might be prone to wearing black 
and listening to angry music was not exclusively created within the parameters of such reports: it 
was merely annexed directly from a discourse long promulgating within those public spheres and 
cultural spaces commandeered by adolescent populations. Should we attribute the broadcast of 
these reports to a fresh manifestation of representational politics against the young, it would 
serve diligence to demonstrate that such reports also constitute a symptom to a preceding rash of 
representational politics - in this instance, levelled against a perceived manifestation of youth 
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subculture, and as enacted by a longstanding manifestations of youth subculture. The over-
arching question at hand, then, would rest with not only determining who orchestrated such an 
affront, but what goals they vied to achieve in doing so. 
The following body of research thus constitutes an attempt to subject the term emo - 
and, by extension, the emergence of the corresponding culture - to a genealogical account high-
lighting the actors, power dynamics, and representational tactics attributable to the emergence of 
what might effectively be regarded, on one hand, an orchestrated trend in popular music and 
youth fashion and, on the other, a subcultural ‘folk-devil’. Through invoking, adapting, and 
aligning the theoretical concepts as presented and popularized by the likes of Pierre Bourdieu 
(2007; 1999; 1993; 1984), Michel Foucault (1995; 1990; 1980), Sarah Thornton (1996) and 
Stanley Cohen (2002), I will demonstrate that the ‘emo kid’ representation can be conceptualized 
as a ‘folk devil’ whose representational construction primarily came to be facilitated by two con-
current subcultural initiatives: the first being the manner through which the term ‘emo’ was 
granted pejorative connotations in a concerted attempt to sustain the integrity of the ‘field’ of 
punk subcultural participation; the second relating to the process through which fields exterior to 
such subcultures hijacked the term ‘emo’ and, concurrently, the perceived authority to grant it 
legitimate constitution. In essence, I propose to demonstrate how the process through which the 
term ‘emo’ came to be annexed into the discourse of the mainstream music media inspired the 
creation of a representation meant to prohibit the mainstream colonization (and commodifica-
tion) of the subcultural ‘underground’ while, simultaneously, denying those attracted to the sub-
cultural milieu under the auspices of emo’s mainstream appeal the ability to extract status within 
(and thus potentially alter the structure of) the field of subcultural participation.  
Chapter two will concern itself with illustrating the manner in which the concept of the 
representational ‘folk-devil’will be used in a unique manner meant to draw attention to those 
processes through which contemporary youth subcultures arguably impose participatory nor-
malization and, concurrently, subcultural perpetuation. This line of reasoning will also demand 
that the theoretical debates regarding the proper conceptualization of subculture, as attended to 
by critical neo-Marxist structuralists and postmodernist commentators, be granted due considera-
tion. I will, however, inevitably posit that the adoption of a ‘middle-range’ Bourdieuian frame-
work - meant to characterize pockets of subcultural participation as ‘fields’ and those within 
them as actors pursuing the accumulation of various types of ‘capital’ - might not only best stand 
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to account for the phenomena of interest, but facilitate something of a synthesis between the pri-
mary tenets of the structuralist and postmodernist theoretical orientations.  
 In arguing for the utility of a Foucaultian genealogical framework in regarding the emer-
gence of the subcultural ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representation, chapter three will briefly highlight 
Foucault’s postulations regarding the interrelationship between the creation of knowledge, the 
conduction of power, and how each contributes to processes through which individuals come to 
be granted constitution as ‘subjects’ to a body of knowledge - or ‘truth’ – tailored toward ensur-
ing dispositional homogeneity or ‘normalization’.  In describing how discourse serves as the 
conduit through which knowledge and power come to accumulate their ‘force’, I will briefly ex-
plicate the principle tenets of the discourse and content analysis which this thesis will utilize in 
aspiring to substantiate its primary arguments.  Furthermore, and against the backdrop of the 
Foucaultian theoretical framework, chapter three will concern itself with those postulations, as 
advanced by the likes of Thornton and Bourdieu, regarding the manner through which the crea-
tion of knowledge, and thus the dissemination of power, suffices in not only structuring those 
‘fields’ dedicated to processes of cultural knowledge production, but shaping those fields of cul-
tural consumption so dependent on the knowledge produced therein.  In essence, the chapter will 
provide the context against which I will argue that the phenomena of our current concern consti-
tutes an instance in which that body of knowledge constructed within the field of cultural pro-
duction was deduced to pose a danger to the sanctity of those conventions having long guided the 
field of subcultural participation.   
Chapter four will work toward better contextualizing the applicability of this framework 
in providing brief overviews of the genesis of the term ‘emo’, the histories of Alternative Press 
Magazine and the Punknews.org website (the niche-mediated and micro-mediated sites of cul-
tural knowledge production on which I will extend primary focus), and past occasions that can be 
taken to support the postulation that the punk subculture is a ‘field’ in which participants strive to 
construct ‘authentic’ identities in correspondence with longstanding conventions meant, in large 
part, to facilitate its exclusivity.  This chapter will demonstrate that, following its initial inception 
into the lexicon of subculturalist discourse, the term ‘emo’ functioned as a means of not only de-
noting subcultural ‘inauthenticity’, but constituted part of a larger initiative whereby the Wash-
ington ‘hardcore’ scene might prohibit the emergence of new practices through which ‘subcul-
tural capital’ might be recognized and disseminated.  It will utilize the testimony of Alternative 
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Press magazine founder Mike Shea in arguing for the applicability of a Bourdieuian framework 
in conceptualizing the field of cultural knowledge production as a field of struggle in which the 
creation of ‘legitimate’ knowledge, and competitively striving for acclaim as ‘authentic’ knowl-
edge sources, are paramount.  It will demonstrate the manner wherein the punk subculture re-
acted to processes whereby the punk musical genre threatened to become ‘the next big thing’ by 
establishing discursive strategies through which the subcultural ‘authenticity’ of choice subcul-
tural producers – and those they had duly attracted to the subcultural field – could be criticized 
and revoked.  Finally, it will describe the process through which Alternative Press magazine ef-
fectively moved toward committing ‘heresy’ within the field of niche-mediated cultural produc-
tion in constructing the perception of a burgeoning ‘emo’ pseudo-genre and detail a portion of 
the subcultural artist in which they effectively ‘invested’ their attention in the process.  
The fifth chapter will concern itself with analyzing those texts through which an eclectic 
collection of communications media publications – including TIME and Seventeen magazine – 
worked toward constructing the perception of a burgeoning ‘emo culture’ in extending an osten-
sible ‘body of knowledge’ on a proclaimed to be emergent youth ‘movement’.  So, too, will it 
analyze that subcultural discourse that effectively arose in reaction to these articles; discourse 
that initially arose in an effort to criticize the notion of a substantive ‘emo’ pseudo-genre, but 
subsequently evolved into a ‘body of knowledge’ sufficing to identify and stereotypically prob-
lematize those populations that might be attracted to the subcultural field by virtue of each arti-
cle’s dissemination.  The chapter will then dedicate a substantial amount of attention to Spin 
Magazine alumni Andy Greenwald’s (2003) Nothing Feels Good; a book that I argue strives not 
only to assert itself as the authoritative text on the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre, but so too aspires to self-
actualize, and thus effectively inspire the objective emergence of, an adolescent ‘emo kid’ cul-
ture.  The chapter will conclude in briefly considering the prospect that this trio of texts worked 
toward reinstating the ‘emo’ term’s subcultural utilization as a derogatory signifier and, by ex-
tension, inspired Alternative Press magazine to utilize such as a derisive term in an effort to 
maintain its status as a legitimate resource for subcultural knowledge.  
Chapter six will chart the process wherein the ‘multiplicity of crises’ that sufficed in en-
dangering the subcultural field following Alternative Press’ ‘heretical’ shift in coverage.  I will 
argue that these crises include the corporate ‘colonization’ of the subcultural field, patterns of 
‘heretical’ practice amongst once revered artistic producers, and the popularization of new trends 
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in aestheticism, and demonstrate how they inspired the creation of a subcultural discourse striv-
ing to condemn those artistic producers so propelling such forces and, by extension, those sub-
cultural ‘other’ populations so extending said artists their fanaticism.  The chapter will demon-
strate that, though these emergent trends in ‘heretical’ subcultural practice were initially granted 
derogatory representation by alternative means, the subcultural ‘body of knowledge’ developed 
as a means of problematizing these trends effectively merged with that ‘body of knowledge’ pre-
viously developed in problematizing a stereotypical representation of the ‘emo kid’.  Finally, the 
chapter will note the process wherein this ‘emo kid’ representation began to be granted sensa-
tionalistic depiction in a range of cultural products and, inevitably, a number of web-based mi-
cro-mediated parodies so sufficing in attributing the representation those additional derogatory 
characteristics, including ‘abnormal’ sexual proclivities and tendencies toward self-mutilation, 
that the ‘emo reports’ would subsequently focus upon whilst annexing the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil 
into the mass-mediated discourse on ‘dangerous’ adolescent populations.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Chapter Two: Toward Conceptualizing the Subcultural Folk-Devil 
 
2.1 Current Debates Regarding Subculture and the Utility of a Bourdieuian Framework 
 
This thesis contends that the mediated ‘emo kid’ representation found inspiration less 
from the presence of a substantive manifestation of youth subculture than the emergence of a 
subcultural ‘folk devil’.  The concept of ‘folk-devil’ is associated with the work of Stanley 
Cohen, who was concerned especially to explore how youth culture was interpreted and distorted 
by media and other authoritative voices.  Though popularized with the publication of Cohen’s 
land-mark Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (2002a), the 
subsequent range of applicability granted to the concept of the ‘moral panic’ has arguably begat 
a process through which the works marquis terms have come to be deemed interchangeable. In 
decoupling the ‘folk devil’ from the ‘moral panic’ in a manner meant to dispel the notion that the 
latter is necessitated for the emerge of the former, we might subsequently critique the implicit 
notion that representational folk-devils might only be crafted and utilized by a society’s ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ and, furthermore, only invoked in the interest of facilitating large-scale socio-
legal alterations.  
In deriving due inspiration from Becker’s (1963) labelling theory and a body of social 
constructivist literature suggesting that deviance does not exist beyond the bounds of collective 
social perception, Cohen aspired to illustrate one of the processes through which, firstly, certain 
populations come to be perceived as problematic and, furthermore, the means through which so-
cietal reactions to such populations might inspire changes in the manner in which deviance is 
defined and dealt with. Through crediting the mass media, politicians, and other authoritative 
figures with the ability to convince wider publics of the presence of dangers by disseminating 
“stylized and stereotypical” media depictions in chorus with the “diagnoses and solutions” of-
fered by “socially accredited experts” (2002a:1), Cohen served to demonstrate how ‘folk devils’ 
might arise should empowered interest groups with the requisite means to do so choose to target 
subservient groups through attributing them with unsavoury - and, indeed, potentially fictitious - 
characteristics. As Schissel (2006) notes that folk-devils are necessarily “identified by associa-
tion with a particular, visible social category” and “imbued with stereotypical characteristics that 
set them apart from so-called normal, law-abiding society” (2006:53), it follows that a “condi-
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tion” (Cohen, 2002:1) of ‘moral panic’ might arise should those characterizations successfully 
seep into the public conscience. Moral panic is, in essence, a phenomena prone to arise when the 
wider social arena perceives of, first, the presence of a dire problem and, furthermore, a readily 
identifiable representative population to whom the threat can be attributed and, thus, mobilized 
against.  
It would seem to me, however, as if Cohen’s original framework concerned itself with 
two separate processes - the formation of the threat to be perceived (the folk-devil) and the wider 
reactions to the perception of the threat (the moral panic) - which might subsequently function to 
reinforce each other once the latter condition has found initiation. In my opinion, a stern adher-
ence to the orthodox assumption that “folk devils are constructed in the context of moral panics” 
(Schissel, 2006:53) has limited the potential applicability of the concept. Though St Cyr (2003) 
offers a very rich definition of the ‘folk-devil’ in claiming such to be a “personification of evil, 
characterized through a totality of negative attributes” which, once having been “identified and 
named through the creation of a moral panic…becomes a direct reminder of what we should not 
be” (2003: 29), even she fails to disassociate the representational spectre from the phenomena 
their perceived presence is assumed to instigate. For the purpose of this paper, I would indeed 
wish to conceptualize the folk-devil as a representation composed of ‘a totality of negative at-
tributes’ that is meant to serve as a ‘direct reminder of what one should not be’. I would not, 
however, wish to argue that this particular representation was initially constructed in tandem 
with a wider condition of moral panic or, indeed, initially meant to inspire a widespread condi-
tion of moral panic. In lieu of such, I will argue that the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil warrants specifica-
tion as being a subcultural folk-devil - a representational construct whose authorship rests with 
those participating within the spheres of youth subcultural participation – that was effectively 
annexed into that wider program of representational politics so designed to reinforce the political 
disempowerment of adolescent populations.  To be clear, though the ‘emo kid’ representational 
folk-devil has always been tailored toward facilitating the disempowerment of targeted popula-
tions, its function within the subcultural context largely rest with ensuring processes of symbolic 
disempowerment bordering on representational degradation.  The fact that it was so easily 
usurped and used by the moral entrepreneurial American broadcast media in what I perceive to 
be an effort to further foster the substantive disempowerment of all perceived-to-be non-
conventional youth cultures is, to some extent, ironic.  
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Though I have surely not yet suitably justified my endorsement of the concept of the 
‘folk-devil’ for the purposes of the initiative at hand at this time (I will return to this matter 
shortly), I now wish to divert my attention to considering my utilization of another controversial 
term: that of ‘subculture’. As the designation and the manner in which it might best be utilized as 
an analytical concept has become a subject of great debate amongst contrasting sociological dis-
positions, it would appear necessary to consider the long-standing debates between, on one hand, 
those choosing to conceptualize youth subcultures as collectivities meant to inspire “resistance 
against hegemony” and, on the other, groups engaged in “a form of delimited role-playing” that 
merely prove “resistant in ways linked to individual pleasure in transgression rather than in mate-
rialist political terms” (Nogic and Riley, 2007:318). I would thus wish to briefly highlight the 
theoretical positions advanced by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS) and note how those tenets have come under fire by post-subcultural and ‘lifestyle’ theo-
rists for the sake of advancing a postmodernist re-conceptualization of subculture. I will then 
demonstrate the manner through which adopting a Bourdieuian (1993; 1984) framework might 
serve to credit elements derived from each orientation - thus lending credence to those calling for 
some degree of synthesis between the critical neo-Marxian and postmodernist narratives on 
youth subculture (Nogic and Riley, 2007; Greener and Hollands, 2006; Schildrick and Mac-
Donald, 2006; Hesmondhalgh, 2005). Finally, I will return to my justification for endorsing a 
slightly modified version of the ‘folk-devil’ concept. 
 
2.2 The CCCS on Subculture: Collective Reactions to Social Conditions 
 
In taking the phenomena of the music and fashion-based youth subcultures that arose in 
the wake of England’s post-war climate as their objects of study, the Birmingham Centre and its 
affiliates merged the tenets of structural neo-Marxism with the traditions of choice Chicago 
School theorists (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1996; Thrasher, 1963) in deducing that subcultural 
movements find their genesis, first and foremost, by virtue of a shared sense of class-correlative 
social under-privilege. Birmingham theorists such as Hall and Jefferson (1976), Willis (1981), P. 
Cohen (1972) and Hebdige (1979) characterized such subcultural manifestations as the Teddy 
Boys, Mods, Rockers, Skinheads, and Punks as groups engaged in a collective reaction to an 
emergent social climate that promised only to fortify their disempowerment. By their account, 
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working and lower-class youth were given the sense that their foreseeable futures would either 
be plagued by inescapable poverty or soul-crushing manual labour - granted, of course, that the 
cold war did not make good on its looming promise of inevitable nuclear escalation. It was this 
heady brew of omnipotent social tensions, by all accounts, that inspired the formation of youth 
cultures meant to signal an opposition to these wider trends and the longstanding institutions that 
facilitated their persistence. The Birmingham theorists, then, interpreted subcultural participation 
as a channel through which adolescents and young adults could voice collective protest against 
those phenomena perceived to threaten them through the few means available to them: the use of 
leisure time, interpersonal affiliation, consumption patterns and, perhaps most importantly, the 
use of fashion.  
In taking equal inspiration for the semiological Marxism of Barthes (1986) and Gram-
sci’s (2004) concept of hegemony, Hebdige (1979) looked to youth subcultural fashion as a form 
of critical dialogue with the wider culture. “Style in subculture”, he wrote, “is pregnant with sig-
nificance. Its transformations go ‘against nature’, interrupting the process of ‘normalization’… 
[and can be interpreted as] movements towards a speech which offends the ‘silent majority’, 
which challenges the principles of unity and cohesion, which contradicts the myth of consensus” 
(1986: 18). Thus, according to Hebdige, subcultural style was inspired by much more than 
shared tastes in fashion, and every instance of subcultural ‘bricolage’ professed the potentially 
decipherable ideological undertones propelling the subcultural manifestations to coalesce and 
persist. Thus, the fashions appropriated by the Teddy Boys (Jefferson, 2006) and the Skinheads 
(Clarke, 2006; Cohen, 1972) were interpreted as speaking to the presence of a socially conserva-
tive ideology that speaks out against those social dynamics serving to threaten Western cultural 
austerity or, at a more micro-socio level, the ethnic solidarity of traditional working-class 
neighbourhoods. The aesthetics adopted by the Mods and the Punks (Hebdige, 2006a, 1979), on 
the other hand, signal an ideological dissatisfaction with the ills born of Western capitalism, the 
socially conservative lifestyle conventions expected of post-adolescent populations, and - indeed 
- those initiatives tailored toward rearing a generation of subservient youth whose ‘normality’ 
might render them suitable fodder for the dehumanization of the labour market. The Teddy 
Boys’ appropriation of the ‘zoot suit’, the Skinhead’s affinity for the work boot, and the Punk’s 
misuse of the safety pin were all taken as examples whereby “humble objects…[came to be] sto-
len by subordinate groups and made to carry ‘secret’ meanings: meanings which express, in 
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code, a form of resistance to the order which guarantees their continued subordination” (Heb-
dige, 1979: 18). 
Though unquestionably overshadowed by the attention granted to the potential signifi-
cance of subcultural style, the Birmingham theorists also - albeit often implicitly - concerned 
themselves with the means through which subcultural participation might impact one’s sense of 
personal identity. Suffice to say, Althusser’s (2004) proposition concerning the manner through 
which ideology “interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (2004: 320) - with 
‘interpellation’ meant to denote how ideology serves to supply the means through which indi-
viduals come to develop self-actualization - cast a considerable shadow over the work of the 
Birmingham theorists. Clark, Hall, Jefferson, and Roberts (2006) thus suggested that subcultural 
studies might be best suited toward analyzing the processes “by which individual identities and 
life-histories” (or ‘biographies’) are “constructed out of collective experience”. (2006: 45). More 
specifically, they suggested that the most prominent point of theoretical interest should rest with 
studying the processes through which an individuals’ development of personal identity is influ-
enced by “the set of socially organized positions and experiences of class in relation to the major 
institutions and structures [and] the range of socially organized and patterned responses to the 
social and material conditions” (2006: 44).  This  might even suggest that the Birmingham Cen-
tre’s primary interest lay with charting the emergence of pockets of collective identities - which 
could neither “be conceived as wholly individual or free-floating” (2006: 45) - born of counter-
hegemonic ideological forces. Subcultures could be said to serve as the expression of subversive 
ideologies given rise by similarly marginalized groups of youth who, in turn, came to find them-
selves subjectified by those ideologies. As those ideologies would subsist at the very core of the 
so-indoctrinated subculturalite, the constitution of their very identities might cater to a form of 
resistance that, though signalled to others through self-presentation, was actually put into prac-
tice by the sheer fact of the participants’ ideological allegiance.  
It is of distinct note that the Birmingham theorists ultimately declared youth subcultures 
incapable of establishing anything resembling substantive social betterment. Such was attributed, 
by and large, to the fact that youth subcultural resistance strategies too seldom transgressed the 
realm of a symbolic subversion that manifested in little practical action beyond open feuding be-
tween rival groups (Cohen, 1978); initiatives, in other words, that were all too easily perceived as 
gang warfare, and unlikely to serves as a constructive means of challenging the status quo 
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(Cohen, 2002b). Willis (1978) advanced a dour forecast in deducing that the seeds of any subcul-
ture’s defeat were planted by its members themselves; for what did adopting the anti-
intellectualist values popularized by most subcultures result in, besides serving to unwittingly 
coax the devout into securing their own status as inevitable fodder for an exploitative labour 
market? As subcultural resistance strategies would likely never breach the realm of mere sym-
bolism, and as the Birmingham theorists were resigned to “[oscillating] between dystopian de-
spair at the limitation of subcultures and celebration of their all too tenuous achievements” 
(Kahn-Harris, 2004: 96), a near decade of sociological enquiry might be said to have deduced 
that none amongst the plethora of youth subcultures to have emerged had held any substantive 
hope of challenging the wider social processes serving to maintain their current predicaments. 
Beside criticisms centring around the Birmingham Centre’s lack of interest in factoring 
the personal narratives of subcultural participants into their theoretical accounts (Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt, 1995) and lack of appreciation for the ‘true’ genesis of some subcultural styles 
(Cohen, 2002b), the propositions extended by the CCCS have come to draw distinct criticisms 
from a vocal block of self-professed postmodernist theorists. Redhead, in famously deducing that 
“subcultures were produced by subcultural theorists, not the other way around” (1990: 25), 
would appear to have meant to extend an insinuation accusing those critical theorists of allowing 
their own wish for the emergence of counter-hegemonic groups to taint their academic objectiv-
ity. Muggleton (2000), a former affiliate with the punk subculture, partially cites his own oblivi-
ousness to the dialogue that his sense of fashion was purported to contribute to as grounds on 
which to debunk Hebdige’s notion of ideologically inspired style-based subcultural semiotics. 
Bennett (1999) chastises the Birmingham theorists for denying the fact that such forms of ‘resis-
tance’ functioned to facilitate an economy of “mass-produced consumer items, such as popular 
music and visual style” (1999: 601) which had just set about targeting youth populations with a 
requisite degree of disposable income. According to Bennett, the notion that one’s style reflected 
one’s allegiance to their class positioning, as opposed to a newfound freedom to express oneself 
with a wide range of novel consumer products, is ludicrous. As the process of bringing the notion 
that subcultural style was used as a means of signalling the presence of a collectively adhered-to 
ideology into question ultimately brought the commonsensicality of the presence of any such 
ideology into question, key figures within the sociological landscape deduced that the subcultural 
theory of the Birmingham theorists need be retired for the sake of forging a body of speculation 
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better meant to reflect the modern use of subcultural style and, indeed, the significance that con-
temporary subcultural participants attribute to the concept of ’subculture’ itself. It is to these 
‘post-subcultural’ theories that we now turn.  
 
2.3 ‘Post-Subcultural’ Theories: Postmodern Societies and the Fluidity of Identity  
In pulling the bulk of their epistemological backdrop from the theoretical propositions 
advanced by Lyotard (1984), Baudrillard (1983) and Jameson (1991), postmodernist subcultural 
theorists presume that western societies have undergone concurrent processes whereby a collapse 
of faith in the ‘grand narratives’ of enlightenment thought, the onset of a post-industrial economy 
centred around the manufacture of signs, and a movement through which culture has become no 
more than a haven for ‘simulations’ have brought the notions of truth and reality into dire ques-
tion. The resulting post-modern subject, unable to utilize any certainty in attempting to grasp an 
understanding of themselves and the world around them, must resort to the consumption of cul-
tural signifiers as a means of attempting to achieve self-definition and some sense of solidity. 
Such cultural signifiers, though meant to produce the collective representations on which social 
solidarity depends, have been divorced of their genial significance and rendered superficial, dif-
ficult to decode, and open to interpretation. The post-modern individual, in a sense, suffers a dis-
orientation brought on by virtue of being forced to negotiate a scenario wherein the plethora of 
symbols with which the subject is to ‘make sense’ of the world around them are hollow, inde-
terminate, and easily interchangeable, thus rendering it improbable that tangible identities can be 
negotiated. It thus goes without saying that the Birmingham Centre’s deduction that youth sub-
culture functions to allow that discontent be voiced within the symbolic universe of shared mean-
ings would be deemed inapplicable in the modern context: no such symbolic universe of shared 
meanings is any longer believed to exist. 
 In arguing that modern youth subcultures are constituted less by participants endowed 
with a collectivist mind-set than individualists evidencing distinct post-modern ‘sensibilities’, 
Muggleton (2000) deduces that “subcultures are manifestations of self-expression, individual 
autonomy and cultural diversity…[entailing] a postmodern (or liminal) working-class subcultural 
sensibility [that] can be traced back at least to the beginning of the 1960s” (2000: 167). In lieu of 
conceptualizing subcultural style as a means of resisting hegemonic indoctrination or lashing out 
against the oppressive conventions of the parent culture, Muggleton channels Baudrillard (1983) 
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in reinterpreting such as celebrations of cultural inauthenticity; processes whereby subculturalites 
“revel in this simulation culture…by inscribing visual signs upon their bodies [that refuse] mean-
ing in the name of the spectacle” (2000: 46). As “subcultural styles have become simulacra, cop-
ies with no originals” (2000: 46), Muggleton argues that the subcultures constitute spheres of 
‘hyperreality’ wherein signifiers are endorsed (or ‘reproduced’) in a manner which not only dis-
solves their allegiance to that originally signified, but an allegiance to any shared conception of a 
concrete representation of an over-arching ‘reality’. Subcultural style, in Muggleton’s view, not 
only says nothing; it contributes to those very processes through which nothing can be intelligi-
bly said. Paired with empirical interviews with subcultural participants professing a proclivity to 
affiliate themselves with whatever subculture best coincides with their personal evolution, Mug-
gleton deduces that subcultural identities entail a considerable fluidity demanding that the con-
cept of a cohesive subcultural dialogue with the wider society be brought into question. In lieu of 
propping up the CCCS conception of the ideologically entrenched subculturalist, Muggleton 
characterizes (post)modern subculturalites as “post-subculturalists” who “do not have to worry 
about contradictions between their selected subcultural identities, for there are no rules, there is 
no authenticity, no ideological commitment, merely a stylistic game to be played” (2000: 47). 
 Rather than revise and amend the established orthodoxy regarding the sociological sig-
nificance of subcultural manifestations, the bulk of the postmodernist theory regarding youth 
subcultures serves to suggest that the very concept of ‘subculture’ - and the theoretical baggage 
the term entails - be abandoned outright.  Chaney (2004, 1996) points to wider cultural processes 
in suggesting that ‘subculture’ has become a redundant notion. In denoting a progression by 
which the arena of mass culture, once constitutive of a relatively limited number of channels 
through which adherents might cull the information requisite in conceptualizing themselves and 
the world around them, has “fragmented [and now presents] a plurality of lifestyle sensibilities 
and preferences” (2004:47), Chaney argues that there is presently no discernable dominant cul-
ture against which subcultures might form in the interest of rebelling against. With due attention 
paid to dispelling the Birmingham Centre’s tent-pole assumption that the adoption of unorthodox 
lifestyles serve as a means of negotiating one’s unsavoury class positioning, Chaney interprets 
the present absence of any notion of a ‘normalized’ cultural identity - or, for that matter, the im-
pression that the adoption of unorthodox lifestyle choices would no longer appear class-specific - 
as grounds on which to deduce that subcultural manifestations should “be regarded as collective 
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lifestyle statements, which reflexively negotiate rather than directly mirror the structural experi-
ence of social class” (2004:42). In likewise regarding youth subcultures as “prime examples of 
the unstable and shifting cultural affiliations which characterize late modern consumer-based so-
cieties” (1999:605), Bennett (1999) argues that a variation of Maffesoli’s (1996) concept of the 
‘tribe’ might be better applied in concerning more recent incidents of subcultural emergence. 
Though tribes, like subcultures, find denotation in similar styles of dress, taste, and leisure hab-
its, they are also taken to “illustrate the shifting nature of collective associations between indi-
viduals as societies become increasingly consumer orientated” (Bennett, 1999: 606). In lieu of 
conceptualizing such group formations as entities endowed with any degree of ideological con-
tent or permanence, Bennett proposes that adherents quite simply be regarded as reflexive agents 
having engaged in a lifestyle choice; the term ‘lifestyle’ here being utilized to denote “the sensi-
bilities employed by the individual in choosing certain commodities and patterns of consumption 
and in articulating these cultural resources as modes of personal expression” (1999: 607). In at-
tempting to introduce the term ‘neo-tribe’ into discussions concerning manifestations of assumed 
group collectivity, Bennett characterizes the ‘neo-tribal’ participant as one whose affinity for 
constantly “moving between different sites of collective expression” - an affinity which is, itself, 
an outcome of the “temporal nature of collective identities” (1999: 606) in a postmodernist con-
sumption-based society - renders their corresponding tribes superficial conglomerations of transi-
tory adherents who effectively affiliate themselves with the group until opportunity for the next 
transition reveals itself. A variety of terms - ranging from ‘scene’ (Straw, 1991) to ‘genre’ (Hes-
mondhalgh, 2005) to ‘bunde’ (Hetherington, 1998) - have additionally been proposed as re-
placements suitably fit to highlight the fluid nature of modern identity-based collectivities.  
Post-subcultural theories have, quite predictably, drawn the ire of critics possessed of 
the opinion that such lines of inquiry have proven themselves too eager in debunking the primary 
tenets of the CCCS canon. Blackman (2005) claims that post-subcultural theories suffer a dire 
lack of critical self-reflection; thus allowing them leeway in ignoring “the collective basis to sub-
cultural practice and performance” while rendering themselves incapable of noting how the 
spaces which subcultures inhabit are “structured by capital as a universalistic form of exploita-
tion” (2005: 15). Shildrick and MacDonald (2006) take issue with the fact that post-subcultural 
studies neglect to concern themselves with issues pertaining to class stratification and social in-
equities, noting that “once one accepts that, for some young people at least, social divisions still 
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shape youth cultural identities, the postmodern tendency to celebrate the fragmented, fleeting and 
free-floating nature of contemporary youth culture becomes difficult to sustain” (2006: 126). 
Hollands (2002) and Carrington and Wilson (2004) each censure the tendency for postmodernist 
frameworks to deny the political dimensions of modern youth subcultures in a brash attempt to 
completely negate the structuralist propositions advanced by the CCCS - with the former going 
so far as to claim that “postmodernists do not appear to find inequalities or stratified youth cul-
tures partly because they are not looking for them” (2002: 158). Hodkinson (2004, 2002), quite 
simply takes issue with the orientations’ disinterest in concerning itself with subcultural manifes-
tations (such as the Goth movement) that do not conform to post-subcultural expectations con-
cerning fluidity, superficiality, and transience. Though willing to concur that such postmodernist 
theories are prone to advance valid points in concerning some of the elements of modern-day 
subcultural manifestations in some cases,3
Admittedly, any initiative meant to synthesize the macro-theoretical propositions ad-
vanced by the CCCS and the micro-sociological analysis developed by the postmodernist theo-
rists would indubitably prove destined to fail if, first, every proposition forged by each orienta-
tion (often at dire odds with each other) were uncritically compiled and, secondly, any such syn-
thesized framework was assumed applicable to every manifestation of subculture. Suffice it to 
say, and as I will attempt to demonstrate as this project unfurls, I argue that the subculture with 
which this project will primarily concern itself - the punk subculture - can be acknowledged as 
possessing an ideological dimension entailing an allegiance to initiatives of counter-hegemonic 
resistance and a plethora of strategies through which participants - individually or collectively - 
might engage with them. I also argue for the possibility, however, that a considerable portion of 
those who might be conforming to the surface-level lifestyle traits of the subculture possess the 
 the over-arching criticism rests with the apparent lack 
of any attempt, on the part of the post-subcultural apologists, to credit those elements of the Bir-
mingham Centre’s analyses that might still prove pertinent.  
                                                          
3 It is perhaps of note that Hodkinson – quite accurately, in my opinion – conceives of a continuum of subcultural 
manifestations embodying differing degrees of what he deems to be ‘substance’.  In deducing that subcultural sub-
stance might be assessed through taking note of any “consistent distinctiveness in group values and taste, a strong 
sense of shared identity, practical commitment among participants, and a significant degree of autonomy in the 
facilitation and operation of the group” (2004: 141-42, italics in original), Hodkinson essentially means to argue 
against uncritically taking postmodernist assessments of largely substance-deprived subcultures – including the 
dance and rave subcultures with which Bennett and Miles (2001, 1995) primarily concern themselves – as being 
applicable to those subcultural entities that do not seem to be typified by fracturation and participatory tran-
sience. 
27 
 
‘post-modern sensibilities’ that Muggleton aspired to detect, and that one’s participation with 
what might be described as the ‘theatrics’ of the subculture cannot necessarily be taken to entail 
the presence of a class-specific, ideologically bound collectivity. Assuming such necessarily de-
mands the utilization of a theoretical framework that not only means to account for both the 
macro-structural tendencies and the micro-level dynamics of individualized participation, but 
would refuse to defer to postulations regarding either a status of unwavering solidarity or chaotic 
fragmentation in lieu of characterizing the unique tensions between the two. I suggest that the 
theoretical framework advanced by Pierre Bourdieu in regarding the structuration (and function) 
of cultural participation would not only supply such a bridge, but grant those elements, hereto-
fore likely perceived as theoretical contradictions, a drastic re-conceptualization thus exposing 
the operation of a specific cultural logic tailored toward perpetuating established social hierar-
chies and the processes through which identity-construction is achieved. It is to Bourdieu, then, 
to whom we now turn.  
 
2.4 Identity in Difference, Distinction in Capital: The Theory of Pierre Bourdieu. 
 
In rigorously subjecting various dimensions of French culture to a personalized brand of 
what might be considered ‘middle-range’ sociological analysis, Bourdieu developed a theoretical 
framework meant to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the implicit ‘rules’ facilitating pat-
terned conventions of social practice and the conscious decision, on the part of social actors, to 
reinforce such conventions through their willingness in abiding by them. In conceptualizing the 
social as a landscape entailing partitions into stratified regions of differentiated social spaces, 
Bourdieu not only implied that processes whereby social groups would inhabit “positions which 
are exterior to one another and which are defined in relation to one another through their mutual 
exteriority and their relations of…[distance] and [hierarchy]” (2007a, 271) were essentially re-
quired by processes of social structuration, but that all social actors - regardless of their relative 
positioning - were products of, and participants in reinforcing, such stratification. In identifying 
culture, that shared network of symbols and practices which means to give a social body a cohe-
sive identity and collection of practices, as the primary locus through which processes of differ-
entiation find engagement, Bourdieu deduced that culture must be characterized as both a force 
actively serving to perpetuate social division and, simultaneously, a by-product of processes of 
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social division. Bourdieu’s seminal work, Distinction (1984), bolstered the former proposition in 
not only demonstrating a strong correlation between class position and consumption patterns 
(themselves dictated by seemingly innate personal ‘tastes’; be they for music, foods, or fashion), 
but locating in distaste, and by extension the differential capacities for different classes to de-
velop the ‘aesthetic disposition’ requisite in appreciating ‘legitimate’ culture, “one dimension of 
a distant, self-assured relation to the world and to others which presupposes objective assurance 
and distance…in an essential way, since taste is the basis…whereby one classifies oneself and is 
classified by others” (1984: 56).  
 
2.4.1 Positions, Position-taking, and Habitus 
It is important to note that Bourdieu deduced that social space primarily functions (and 
can only be analyzed if treated) as a symbolic space in which actors preternaturally correlate the 
manner in which they articulate themselves with their social ‘positions’. Indeed, the notion of an 
objective and collectively shared conception of a singular ‘reality’ must be done away with under 
the premise of this framework; and replaced in its stead by a re-conceptualized social landscape 
constitutive of individuals reared within particularized realities structured and influenced by a 
spate of differentiable elements - class, be it in terms of wealth or social prestige, being just one 
of a multitude of variables. By the nature of this logic, the cultural conventions through which 
social actors come to constitute their social identities - and relay such identities to others - can 
best be interpreted as incidents of ‘position-taking’ that are invariably inspired by one’s position-
ing in social space. Bourdieu ultimately locates one’s propensity to develop their preferred posi-
tion-taking sensibilities - and, indeed, the aforementioned ‘aesthetic disposition’ - less with a 
connoisseurs’ conscious inclination than with the subconscious influence of their habitus; that 
cognitive structure which guides one’s manner of perceiving social reality, and which finds its 
own particularistic constitution through absorbing the implicit logic propelling the class-specific 
practices alongside which one was initially socialized. Knowing no other way of articulating 
identity than through the conventions absorbed in chorus with the cognitive framework through 
which one perceives and understands the social world, the social actor is bound to embody their 
positions whilst consuming cultural products as a means of partaking in the symbolic rites of cul-
tural participation.  
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Though constructed by virtue of what might be regarded a situated socialization, one’s 
disposition for particularistic tastes (and thus particularistic cultural products) not only appear 
intrinsic within the social actor, but substantiate the notion that differential ‘tastes’ signal the 
presence of naturalistic differences between social classes. In declaring “life-styles…the system-
atic products of habitus, which, perceived in their mutual relations through the schemes of the 
habitus, become sign systems that are socially qualified (as ‘distinguished’, ‘vulgar’ etc.)” (1980: 
172), Bourdieu explicitly suggests that the perception of ‘naturalistic’ difference serves as the 
primary basis on which social identities find their initial development - and, one might argue, 
implicitly suggests that the concept of identity is allotted the ability to persist through the per-
petuation of the perception of intrinsic difference. However, and though Bourdieu indeed means 
to posit here that an individual’s cultural identity is, in many respects, a manifestation of their 
place within a hierarchy of stratified social realities, such does not mean to suggest a strict class-
determinism; for, even though social actors must refer to their space-specific habitus in the proc-
ess of expressing themselves to others, the manner in which they might decide to do so is 
amendable to some degree of personal creativity. Hence, there is a great deal of potential for 
novel forms of position-taking to materialize, and it would likely not stand as a stretch of the 
imagination to suggest that manifestations of youth subculture, to a large extent, might be per-
ceived as such. 
 
2.4.2 Capital and the concept of the Field 
Bourdieu does not, however, contend that social spaces constitute calm collectivities in 
which an implicit allegiance to the specificities advised by the collective habitus entails intra-
spatial harmony. On the contrary, the various factions of social space inevitably overlap and con-
flict as social actors intrinsically vie to ascend their spatial placements and, thus, improve their 
objective life-conditions. Though Bourdieu regards such impulses as wont to failure - graduation 
into an alternate social space without the correspondingly requisite habitus is more apt to breed 
anomie than the desired comforts (2007b: 287) - the processes wherein those populating the de-
sired realms of social space vie to defend the stasis of the existing social landscape nonetheless 
inspires a phenomenon whereby those cultural signifiers meant to denote spatial placement are 
invested with a great deal of gratuitous significance. In conceptualizing those arenas of social 
practice wherein individuals and classes vie to construct, substantiate, and defend the uniqueness 
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of their social identities as ‘fields’, Bourdieu elects to employ something of a game analogy in 
illustrating the logic of what could be regarded as an ‘economy’ of social interaction. 
Bourdieu contends that social spaces retain their stratification - and internal stasis - by 
virtue of a process through which personal attributes serve to constitute, and find utilization as, 
various types of capital. Though economic capital, referring to capital in the material sense, 
stands as one of the manifestations attributed a considerable significance, such is no more sig-
nificant than the immaterial manifestations which Bourdieu takes pains to highlight. Possession 
of the ‘aesthetic disposition’ and any comparable ability to derive a privileged appreciation from 
otherwise seemingly nondescript practices, for example, might signal a wealth of cultural capital 
derivative of class-positioning, honed by virtue of educational inculcation, and used as a strong 
indicator of intrinsic ‘belongingness’. Social capital is gained through the obtaining the social 
stature requisite in forming (and the implicit ability to know how to utilize) networks amongst 
the social space that one is either trying to gain induction into or, alternately, defend. Finally, 
symbolic capital is meant to refer to “the acquisition of a reputation for competence and an image 
of respectability and honourability” (1980:291), or the ability to navigate the use of economic 
capital, cultural capital, and social capital to achieve and maintain distinction within one’s field 
of elected participation.  
If my reading of Bourdieu is correct, there are essentially two concurrent ‘games’ at 
hand. The first and most immediate requires that social actors vie to excel in procuring whatever 
form of capital is most sought after in keeping with the structural logic underlying both their so-
cial positioning and the specific field in which they have elected participation. Thus, social actors 
confined to social positioning marked by a relative scarcity of economic capital will aspire to 
establish their prominence through compiling whatever manifestations of capital the relevant 
field might call for; be it a wealth of ‘expert’ knowledge regarding cultural products (amidst the 
‘field’ of cinematic fandom, for example) or a generous proportion of deep interpersonal ties 
(what might be regarded as the ‘field’ of street gang participation comes to mind here). This first 
game is individualistic in nature; the goal lies with not only amassing capital, but knowing how 
to utilize it against those who might threaten one’s stature through compiling their own. The sec-
ond ‘game’ is far more collectivist and requires that spatially-homogenous populations protect 
the sanctity of their social space from those who might breach the positional barrier and, thus, 
deplete the exclusivity functioning to reinforce collective distinction. Hence, the ‘aesthetic dis-
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position’ renders elite culture a weapon allowing that those inhabiting positions typified by a 
wealth of both economic and cultural capital to prevent those who might possess a generous 
stock of the former (but not the latter) from succeeding in the ‘field’ of higher-class cultural con-
sumption.  
 
2.4.3 Subcultural Capital and the Function of Authenticity Claims 
In adopting a Bourdieuian analytical framework as a means of understanding the proc-
esses of insulation and stratification prevalent within ‘underground’ British club subcultures, 
Thornton (1996) has deduced that fields of subcultural participation are structured and reinforced 
by an implicit economy wherein actors vie to procure variations of ‘subcultural capital’. Noting 
that Bourdieu declared it “possible to observe subspecies of capital operating within other less 
privileged domains” (1996: 11), Thornton declares that subcultural capital, 
 
Confers status on its owner in the eyes of the relevant beholder [and can be] objectified or em-
bodied. Just as books and paintings display cultural capital in the family home, so subcultural 
capital can be objectified in the form of fashionable haircuts and well-assembled record collec-
tions…[and] just as cultural capital is personified in ‘good’ manners and urbane conversation, 
so subcultural capital is embodied in the form of being ‘in the know’, using (but not over-
using) current slang and looking as if you were born to perform the latest dance styles. Both 
cultural and subcultural capital put a premium on the ’second nature’ of their knowledges. 
Nothing depletes capital more than the sight of someone trying too hard. (1996: 11-12, italics 
in original) 
 
Though Thornton’s analysis might seem to best play with postmodernist tenets in subtly 
suggesting that taking on the subcultural identity is ultimately a competition wherein participants 
compete to put on the most sophisticated front, it is important to note that, as the habitus is con-
ceptualized as a cognitive structure that manoeuvres below the level of explicit cognition 
(2007b), Bourdieu himself did not correlate the perpetuation of such symbolic economies with 
any conscious intentions on the part of its participants. Though Thornton’s observations do not 
contrast with the sense that homogolous subcultural participation might initially appeal to groups 
endowed with similar habitus imparted upon them by virtue of their locality within a shared so-
cial space, her conceptualization of subcultural capital might be accused of losing grasp of the 
fact that such participants might unconsciously abide by, and reinforce, practices meant to im-
pede groups, with different habitus as conditioned by different environments, from interjecting 
themselves into the field and, thereby, threatening the autonomy of the field and the individuality 
of its participants themselves. 
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I would argue that this notion of an unconscious drive toward differentiation coincides 
with the manner in which ‘authenticity’ has been found to be sanctified within various fields of 
subcultural practice by a considerable host of ethnographic initiatives regarding the punk subcul-
ture (Nogic & Riley, 2007; Williams, 2006; Moore, 2005; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995; 
Baron, 1989; Fox, 1987). In each example, those subculturalists whom each research project im-
plicitly regard as being ‘authentic’ representatives of their respective ‘scenes’ not only testify 
that their authenticity derives from being intrinsically drawn to the practices and values endorsed 
within the subculture, but argue that their personal authenticity is perpetuated through maintain-
ing a stern allegiance to those customs and ideological dispositions. Though it would seem 
commonsensical to note the similarity between the subcultural utility of authenticity and 
Bourdieu’s “ideology of natural taste” - characterized as “an ideological [strategy] generated in 
the everyday class struggle [that] naturalizes real differences [by converting ] differences in the 
mode of acquisition of culture into differences of nature” (1984, 68l; italics in original) - it is of 
dire importance to note that the manner in which authenticity is conceptualized has not retained 
any considerable degree of stasis within the punk subculture. Fox (1987) and Baron (1989) found 
that, while self-professedly ‘authentic’ subcultural participants declared that they couldn’t vocal-
ize why they felt as if participation within the punk subculture came ‘naturally’ to them, they 
could gage the lack of in-authenticity in others through their lack of a stern commitment to opt-
ing out of the conventions of wider society or engaging in violent altercations with rival subcul-
turalists. Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995) and Moore (2005) subsequently found that, while 
self-professed ‘authentic’ subcultural participants declared that they couldn’t vocalize why they 
felt as if participation within the punk subculture came ‘naturally’ to them, inauthentic members 
could be deduced by virtue of their having been introduced to the movement by ‘mainstream’ 
cultural products or their proclivity toward signalling their belongingness through the consump-
tion of ‘mainstream’ cultural products. Nogic and Riley (2007) and Williams (2006) illuminate 
manifestations of punk subcultural practice in which authenticity is measured by virtue of the 
manner through which one garnered their knowledge concerning the conventions endorsed by 
their scenes and, furthermore, how adequately newer participants respect the conventions en-
dorsed therein. It could be argued that these studies serve to demonstrate that ‘authenticity’ has 
become something of a catch-all trope that self-purportedly naturalized subcultural participants 
utilize in problematizing whatever conventions of practice or emerging subcultural populations 
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inherently feel ‘wrong’ and ‘threatening’ at any given time. It could also be argued, however, 
that the manner through which ‘authenticity’ is conceptualized is but one of the stakes over 
which to be fought within the field of subcultural participation, and has undergone a number of 
discernable permutations within the past twenty years. Both postulations only serve to bolster the 
applicability of a Bourdieuian framework and, even if this collection of research initiatives do 
little to suggest that each served to detail but one pocket of a widely dispersed but unified ‘punk’ 
subculture, the identification of unique stratification techniques within each example mean to 
suggest that, be it subcultural aristocracy or a purity of ideological agenda, those assured of their 
own hierarchical ascendancy within the field felt it requisite that they protect the sanctity of 
something.  
It would therefore appear that the Birmingham Theorists’ conceptualization of subcul-
tures as harbouring a sense of solidarity fit to render them egalitarian collectives is certainly 
problematic and, though a great deal of theorization might have been dedicated to understanding 
conflicts between subcultural entities and other out-groups (Hebdige, 2006; Jefferson, 2006), 
there is little material present for the purposes of aiding one in understanding any such deep-
rooted conflicts, or patterns of stratification, within the same subculture.4
                                                          
4 Except for, of course, those studies highlighting processes of gender stratification within subcultural collectivities; 
with the work of McRobbie and Garber (2006) standing as the most renowned. 
 On the other hand, 
however, the fact that accusations of in-authenticity would oft appear levelled against partici-
pants either unwilling to conform, or pay due respect to, the conventions and expectations func-
tioning in not only maintaining group homogeneity, but the collectivity’s comparative structural 
heterogeneity, might be taken to dispel the notion that subcultures consist of superficial composi-
tions of participants who neither invest in the maintenance of cultural conventions nor adhere to 
anything resembling a subcultural conscience collective. The adoption of a Bourdieuian frame-
work of analysis and, thereby, conceptualizing the ‘field’ of subcultural participation as a pocket 
of social space in which two games find simultaneous engagement - one whereby individual 
members compete for subcultural capital, another entailing a collective initiative to maintain the 
longstanding structure of the field - might thus harbour something resembling the synthesis be-
tween the Birmingham School’s structural-Marxism and the postsubculturalist orientation.  
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2.5 The ‘Generalized Other’ as a Subcultural ‘Folk-Devil’ 
 
To return, finally, to justifying my intentions in regarding the representation of the ‘emo 
kid’ as a subcultural ‘folk-devil’, I might wish to highlight a peculiar tendency as denoted by 
Muggleton (2000) and Widdicombe and Wooffit (1995, 1990) in their respective ethnographies 
of the contemporary punk subculture: namely, the utilization of a generalized representational 
‘other’ in processes relating to discursively maintaining self-authenticity and reinforcing subcul-
tural sanctity. To Muggleton’s credit, he concedes that patterns tailored toward the invocation 
and stigmatization of subcultural ‘Others’ serving as “a stereotypical characterization based on 
subculturalists who are contemporaries rather than consociates” and “against which the inter-
viewees authenticate themselves” (2000: 90) - or, groups which are “invariably perceived as ho-
mogenous, internally coherent and externally demarcated…unknown contemporaries [that are] 
judged only by reference to general cultural categories” (2007: 127-28) - prohibits his initial hy-
pothesis that modern subcultures have taken on an entirely postmodernist nature from achieving 
definitive affirmation. In granting the discursive phenomena whereby subculturalites vie to de-
authenticate those perceived to function as the generalized ‘other’ a greater depth of attention, 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt have observed that “speakers use three primary resources to accom-
plish their negative assessments of other members” (1995: 151). The first involves the use of de-
rogatory labels meant to “draw attention to the differences between [subcultural] factions” 
(1995: 152). The second involves the utilization of descriptions meant to “emphasize the shal-
lowness of new members”; used in indicating “the [inauthentic] motives which lead these indi-
viduals to affiliate” and insinuating that such motives “are insincere as they are not adopting the 
overarching lifestyle of the subculture” (1995: 153). Finally, ostensibly authentic members en-
dorse a practice whereby the inauthentic are ascribed prototypically unsavoury features that most 
often relate to the unsanctioned manner in which undesirable factions are believed to enter into 
the field of subcultural participation.  
To be sure, Muggleton, Widdicombe and Wooffitt each mean to demonstrate the proc-
esses through which established subculturalites utilize and reinforce stereotypes in prohibiting 
certain factions due regard as authentic participants; what might, under different circumstances, 
be interpreted as a program of subcultural representational politics. And, indeed, even in adopt-
ing a Bourdieuian framework, these processes might rightfully be interpreted as a strategy 
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through which to impede select populations from acquiring the authenticity that might appear to 
serve as the most sought-after form of subcultural capital, and thus exclude them from the indi-
vidualistic ‘game’ at hand. However, in recalling that the concurrent game - that involving a col-
lectivity attuned to unconsciously adopt practices simultaneously meant to protect and perpetuate 
itself - it might safely be assumed that these representational strategies serve to facilitate a sec-
ondary function: that of implicitly promoting, and discursively punishing transgressions against, 
the longstanding conventions of subcultural practice and ideological allegiance. In essence, I 
wish to argue that such representations might be meant, in part, to facilitate processes of subcul-
tural normalization tailored toward guaranteeing not only a requisite degree of dispositional con-
formity, but an ever more salient need for a requisite number of normalized subcultural partici-
pants.  
It might be recalled that St. Cyr defines the classic conceptualization of the ‘folk devil’ 
as a “personification of evil, characterized through a totality of negative attributes…[which] be-
comes a direct reminder of what we should not be” (2003: 29). I would wish to posit that the 
subcultural ‘folk-devil’ might similarly be conceptualized as a representation constructed around 
the perceived or threatened presence of subcultural ‘others’ who are taken as embodying what-
ever variety of prototypically negative attributes are deemed particularly problematic within any 
subcultural field at any given juncture. The subcultural folk-devil is reified through intra-
subcultural discursive practices for the sake of fulfilling three potential functions, each correlated 
with the implicit structure of the economy of subcultural capital and, furthermore, preserving the 
sanctity of the field of subcultural practice. The first regards a means by which established sub-
culturalites might protect their individual capital-stocks and, by extension, their standing in the 
field from those constituting the influx of problematic subcultural aspirants. The second is that of 
allowing those groups so concerned with maintaining the established doxa of the subcultural 
field the ability to maintain their stature by virtue of protecting the longstanding processes - li-
able to challenge by virtue of an incursion of either the uninitiated or disrespectful - through 
which such is measured and disseminated. The third regards replenishing the requisite population 
of the subcultural field with participants subjected to proper inculcation; processes potentially 
facilitated, in part, by presence of representational constructs of a generalized other meant to 
serve as a fledgling participants’ direct reminder of what they should not be, should they them-
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selves aspire to take part in the individualistic ‘game’ while, concurrently, perpetuating its col-
lectivist counterpart. 
In the coming chapters, I will attempt to demonstrate that the ‘emo kid’ stands as one 
such subcultural folk-devil born with a due concern for protecting some of the longstanding con-
ventions within, and in response to a number of the distinctly contemporary anxieties suffered 
by, what might most conservatively be regarded as the modern punk subculture. Prior to doing 
this, however, due attention must be dedicated to outlining the means and methodologies with 
which I shall inspire to do so.  Therefore, and in addition to mapping out the tenets for the genea-
logical analysis of the emergence of the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil, I wish to dedicate the following 
chapter to illustrating the pivotal role played by quasi-subcultural ‘niche’ media products and 
invoke the theoretical works of Michel Foucault (1995, 1990, 1980) as a means of introducing 
the operation of subcultural power dynamics into the current project. 
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Chapter Three: On the Foucaultian Genealogy, the Mediated Constitution of Subculture, 
and the Field of Subcultural Production. 
 
3.1 Introductory Notes 
I have conceptualized subcultures, in the previous chapter, as ‘fields’ of cultural partici-
pation in which those actors so engaged adhere to implicit conventions of practice in competing 
for various manifestations of ‘capital’. This characterization implies that the emergence of the 
‘emo kid’ folk-devil might be attributed, in part, to the processes through which established fig-
ures within the punk subculture vied to denigrate ‘inauthentic’ participants in collusion with 
strategies tailored not only toward protecting the stasis of their own capital reserves, but the 
sanctity of the processes through which this capital is distributed throughout the subcultural field. 
I link this analysis with Bourdieu’s assertions regarding the processes that facilitate the overarch-
ing function of the field of cultural production. This chapter, which will be divided into three dis-
tinct sections, will advance the argument that the music media - or ‘niche media’, as described by 
Thornton (1996) - have served to play an equal (if not greater) role in inadvertently inspiring the 
subcultural construction of the ‘emo kid’ representation. In the first section of this chapter, I dis-
cuss the manner through which this thesis will abide by the parameters of a Foucauldian geneal-
ogy - and thus utilize critical discourse analysis and content analysis – in attempting to highlight 
the differential power dynamics involved in both the emergence of the perceived genre of ‘emo’ 
music and, subsequently, the discursive genesis of the ‘emo kid’ representational folk-devil.  The 
second section will contextualize the applicability of the genealogical methodology through con-
sidering Thornton’s (1996) assertion that communications media products (and the authoritative 
‘expert’ voice with which they speak) fulfill a crucial role in not only facilitating the emergence 
of subcultures, but in determining the conventions with which they structure themselves. This 
section will also consider Bourdieu’s thoughts concerning the manner through which knowledge 
producers within the ‘field of cultural production’ - which is also structured by competitive 
power dynamics - legitimate the ‘value’ of artistic works through determining their authenticity. 
The final section will explicitly touch upon a number of prospective ‘struggles’ - within and be-
tween the variety of ‘fields’ both involved with, and that might stand to benefit from, the creation 
and consumption of cultural products and knowledge- that I will correlate with the processes 
through which the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil came to emerge. By the conclusion of this chapter, I will 
have compiled a theoretical backdrop against which to advance my overarching argument: that 
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the ‘emo kid’ representation came into being as a means through which subcultural participants 
could utilize representational measures in resisting an agenda whereby key ‘niche’ media outlets 
attempted to facilitate the construction of a new subcultural entity and, thus, threatened to decon-
secrate the established conventions serving to structure their subcultural fields.  
 
3.2 Section One: Foucault and Genealogy: Power, Discipline and Normalization  
 
The majority of Foucault’s work might be taken as a wide-ranging inquiry into the na-
ture of power and the mechanisms through which it is invoked. However, Foucault does not con-
ceptualize power in the juridical sense, where “power is taken to be a right” and looked upon as a 
“concrete power which every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession enables politi-
cal power or sovereignty to be established” (1980: 88). Nor does he regard power as an entity of 
oppression constitutive of “a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a 
system whose effects, through derivations, pervade the entire social body” (1990: 92). Instead, 
for Foucault, power is ultimately regarded as “a multiplicity of force relations” which suffices in 
“forming a chain or a system” and manifesting in “strategies…whose general design or institu-
tional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of law, in the various 
social hegemonies” (1990: 92-93). As Foucault regards power as indelibly relative and in con-
stant flux, power is essentially regarded as a force which is less possessed by any social agent 
than found to work through them. He posits that power ultimately comes to be exercised “in the 
interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” (1990: 94) which can simultaneously be found 
to operate through (and perpetuate the power imbalances within) a plethora of individualistic so-
cial relationships and wider social processes.  Foucault nonetheless deduces that these dynamics 
implement and perpetuate “comprehensive systems” tailored toward serving functions above and 
beyond the “aims and objectives” possessed of those individuals, or groups, taken to be dominant 
within any particular relation; systems in which “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipher-
able, and yet…no one is there to have invented them, and [there are] few who can be said to have 
formulated them” (ibid., 95). In being exercised within and throughout the social arena, then, tac-
tics of power that can be attributed to the conscious aims of social actors might also be found to 
facilitate processes escaping the explicit cognisance of the oppressors and oppressed alike. This 
phenomenon allows the emergence of processes through which systems of power, devoid of ei-
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ther any architect or governor, silently envelop and regulate the entire social body. Indeed, one of 
the aims of Foucault’s genealogical project lay not only with denoting and exposing the opera-
tion of these processes, but identifying the social artefacts and practices that might be taken as 
their product.  
In the course of his studies, Foucault alluded to the presence of two forms of widely 
pervasive powers. Disciplinary (or anatomo-political) power, expressed in the entrenched con-
ventions of such institutions as those concerning education, healthcare, and militarism, is taken 
to be a force that “produces subjected and practiced [or] docile bodies” (1995, 138) through in-
creasing their concrete utility while, simultaneously, guaranteeing subservience, or “a relation of 
strict subjection”, to the overarching “machinery of power” (1995: 138). Discipline essentially 
exerts its force over the subject at the corporeal level; it takes the body as a machine and sees to 
“the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its useful-
ness and its docility, [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls” (1990: 
139). Regulatory power, or the ‘bio-politics’ focusing “on the species body” and “the mechanics 
of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes”, vies to subsume control over popula-
tions at the very level of life through concerning itself with - and, indeed, orchestrating - “propa-
gation, births and mortality, the level of health, [and] life expectancy and longevity” (1990: 139). 
Foucault deduces that each manifestation of power - the former enacting itself over individual-
ized ‘subjects’ and the latter over subjectified populations - contributes to the realization of a 
“society of normalisation” (1980: 107) in which individuals (and entire societies) might conform 
to the expectations of (and act in due accordance with) those tenets determined vital should any 
given society perpetuate itself.  
 
3.2.1 Truth and Knowledge, Scientific Discourse, and the Construction of the Subject 
Though Foucault was not naïve to the fact that certain populations ultimately stood to 
benefit from the operation of these mechanisms of power, the fact that disciplinary and regula-
tory powers operate without the guidance of sentient instigation warrants repetition. Instead, 
Foucault directs his attention to the emergence of the enlightenment mindset and its correspond-
ing assumptions that the human body could not only come to be known and optimized through 
the creation of truth-claims, but that human societies could, likewise, achieve a state of perfec-
tion through the accumulation of knowledge. As the human sciences ultimately constructed and 
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reinforced connotations of normalcy - and abnormality - in the process of mapping the human 
body and cognitive processes, individuals become ‘objects of knowledge’ in that the analytical 
‘gaze’ of the human sciences renders them objects to be understood in collusion with scientific 
paradigms; the ‘subjects’ of processes meant to study, categorize and (potentially) condemn or 
correct. Foucault thus deduces that power operates through the creation of knowledge that not 
only successfully purports itself to constitute ‘truth’, but proposes a mandate tailored toward 
achieving the ideal society. This assumption has not only since facilitated a process whereby “the 
formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular 
process” (1995: 224), but one whereby fewer and fewer dimensions of life are unmolested by 
regimes of surveillance and control. As an example, The History of Sexuality (1990) meant not 
only to chart the process through which sex was subsumed under the domain of health practitio-
ners and psychoanalysts, but came to show how categories of sexual deviants were created as a 
means of curtailing manifestations of sexual orientation that might neither contribute to societal 
regeneration nor correlate with the dominant moral order. The human sciences, in essence, cre-
ated a ‘truth’ discourse meant to identify expressions of sexual deviance (that the field of peda-
gogy, in part, vied to prevent through a variety of inculcation techniques) while simultaneously 
‘creating’ populations of sexual deviants for whom normalization might only be achieved 
through further subjecting oneself (or being forcibly subjected) to the expertise of the clinical 
gaze. 
Though Foucault conceptualized the sexualized body as one of the primary sites through 
which power renders the subject-of-interest subservient to the aims and will of power mecha-
nisms attuned to normalization and social regeneration, his assertion that the institutions of 
medicine also succeeded in creating ‘species’ of sexual deviants hints toward a further presuppo-
sition: that the very ‘regimes’ of discourse from which knowledge and truth are constituted si-
multaneously served as the frameworks through which the post-enlightened individual came to 
achieve self-reification, or construct one’s own subjectivity. Though “discipline ‘makes’ indi-
viduals” by virtue of the fact that “it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals 
both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (1995: 170), Foucault concludes that those so 
subjectified also reinforce disciplinary mechanisms through not only self-identifying with their 
classifications, but also enacting disciplinary powers upon themselves as a result. In essence, 
then, truth is just as likely to take on an air of substantiation through the acknowledgement and 
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repentance of the self-professedly ‘abnormal’ subject as it is through scientific discovery, and it 
is no wonder that Foucault traces the roots of self-disciplinary mechanisms to the emergence of 
the practice of confession.  
 
3.2.2 The Genealogical Method: Using Discourse and Content Analysis in Uncovering a History 
of Struggles  
 
In addition to subjecting individuals to processes of objectification, categorization and 
normalization, Foucault also deemed that the sciences’ construction of universalistic ‘truth’ nar-
ratives also functioned to suppress and deny what he referred to as ‘subjugated knowledges’: that 
“whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate [by virtue of being located] 
beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” (1980: 82). These subjugated knowledges 
entail a cognition of ‘historical contents’ - or struggles - that “have been buried and disguised in 
a functional coherence or formal systematization” (1980:  81). In other words, Foucault means to 
suggest that the validity of the knowledge-stocks which have come to constitute human subjec-
tivities did not simply emerge and come to find acceptance with those populations whom they 
vied to affix their gaze upon. Even should the established histories of the emergence of such ‘re-
gimes of truth’ gloss over or deny recollections pertaining to instances of their own refusal and 
resistance, those recollections might still persist elsewhere - be they inscribed within the subtext 
of case-studies, the collective memories of disempowered peoples rarely given the chance to 
‘speak’, or relegated the status of having been ‘disqualified’ by virtue of their inability to con-
form with the lofty standards expected of empirically verifiable ‘scientific’ claims to truth. Sub-
jugated knowledges, then, concern themselves with “a historical knowledge of struggles”(1980: 
83, italics in original), and Foucault elected to concern his studies with those stocks of ‘popular 
knowledge’ in which “there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even to this day have 
been confined to the margins of knowledge” (1980: 83).  
A Foucauldian genealogy thus consists of unifying “erudite knowledge and local memo-
ries” in a manner that “allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use 
of this knowledge tactically today” (1980: 83). The method consists of engaging with “a pains-
taking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts” that might ulti-
mately “entertain the claims of [subjugated knowledges] against the claims of a unitary body of 
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theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge [as to] 
what constitutes a science and its objects” (1980: 83). In lieu of taking that commonsensicality 
facilitated by theoretical doxa as its data, the genealogy sifts through the discourses, artefacts, 
and collective recollections of subjugated populations in hopes of not only mapping a history of 
any identifiable struggles, but alerting us to the presence of those subjugating power mechanisms 
operating therein. The genealogy is thus a brand of historical sociology which concerns itself less 
with landmark eras and events than the power dynamics underlying said eras and events; dynam-
ics which might be deduced through studying the manner in which allusions of implicit struggles 
are manifest in the discourse, and concrete artefacts, of the subjugated populations. 
 It stands to reason that the compilation of a genealogical inquiry demands the employ-
ment of a methodology that might allow one to take the means through which knowledge is 
communicated, and testimonies of ‘truth’ reinforced, as its primary focus. In this light, discourse 
analysis has stood as one means through which the histories of implicit struggles might be rec-
ognized and rendered suitable for analysis. Informed by the ontological presupposition that 
meaning (and, in effect, social reality) is effectively constructed through the manner in which we 
speak about, or construct knowledge concerning, the world (Berger and Luckmann, 1984), dis-
course analysis concerns itself with detailing the processes through which discourses “do not 
simply describe the social world, but categorize it [and] bring phenomena into sight” (Parker, 
2004: 252). However, and rather than taking the significance of a discourse (or a ‘text’) at face 
value, critical strains of discourse analysis concern themselves with a number of pressing ques-
tions. About whom does the discourse speak, and who is speaking? What meanings, or represen-
tations, might the discourse subtly be enforcing? How might the discourse impact those with 
whom the discourse concerns itself, those who constructed it, and those who inevitably receive 
it? As Hall (1986) notes, critical discourse analysis essentially strives to deduce the subtle means 
through which certain dimensions of social reality are ‘naturalized’ - or made to appear com-
monsensical and unavoidable - in a manner serving to benefit those populations endowed with 
the power to determine the means through which we speak about certain populations, issues, and 
social processes. In taking instances of discourse as its research data, critical discourse analysis 
vies to uncover and highlight the manner in which a discourse facilitates the construction of 
meaning and the means through which people conceptualize reality (and deny the validity of al-
ternative meanings and conceptualizations of reality) while extending due care and consideration 
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in deducing the origins of a discourse and the overarching power dynamics in relation to which it 
might have been constructed. 
Content analysis, on the other hand, aspires to apply a similar programme of critique to 
those communicative products that strive to construct meaning through non-discursive, or sym-
bolic, means (Woollacott, 1986). Having come to be perceived as epistemologically inseparable 
from the concept of deconstructionism - a methodology drawing from the post-structuralism of 
Derrida (1981) and the critical semiology of Barthes (1986) - critical content analysis presup-
poses that the meanings contained within any cultural product might not confine themselves to 
the messages explicitly conveyed within. The constructive power of the communicative product 
might reside at the level of symbolism, in the nature of the imagery, or even within the associa-
tions which audiences are implicitly expected to draw on their own accord (Denzin, 2004). These 
methods of representation are correlated with measures meant to inspire an audience in forging 
associations between particularistic traits and particular populations and stake jurisdiction over 
the dissemination of those touchstones with which collective meanings are created and rein-
forced. Critical content analysis, simply put, concerns itself with the representations that are cre-
ated and reinforced through the latent meanings that are disseminated through the symbolic di-
mensions of the social text. Taken together, both discourse and content analysis constitute a 
methodology that serves not only to deduce how meaning is being created through what is being 
stated explicitly, but also through what is being stated implicitly through the presentation of par-
ticularistic imagery or symbolic subtext.  
 
3.3 Section Two: The Dissemination of Cultural Knowledge, the Mediated Constitution of 
the Subcultural Subject, and the Field of Cultural Production. 
 
At this point, the question might arise as to exactly how the adoption of a genealogical 
framework might be of use in the context of the research issue at hand. Indeed, initiating a Fou-
caultian genealogy would arguably appear to entail two prerequisites in regarding the phenome-
non under study: the first being an entity dutifully engaged in the process of producing an ‘expert 
knowledge’ regarding the normalized dispositions and practices of a subjugated class; the second 
the presence of populations so measured against the standards and ‘truth claims’ constructed 
therein. Though it might not initially appear as if the subcultural realm harbours any fitting 
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equivalents to the health professionals whom Foucault believed to have played a part in con-
structing species of sexual deviants or categorizations of mental illness, I would argue that such a 
first impression might not hold entirely true. In considering Thornton’s (1995) assertion that the 
formation and structuration of subcultural entities is inspired less by subcultural participants than 
by widespread communications media which “create subcultures in the process of naming them 
and [drawing] boundaries around them in the act of describing them” (1995: 162), I wish to initi-
ate a discussion regarding the processes through which the value of, or meaning associated with, 
subculturally revered artistic products is largely constructed and distributed by virtue of the ‘ex-
pert’ discourses constructed within what Bourdieu would describe as the ‘sub-field of cultural 
knowledge production’ - but which we might, for the time being, simply describe as the enter-
tainment media industry.  
 
3.3.1 Regarding the Three Orders of Media 
Thornton (1995), discussed previously with reference to her role in coining the term 
‘subcultural capital’, conceptualizes subcultural manifestations as Bourdieuian ‘fields’ in which 
practices are informed by (and the structure of the field is maintained through) an implicit logic 
centred around the distribution and accumulation of privileged knowledge which might translate 
into the development of sanctified ‘tastes’ and, by extension, prestige. However, Thornton parts 
company with those who might deduce that the cultural products and practices indicative of sub-
cultural authenticity are decided upon by the sole volition of the subcultural field; instead, she 
asserts that, “the media are crucial…[as] a series of institutional networks essential to the crea-
tion, classification and distribution of cultural knowledge” (1995:118). Aside from functioning to 
alert the unfamiliar to the existence of such subcultural groups (and the tastes celebrated therein), 
Thornton credits media institutions with a formative role in deducing that,  
 
 
subcultures are constructed in the process of being discovered. Journalists and photographers 
do not invent subcultures, but shape them, mark their core and reify their borders…[thus prov-
ing] integral to the process by which we create groups through their representation (1995:160). 
 
Thornton speaks to the presence of what might be described as three orders of commu-
nications media, each of which plays a significant role in functioning to reify, perpetuate, and (at 
times) restructure subcultural manifestations. The first, micro-media, which include “flyers, fan-
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zines, fly posters, listings, telephone information lines, pirate radio, e-mailing lists and internet 
archive sites” (1995: 137), harbour a significance beyond the obvious fact that many serve to 
alert subcultural communities in regards to events and current issues of collective concern. In-
deed, in many cases, micro-media allow subcultural participants to utilize media dissemination 
channels as a means of purveying information to a specific target audience of fellow subcultural 
participants. Thornton singles out the practice of creating ‘fanzines’ - independently produced 
and circulated publications centring around show reviews, album critiques, and other subcultur-
ally relevant commentaries - as one such method through which subcultural audiences might de-
velop an appreciation for those tastes and conventions which are currently regarded as ‘hip’ from 
an authentic, decidedly ‘grassroots’ source. Micro-media products can essentially be taken as 
indicative of initiatives, on the part of subcultural participants, to ensure the necessitated dis-
semination of cultural knowledge throughout a limited body of specific recipients; a practice 
which Thornton declares to be crucial as a means of prohibiting other mediated entities from ex-
ploiting the subculture for monetary profit or, worse yet, devaluing some manifestations of sub-
cultural capital through the process of distributing sensitive knowledge to non-participatory me-
dia consumers. 
The second order, the mass media - which might be placed at the opposing end of the 
spectrum - consist of such mainstream information channels as televised and print news broad-
casts, network television entertainment programs and, in Thornton’s analysis, the tabloid press. 
These are the mediated entities which expose wider publics to potentially sensationalistic and 
erroneous representations of the subcultural entity through derogatory news reportage concerning 
itself with burgeoning (and highly problematic) ‘trends’ in youth fashion and culture. Thornton 
also correlates factions within the mass media with initiatives tailored toward exploiting those 
subcultural manifestations perceived as harbouring an ‘untapped’ market potential through the 
dissemination of sterilized representations; a process that suffices in popularizing surface-level 
subcultural fashions amongst the general population while, quite effectively, assassinating the 
allure of the derivative collectivity. The mass media thus not only harbour the ability to inspire 
the unwarranted stigmatization of a subcultural entity, but the ability to render a subcultural field 
fallow grounds as a sphere in which to construct subversive identity through the sheer process of 
extending approving media coverage.  
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The final permutation of communication media, which we might place in the centre of 
the spectrum, is niche media; those ‘consumer magazines’ which proliferated in the 1980s and 
themselves stand as “the result of more detailed market research, tighter target marketing and 
new technologies such as desktop publishing” (151). Thornton deduces that niche media function 
to facilitate a plethora of crucial roles in regards to shaping subcultural manifestations, the most 
crucial of which stem from their proclivity to, 
 
…categorize social groups, arrange sounds, itemize attire and label everything. They bap-
tize scenes and generate the self-consciousness required to maintain cultural distinctions. 
They give definition to vague cultural formations, pull together and reify the disparate ma-
terials which become subcultural homologies. The music and style press are crucial to our 
conceptions of [youth]; they do not just cover subcultures, they help to construct them 
(1995: 151, my italics). 
 
In effect, Thornton would appear to speak of the presence of a reciprocal relationship 
between subcultural collectivities and the niche media which aspire to cater to them. As these 
media products provide the mediated artefacts through which readers might introduce themselves 
to the trends in dress, artists, and ideological undercurrents indicative of proper subcultural par-
ticipation at any given point, their readers come to grant such publications an equal measure of 
financial support and implicit legitimacy.  As their audiences become further indoctrinated into 
the subcultural milieu, so too do they become further dependent upon these publications in keep-
ing up-to-date on permutations within the ‘scene’. In inevitably deducing that niche media effec-
tively serve as “a network…akin to the education system in their creation, classification, and dis-
tribution of cultural knowledge” (1995: 161), Thornton could arguably be taken to suggest that it 
is ultimately they who deduce what qualifies as distinguished taste, classifies as relevant knowl-
edge, and constitutes accepted practice. In other words, Thornton’s postulations implicitly refer 
to, without explicitly invoking, many of the key insights advanced by Pierre Bourdieu in consid-
ering the practices facilitating - and, above all else, the struggles noted as structuring - the field 
of cultural production. It is toward a consideration of these presuppositions that we now turn. 
 
3.3.2 Bourdieu on the field of cultural production 
 
Chapter two provided a brief overview concerning Bourdieu’s postulation that patterns 
of cultural consumption - and the very constitution of what might be regarded as ‘natural’ taste - 
are informed by a quasi-subconscious economy wherein social actors compete for a variety of 
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manifestations of ‘capital’ and, in doing so, reify and reinforce the longstanding divisions be-
tween inhabitants of the various ‘social spaces’. The following discussion will concern itself with 
the fact that Bourdieu also took pains to deduce that the field of cultural production - or, that 
space wherein a multitude of specialized actors partake in the production of cultural products 
and, by extension, culture itself - operates in congruence with a similar logic and, indeed, suf-
fices in realizing the perpetuation of a similar economy of capital distribution. It is of dire note, 
however, that Bourdieu correlates the operation of the field of cultural production with the opera-
tion of a wider field of power - itself functioning to develop widespread allegiances to the domi-
nant economic processes and political ideologies which thus suffice in reinforcing the smooth 
operation (and stratified character) of the social landscape - in an arguably peculiar fashion. 
Though implying that the field of cultural production reinforces hegemonic allegiances to the 
operation of the field of power by virtue of the nature of many of the cultural products produced 
therein,5 and though admitting that pockets within the field tend to adhere to (and thus facilitate) 
those practices imposed by the field of power, Bourdieu nonetheless posits that “the literary and 
artistic field is contained within the field of power, while possessing a relative autonomy with 
respect to it, especially as regards its economic and political principles of hierarchization” (1993: 
37-38, my italics). In suggesting that the field of cultural production retains an equal propensity 
to either conform to, or act in contradiction with, the logic of the field of power (and, by exten-
sion, apt to engage in tendencies that might either reinforce or challenge that logic), Bourdieu 
argues that the field of cultural production must be conceptualized as “a field of forces, but [also] 
a field of struggles tending to transform or conserve this field of forces” (1993: 30, italics in 
original).6
                                                          
5 ...and thus channelling Adorno (1991), who proposed that the culture industry strives to sterilize any cultural 
product that might stand a substantive chance of breeding mass discontent with established ideological systems. 
6 Though I will not do so explicitly at every applicable juncture of the discussion to follow, I would request that the 
reader not only note the wealth of parallels between the theoretical presuppositions of Bourdieu and Foucault, 
but the ease with which they can be taken to complement one another in broaching subjects (or employing discur-
sive concepts) that either one or the other did not explicitly entertain. 
 The field of cultural production plays host to two categories of cultural producers, 
each of which operate in collusion with distinctly contrasting logics and each of which, further-
more, correlate their artistic production toward the ultimate objective of obtaining the ability to 
dictate the dominant structuration of the entire field. In christening this perpetual programme of 
struggle a competition over the ability to determine the “dominant principle of hierarchization” 
(1993: 40), Bourdieu sought to rationalize those processes through which the field of cultural 
48 
 
production could simultaneously prop up the field of power while, at times, appearing to operate 
by a completely inverted logic to that of the ‘economic world’. We might thus turn our attention 
to Bourdieu’s postulations concerning the struggle between those who aspire to assure a field-
wide allegiance to the heteronomous principle of hierarchization, those who might challenge 
such in support of an autonomous principle of hierarchization, and the strategies that each em-
ploys in striving to achieve their aspired goals. 
 
3.3.3 The Struggle for Hierarchization and the Legitimation of Capital  
At the risk of oversimplification, we might say that Bourdieu’s primary argument cen-
tres around the prospect that cultural producers will intrinsically gravitate toward prescribed po-
sitions within the field of cultural production by virtue of two deeply interrelated factors: one’s 
fundamental ‘dispositions’ (or method of ‘being’, as informed by their class-inscribed habitus) 
and the capital - be it economic, cultural, social or symbolic - which they possess at the onset of 
their induction into the ‘game’. Those actors imbued with a habitus derived from positioning 
within social spaces primarily centred around the procurement of economic capital, and who thus 
stand to acquire privilege from the continued perpetuation of the wider field of power, implicitly 
tailor their practices (and products) toward recreating the logic of the market within the field of 
cultural production. As they stand to benefit from the perpetuation of established systems of 
power distribution (and thus tailor their products toward protecting these systems - be it through 
actively creating the market or reinforcing a wider allegiance to its logic), Bourdieu elects to 
identify those who participate in the creation of highly commercialized cultural products as striv-
ing to facilitate a heteronomous principle of hierarchization within the cultural field. Those who 
might gravitate toward the field from social spaces that value forms of capital alternative to those 
revered within the field of power - such as spaces in which one’s stern refusal to embody the 
logic of the market economy translates into a highly coveted manifestation of symbolic capital, 
for example - will tailor their products and practices toward facilitating a field that is primarily 
centred around the dissemination of alternative gains. Bourdieu deduced that these actors as 
these correlate their practices toward realizing a field of cultural production entailing an autono-
mous principle of hierarchization and, by extension, a field of production so estranged from the 
wider field of power that it stands as an inverted economy wherein achieving success with mass 
audiences actually serves to deplete one’s capital reserves.  
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Though the omnipresence of both breeds of artistic producer effectively creates two 
parallel ‘artistic communities’ - one in which select producers create artefacts for mass consump-
tion (the sub-field of large-scale production) and another in which art is created ‘for art’s sake’ 
and, primarily, for consumption by other like-minded producers (the sub-field of restricted pro-
duction) - each camp nonetheless strives to achieve jurisdiction over the wider field - even if 
only for the fact that the successful entrenchment of the heteronomous principle of hierarchiza-
tion would endanger the established means through which autonomous producers accumulate 
capital (and vice versa). By Bourdieu’s account, then, the struggle which structures the wider 
field of cultural production is that between those producers who, in striving to institute a heter-
onomous principle of hierarchization, might facilitate a field which will parallel the structural 
tenets of the ‘economic world’ and those producers who, in vying to realize a field entailing an 
autonomous principle of hierarchization, might aid in constructing a field in which the principles 
of the wider ‘economic world’ are effectively reversed. Though the struggle over the ability to 
dictate the hierarchical logic of the entire field of cultural production has never produced a dis-
cernable victor, Bourdieu notes that certain sub-populations of artistic producers can be taken as 
operating by the tenets of one of the competing logics. By way of example, the fact that popular 
novelists constitute an artistic community in which high book sales are taken to indicate success 
suffices in suggesting a sub-field guided by heteronomous principles. As poets thrive less on 
commercial success than the reputation and prestige awarded to them within small circles of fel-
low poets, that realm of the field can be taken as endorsing a dedication to the autonomous logic. 
It is no wonder, then, that Bourdieu notes that poets are regarded as artistic failures within circles 
of popular novelists and popular novelists considered insincere opportunists by the community of 
poets. 
It should go without saying that, in the case of those artistic producers so championed 
within the punk subculture, the gross majority of those deemed ‘legitimate’ or ‘authentic’ pro-
duce their works in correspondence with the autonomous logic of the sub-field of restricted pro-
duction.  It is of dire importance to note, however, that their allegiance to the autonomous logic 
might not necessarily be entirely dependent upon their own choice in doing so.  In returning 
briefly to the topic of the field of subcultural participation – and in situating the subcultural field 
within the wider field of power – it is worth highlighting the fact that the field of subcultural par-
ticipation asserts itself in ideological opposition to the wider field of power.  This postulation is 
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rendered all the more salient in considering instances – one of which will be detailed to a greater 
extent in the Chapter to follow - in which actors within the field of subcultural production and 
subcultural consumers alike effectively deem artistic producers ‘illegitimate’ or ‘inauthentic’ 
should they develop business relationships with the corporatized sphere of the ‘mainstream’ mu-
sic industry.   
 
3.3.4 Producing Discourse and Disseminating Legitimacy: The Processes of Consecration 
Bourdieu ultimately deduces that the field of cultural production is primarily structured 
by the opposition “between two economies…which endlessly produces and reproduces the nega-
tive existence of the sub-field of restricted production and its basic opposition to the bourgeois 
economic order” (1993: 53). However, he also notes the presence of a second program of long-
standing struggle which might have a comparably significant impact upon the structure of the 
field: namely, “the opposition, within the sub-field of restricted production…[between] the es-
tablished figures and the newcomers, i.e. between artistic generations” (1993: 53, italics in 
original). Though the processes through which artists in the sub-field of large-scale production 
have few means of accumulating the artistic capital which they seek beyond creating products to 
be deemed popular with the mass public, the conventions of capital dissemination as employed 
within the sub-field of restricted production are much more amenable to the creative whims of 
fledgling producers “who cannot make their own mark without pushing into the past those who 
have an interest in stopping the clock, eternalizing the present state of things” (1993: 60). 
Though the autonomous principle of hierarchization might be allotted the ability to persist de-
spite the emergence of a new onslaught of cultural producers, the same cannot be said for the 
bases on which the processes of hierarchization are actively executed; especially when consider-
ing that the process of improving one’s position within the sub-field of restricted production en-
tails “winning recognition…of one’s difference from other producers…[and], by the same token, 
creating a new position, ahead of the positions already occupied, in the vanguard” (1993: 60). 
Bourdieu posits that one historical by-product of these struggles, which now functions 
to facilitate the recurrence of each struggle, is the creation of the ‘genre’. The genre is an entity 
that effectively “widens the gap between the two sub-fields and leads to the increasing autono-
mization of the sub-field of restricted production” (1993: 53) through the utilization of “pseudo-
concepts”, or “practical classifying tools which create resemblances and differences by naming 
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them…[facilitate one’s] struggle for recognition…and function as emblems which distinguish 
galleries, groups and artists and therefore the products they make or sell” (106, italics in origi-
nal). Though duly noted that pseudo-concepts - such as ‘drama’, ‘poetry’ and the ‘novel’ - origi-
nally sufficed, and continue to serve as, a means by which artistic producers and their products 
could be categorized, differentially legitimized, and comparatively placed into the hierarchical 
order of valued works, the contemporary practice of creating new genres entails one strategy 
through which actors might create new (and more prestigious) positions within the sub-field of 
restricted production. In essence, the emergence of a new genre, and a new palette of works serv-
ing to constitute it, threatens to interrupt the established hierarchical order and, indeed, perma-
nently disrupt the established processes through which capital is distributed and legitimacy as-
sessed. The genre, then, might be taken as one of the primary weapons through which the strug-
gle between the established vanguard and the new generation - which Bourdieu effectively de-
scribes as a struggle “between cultural orthodoxy and heresy” (1993: 53) - finds perpetual con-
tinuation. 
It naturally follows that Bourdieu deduces that the struggles which structure the field of 
cultural production are primarily manifest in the entrenchment of the differential strategies 
through which modes of artistic production are catalogued and, by extension, the methods 
through which their legitimacy is appraised. As such, the most potent strategies through which 
artistic works are deemed ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’ are necessarily discursive strategies, and 
the primary struggle over the dominant principle of hierarchization can simultaneously be read as 
“a struggle for the monopoly of legitimate discourse about the work of art, and consequently in 
the production of the value of the work of art” (1993: 36). It is, therefore, crucial to note that 
Bourdieu does not presuppose that artistic producers are the sole agents engaged in the struggle 
over the dominant principle of hierarchization, and any attempt to understand the struggles which 
serve to establish the structure of the field of cultural production must take due note of the fact 
that, 
 
 
…works of art exist as symbolic objects only if they are known and recognized…as [so-
cially instituted] works of art and received by spectators capable of knowing and recogniz-
ing them as such. [therefore,] the sociology of art and literature has to take as its object not 
only the material production but also the symbolic production of the work, i.e. the produc-
tion of the value of the work or, which amounts to the same thing, of belief in the value of 
the work. It therefore has to consider as contributing to production not only the direct pro-
ducers of the work in its materiality (artists, writers, etc.) but also the producers of the 
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meaning and value of the work - critics, publishers, gallery directors and the whole set of 
agents whose combined efforts produce consumers capable of knowing and recognizing the 
work of art as such. (1993: 37, my italics)  
 
 
It would thus appear as if those who hold jurisdiction over the discourse concerning ar-
tistic products ultimately retain the ability to grant the legitimacy so sought after within the com-
peting sub-fields of cultural producers, substantiate the construction of new genres, and guaran-
tee artistic ‘success’ or ‘failure’ by sheer virtue of their authority in shaping the manner in which 
wider audiences perceive of, and react, to the landscape of cultural products. Bourdieu concedes 
that these ‘producers of meaning’ - and, in particular, the artistic critic - effectively hold a mo-
nopoly over the dissemination of legitimacy in both the sub-fields of large-scale production and 
restricted production, albeit in a drastically differential sense: whereas those among the former 
depend on the consecration that the approving critique might extend to their works for the sake 
of their commercial viability, the wrong kind of positive critical attention can assassinate the le-
gitimacy of an artistic work created within the confines of the latter. In sum, the critics, publish-
ers and promoters of cultural works effectively serve as the “creator of the creator” in that they 
harbour the “acknowledged power to consecrate” the legitimacy of a cultural producer by “[pro-
claiming] the value of the author he defends…and above all [investing] his prestige in the au-
thor’s cause, acting as a ‘symbolic banker’ who offers as security all the symbolic capital he has 
accumulated” (1993: 77).  
Of course, this necessarily begs the question as to where these ‘symbolic bankers’ might 
derive their own symbolic capital from. Bourdieu accounts for this phenomenon in arguing that 
the spheres of artistic criticism, publishing, and promotion also constitute sub-fields, within the 
wider field of cultural production, that endorse a similarly attuned structural logic based around 
the accumulation of economic and symbolic capital. As critical media outlets, publishing houses 
and art galleries derive economic capital from the processes through which they ‘invest’ in artists 
with a high potential for marketability and, alternatively, derive symbolic capital from ‘invest-
ing’ in artists who demonstrate a high potential to accumulate a celebrated reputation within 
genre-specific audiences, Bourdieu places the ultimate power of consecration less with any cor-
poreal pocket of actors than with “the field of production, understood as the system of objective 
relations between these agents or institutions” (1993: 78) itself. Though I wish not to dwell on 
the matter, it is interesting to note that, once again, considerations concerning the root of power 
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ultimately trace back to an omnipotent force, born of intrinsically stratified social spaces, that 
primarily works through social actors in securing the perpetuation of practices facilitating the 
structuration of social interaction. 
 
3.4 Section Three: On the Multiplicity of Possible Struggles Informing the Present Analysis 
and the Proliferation of Subcultural Micro-Media 
 
In sum, Bourdieu’s analysis highlights how those in possession of the ability to con-
struct the discourse that cultural consumers utilize in approaching the artistic product are likely 
to hold domain over the processes through which artistic producers cumulate worth (be it eco-
nomic or symbolic) and, thus, jurisdiction over the overarching structure of any particular sub-
field of artistic production. As noted previously, Thornton has subsequently extended a strong 
argument to suggest that subcultures primarily come to find constitution with the aid of commu-
nication media products; most notably those ‘niche’ media resources which not only function to 
create ‘cultural knowledge’ through exposing subcultural audiences to certain artistic products 
and practices, but grant said products and practices a legitimacy born of their critical approval. In 
combining these theoretical trajectories, I would argue that we might extract three preliminary 
notes - or note the presence of three potential ‘programs of struggle’, if you will - that might ul-
timately aid us in correlating the struggles inherent to the field of cultural production with the 
emergence of the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representation.  
1. Communications media products facilitate a sub-field of cultural knowledge produc-
tion that participates in the constitution of ‘legitimate’ cultural knowledge. As Bourdieu regards 
communication media producers to be actors who fill a significant function within the wider field 
of cultural production, we might also presuppose that they, like those populations of artistic pro-
ducers, are engaged within a perpetual struggle to protect (or improve) their positions within a 
hierarchy of communication media products. In addition to participating in struggles attuned to 
deducing the dominant principle of hierarchization, it might be presumed that communication 
media producers also participate in a struggle over the authority to construct cultural knowledge. 
We might, therefore, not only assume the presence of what can be referred to as a sub-field of 
cultural knowledge production, but one which operates in a manner similar to those fields con-
tributing to the production of scientific knowledge, another realm which Bourdieu (1999) de-
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notes as being structured by a perpetual program of struggle. Though the sub-fields of scientific 
knowledge production also entertain competitions between actors vying to improve their stand-
ing within the hierarchy of knowledge producers, Bourdieu suggests that these struggles also en-
tail a consequence whereby the legitimacy of certain forms of knowledge - and, indeed, entire 
scientific paradigms - is rendered dependent upon the state of struggles within the field at any 
given time. In essence, and though the sub-field of cultural knowledge production entails a com-
petition over the symbolic capital to be derived from supporting ‘bankable’ artistic producers, it 
is ultimately a struggle tailored toward deducing who can legitimately ‘speak’ and, most impor-
tantly, what can be looked upon as constitutive of legitimate cultural knowledge (on the sheer 
grounds of who ‘spoke’ to its validity). It might thus be proposed that the struggle between 
communication media figures to obtain consecration as the legitimate source for cultural knowl-
edge concurrently grants those most successful consecration as the legitimate creators of cultural 
knowledge.  
2. The creation of new pseudo-concepts (or genres) constitutes a strategy through which 
cultural knowledge producers can challenge the hierarchical orthodoxy within the sub-field of 
cultural knowledge production. As in the wider field of cultural production, we might presume 
that cultural knowledge producers also adopt a number of strategies through which to challenge 
the current hierarchy of relations within the field with the ultimate aspiration of improving their 
own positioning. It is doubtlessly the case that the most conventional means through which cul-
tural knowledge producers vie to protect or challenge the status of field positioning, regardless of 
whether they create cultural knowledge for use in the sub-field of large-scale production or the 
sub-field of restricted production, is through the practice of not only ‘investing’ their interest in 
deserving cultural producers, but being the first to do so. One might ask, what better way to de-
velop an esteemed reputation among targeted readerships than through not only being the first to 
consecrate the work of an artist who comes to be cherished and deemed influential, but reserving 
the ability, exercised through any number of means, to remind audiences of this fact in conse-
crating subsequent artists? One possible response to this question (which presents itself as rhe-
torical but is, in fact, not) is that the best way might prove to be the first to introduce the work of 
a soon-to-be-revered artist to the largest audience or, in other words, through poaching artists 
having been consecrated by less renowned publications. A case in point rests with the fact that, 
though Rolling Stone magazine was not the first to feature Nirvana (Azerrad, 1993), the band’s 
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1992 cover appearance - alongside a caption declaring that Rolling Stone has discovered the 
“new faces of rock” (Rolling Stone, 1992) - seems to be the image which has indelibly seeped 
into the public conscience.7
The prevalence of these possibilities necessarily begs the question as to which sub-field 
ultimately retains the most power over the process through which pseudo-concepts stand to be 
granted legitimating as ‘real’ entities or movements. Should Foucault’s aforementioned assertion 
 It might therefore be deduced that merely being the first publication 
to detail an emerging artist is not enough.  
We might also assume that being the first publication to detail an artistic movement, and 
establishing one’s own authority in speaking of that movement before one’s competitors succeed 
in catching wind of its emergence, breeds an authority that is considerably more impervious to 
usurpation. Alas, we must reaffix our attention to the notion of the pseudo-concept and the 
means through which Bourdieu declares that cultural producers might jockey to disrupt the or-
thodoxy of the field of positions through creating the perception of new artistic genres with 
which to align themselves. It is of note, however, that Bourdieu would not seem to determine 
which sub-field, if any, retains the greatest proclivity for planting the seeds from which legiti-
mated pseudo-concepts blossom; and it would serve as a stretch to assume that the creation of 
new genres cannot be accomplished lest the artistic producer, artistic promoter and those collud-
ing in the process of artistic consecration combine their efforts in a collective assault against the 
hierarchy of field-positions. It is likely the case that any one of the three sub-fields might take the 
initiative and, should they succeed, inspire those remaining to follow suit in substantiating the 
presence of the perceived movement. It is equally possible that, should the construction of a 
novel pseudo-concept only appear to benefit the sub-field from which it emerged, that the corre-
sponding sub-fields will vie to contribute to its substantiation in a manner that might not only 
benefit their interests, but dissolve the jurisdiction which the sub-field of original authorship 
holds over its constitution. Finally, it is also possible that the sub-field which constructs the 
pseudo-concept might inadvertently, or maliciously, affix their categorization to artistic works 
without ensuring the permission, or heeding the protests, of those who stand to be impacted 
amongst the corresponding sub-fields.  
                                                          
7 Granted, the fact that Nirvana’s front-man, Kurt Cobain, was resolute in donning a t-shirt which read ‘corporate 
rock magazines still suck’ during the Rolling Stone cover shoot – potentially as a means of deflecting claims of hav-
ing ‘sold out’ (Heath and Potter, 2004) – is likely an ancilliary reason as to why the image is so easily recalled to this 
day. 
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that power and the creation of knowledge are symbiotically entwined with one another carry cre-
dence, it almost goes without saying that we might assume that the sub-field of cultural knowl-
edge production harbours the greatest ability in those processes regarding the substantiation of 
the pseudo-concept. That is to say, though the artistic producer (or artistic promoter) can claim, 
“this work is something new, exciting and well worth your support” in hopes of displacing the 
upper echelons of the hierarchy of positions within their native sub-field, they must defer to the 
cultural knowledge producers in hopes of having any such claims gain prominence within the 
wider sphere of cultural consumers lying beyond their personal social networks. Should cultural 
knowledge producers aspire to invoke a spatial regeneration bordering on ‘heresy’ within their 
sub-field, however, the implicit powers extended to them as the gatekeepers of artistic consecra-
tion grant them leverage in not only deducing what is ‘new’, ‘exciting’ and ‘well worth atten-
tion’, but to do so with an authoritative voice that might far eclipse that of the artistic producer 
while drowning out whatever objections he or she might have to the manner in which their work 
is being classified and ‘sold’ to mass publics.  
 An excellent example rests with the emergence of the perceived ‘grunge’ movement in 
the early 1990s. Following the considerable commercial success of Nirvana’s Nevermind and 
Pearl Jam’s debut album, Ten, there was a proliferation of niche-media reportage concerning Se-
attle’s ‘grunge’ scene that strove to cover (and discover) the bands renowned as being constitu-
tive of it while, quite unsubtly, celebrating the manner in which the movement had effectively 
ceased the commercial dominance of the ‘Hair Metal’ genre (Snowden, 1996). What the music 
press did not take account of (or conveniently neglected to admit) was that some of the most 
prominent so-called ‘grunge’ bands, like Soundgarden and Alice In Chains, had formerly been 
categorized as metal bands and, in the case of the latter, continued to proclaim themselves to be a 
metal band (Gilbert and Aledort, 1996). Though to no avail, a sizable contingent of figures 
within the Seattle music scene actively strove to disown and de-legitimize the mediated grunge 
label, the most prominent example being the instance in which Sub Pop records receptionist 
Megan Jasper, speaking with the New York Times as a self-professed ‘expert’ on the grunge 
subculture, conned the paper into publishing an article concerning a ‘grunge lingo’ that did not 
actually exist (Henry, 2007). Meanwhile, the Seattle music community fell victim to a bom-
bardment of unrequited media attention, and veritable swarms of major label representatives 
(Beaujour, 1996), that did not subside until the ‘grunge’ label fell out of use as the flagship bands 
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of the movement either began to ‘burn out’ or ‘fade away’.8
Unfortunately, as Bourdieu did not share his own thoughts on the process whereby the 
field of cultural consumers account for a sudden shift in the nature of the artefacts imparted upon 
them by the field of cultural production, and as Thornton only details the manner through which 
 Alas, we might not only deduce 
such to have been a case in which cultural knowledge producers had constructed the perception 
of a pseudo-concept independent of the intentions (and best interests) of those artists ostensibly 
being heralded as part of it, but a case in which those artistic producers struggled, and failed, to 
bring the legitimacy of the pseudo-concept, and those perpetuating it, into question. 
3. Mediated pseudo-concepts that inspire the emergence of new subcultural manifesta-
tions can incite a climate of ‘strain’ in pre-existing subcultural fields that might initiate a move-
ment whereby ‘subcultural traditionalists’ aspire to protect the consecration of the established 
conventions. It is extremely important to note that, as freshly mediated pseudo-concepts do not 
exist in a cultural vacuum, the emergence of the subcultural manifestations that they might in-
spire are bound to threaten the sanctity of the conventions endorsed by (and capital-stocks pos-
sessed within) pre-existent fields of subcultural participation. Though we might imagine that the 
exclusivity of the subcultural field is typically under some degree of endangerment (there would 
indeed be instances wherein a cherished artist ‘accidentally’ slips on to the mainstream radar, or 
a sizable portion of ‘outsiders’ nonchalantly stumble across the channels of privileged subcul-
tural information), the emergence of a mediated pseudo-concept that strives to poach artists or 
conventions that already ‘belong’ to a collectivity of established subculturalists in constituting 
itself, or vies to ‘recycle’ movements that, though long devoid of mainstream appeal, are far 
from being dead and entirely abandoned, are bound to instigate a climate of crisis within the field 
of subcultural participation. When appearing in minute flocks, it is surely the case that subcul-
tural ‘tourists’ can be branded ‘other’ and, as the previous chapter detailed, prohibited from par-
ticipating in the ‘game’ of legitimate capital accumulation. But what if these ‘tourists’ not only 
stand to outnumber the population of established field participants, but constitute such a force as 
to rewrite the conventions of acceptable practice in a manner better reflecting the knowledge 
culled from ‘heretical’ niche media than that of ‘proper’ field inculcation? What, in essence, if 
the ‘rules’ suddenly change?  
                                                          
8 To steal a quote from what is unquestionably the most famous suicide note of the 20th century and, at the same 
time, Neil Young’s “My My, Hey Hey”. 
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subculturalists react to positive coverage on the part of the mass media, we need look elsewhere 
for a theoretical framework that might aid the development of a general idea as to how the estab-
lished subculturalist might grapple with the prospect of a subcultural field at risk of being fun-
damentally restructured. I would thus wish to elect that Robert Merton’s (1968) strain theory 
might not only carry some relevance in regards to the conversation at hand, but concerns itself 
with many of the themes prevalent in Bourdieu’s own insights. In Merton’s view, social ‘devi-
ance’ erupts by virtue of the manner in which social actors negotiate an inclination to achieve the 
‘goals’ coveted by the wider society (such as achieving success and social prestige) with the 
availability of means through which they might do so. Depending upon whether actors accept or 
reject these cultural goals, and whether they aspire to achieve them through socially sanctioned 
or socially disavowed means, Merton constructed a typology whereby individuals might fall into 
five groupings. The first, conformists, not only harbour a proclivity toward accepting the validity 
of the coveted goals, but tailor their actions in a manner resembling the conventional means of 
achieving them. Innovators, on the other hand, accept the goals but - often in considering the 
likelihood whereby they might do otherwise - reject the acceptable means of achieving them. 
Ritualists, for their part, abide by the means of achieving such cultural goals despite the fact that 
they have either lost sight of, or given up on achieving, the goals themselves. In implicitly reject-
ing not only the conventional goals, but the means of procuring them, retreatists essentially 
‘drop out’ of the race altogether. The final category, the rebels, essentially vie to entrench new 
goals to be sought after and deduce new means through which to achieve them. This last cate-
gory is, in fact, that in which Merton placed practices related to participation within ‘deviant’ 
subcultural manifestations.  
Should we entertain the notion that it is possible to construct a similar typology in con-
cerning subculturalists duly faced with the threat that the goals long aspired for within the sub-
cultural field (such as garnering prestige and authority within the collectivity) might soon only be 
achieved through alternative means than previously established, we might deduce the likelihood 
of four potential responses. If possible to do so in a manner allowing that any degree of one’s 
previously established legitimacy might be retained, subcultural conformists might continue to 
strive for the coveted goals, but through adhering to the newly designated ‘acceptable’ means of 
doing so - a transition that might demand that they abandon previous tropes in taste and fashion 
for the sake of adopting the new trends in musical preference and dress. Subcultural ritualists 
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might deduce that continuing to aspire to the overarching goals through employing the new bevy 
of means is not a worthwhile venture and, in doing so, retain their proclivities for subcultural 
taste and practice at the expense of succeeding in the modified ‘game’ at hand. My own experi-
ences might suggest that the largest contingent of participants effectively render themselves sub-
cultural retreatists who not only reject the new means of achieving subcultural goals, but even-
tually come to reject the entire prospect of participating within the subcultural field.  
In lieu of bastardizing Merton’s typology to a degree extending past that required, I 
would argue that we need only propose one additional category that I would wish to christen 
subcultural traditionalists. Subcultural traditionalists might not only reject the emergence of the 
new methods of achieving the traditional goals, but actively strive to resist or counteract the on-
set of their wider adoption and, by extension, the total extinction of the conventions informing 
the previous incarnation of the field. They are the vanguard which vies to protect the sanctity of 
those conventions having previously informed the individual and collectivistic ‘games’ serving 
to have structured the subcultural field (Chapter 2) against the influx of ‘heretical’ newcomers, 
the treachery of subcultural conformists, and the exodus of subcultural retreatists. Subcultural 
traditionalists might indeed require the employment of any number of subcultural resistance tac-
tics; the most traditional of which (at least within the punk subculture) has been that of stigmatiz-
ing artists who achieve some measure of commercial success for having ‘sold out’ their status as 
authentic representatives of the field.9
There would, in essence, appear to be three programs of struggle - between fellow cul-
tural knowledge producers, between the sub-field of cultural knowledge production and those 
other fields participating within the wider field of cultural production, and between those cultural 
knowledge producers who facilitate the construction of subcultural manifestations and the pre-
existing subcultural collectives who they thereby offend - that might be assumed to approach an 
apex of intensification when attempts to introduce a new pseudo-conceptual ‘genre’ are initiated. 
This thesis will argue that the sub-field of cultural knowledge production is primarily responsible 
for the initial constitution of the ‘emo’ genre, and that this triage of struggles each sufficed to 
contribute, in some manner, to the corresponding construction of the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil.  How-
ever, as I have not yet adequately granted grounds on which to substantiate the claim that princi-
  
                                                          
9 As a point of fact, it would appear that ‘selling out’ has been a heretical practice within the punk subculture for as 
long as the punk subculture has existed – and the band most widely believed to have committed the sin was, 
somewhat inconceivably, the Clash (Gray, 2004: 218). 
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ple authorship of this representational construct might be traced back to the field of subcultural 
participants and, more specifically, those who we have come to deem subcultural traditionalists, I 
wish to dedicate some attention to the emergence of contemporary communicative technologies 
and the manner in which subcultural collectives have adapted to them.  I argue that contemporary 
communicative technologies have initiated a process through which subcultural participants have 
had opportunity to infiltrate the sub-field of cultural knowledge production. 
 
3.5 Blurring the boundaries between knowledge consumers and knowledge producers: Mi-
cro-media in the Internet age. 
 
At this point, it might serve to our benefit if we briefly return to Thornton’s concept of 
subcultural micro-media and, most importantly, the qualities that serve to differentiate its proc-
esses of construction and production from that of the niche-media. Whereas the latter are deemed 
to fulfill the function of disseminating subcultural knowledge by way of widely available infor-
mative products, the former are purported to utilize small-scale products destined for limited - 
and highly specified - distribution. Whereas niche-media producers constitute ‘outsiders’ at-
tempting to disseminate subcultural knowledge to audiences beyond the subcultural realm, mi-
cro-media producers serve as ‘insiders’ who utilize small-scale dissemination channels as a 
means of reaching ‘insider’ audiences (while preventing that subcultural knowledge be distrib-
uted through ‘outsider’ populations). Whereas niche-media strive to ‘poach’ and disseminate 
subcultural knowledge, micro-media products, in effect, are subcultural knowledge; concrete 
artefacts indelibly shaped by the patterns and practices which guide the field of subcultural par-
ticipation. It logically follows that Thornton’s account carries with it the implication that dra-
matic permutations in the manner through which subculturalists communicate with each other 
will inspire dramatic permutations in the nature of their micro-media products. 
 Having been published in 1995, Thornton’s Club Cultures just barely revokes itself of the 
ability to speak to the emergence of the Internet, the drastic means by which the prevalence of 
web-based communications might impact subcultural interaction and, by immediate extension, 
the form that micro-media has taken in a web-mediated world. Nonetheless, and as Moore has 
recently noted, “young people continue to appropriate the technologies of communications media 
to establish creative forms of work, participatory social networks, and outlets for self-
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expression” (2007: 469). Subsequent commentators have, indeed, taken pains not only to note 
the differential means through which subcultural communities have since come to constitute 
online communities, but to consider the benefits gained - and hardships sustained - by virtue of 
such processes. In concerning himself with the construction of internet forums tailored for use by 
participants of the Goth subculture, for example, Hodkinson (2007) notes a curious process 
wherein the proliferation of online ‘blogging’ practices has allowed participants to interact 
within much larger networks than sheer locality might allow - but, quite concurrently, the ability 
to do so in increasingly individualized ways. Williams vies to demonstrate how the emergence of 
online ‘straight-edge’ communities effectively “confounds the idea that a face-to-face scene is 
necessary” (2006: 195) and has thus fractured the straight-edge subculture into traditionalists 
who “[earn] respect…through doing straightedge community in local punk/hardcore music 
scenes” and “new members, disconnected (often by choice) from hardcore music scenes, [who] 
consider themselves authentic [in utilizing] computer-mediated spaces to articulate their identi-
ties and experiences as straightedgers” (195, italics in original). The important point to note here 
is that Hodkinson and Williams each came to their conclusions, in large part, through utilizing 
easily accessible web-based forums and online journals that any internet user, if so inclined, 
could access and utilize as reservoirs of cultural knowledge. In essence, those web forums and 
journal sites which concern themselves with ‘privileged’ subcultural knowledge are remarkably 
accessible, even despite the fact that they might either retain an aura of privacy or facilitate tac-
tics through which the possessors of these knowledges might nonetheless serve to have their 
claims to authenticity criticized.  
As subcultural micro-media products have also thrived in response to the emergence of 
web-based communications, the ease with which any subcultural participant (with the means and 
the integrity requisite in doing so) can become a micro-media producer - and, by extension, sub-
cultural knowledge producer - has increased dramatically. In concerning themselves with the 
permutations that the rave and straightedge subcultures have undergone in the wake of having 
‘gone online’, Wilson and Atkinson highlight the manner in which their groups of focus “used 
the Internet to promote ideologies, communities, events, and consumer products…while at the 
same time responding to the sometimes-negative mass-mediated mainstream portrayals of their 
subcultures and to attempts to incorporate their scenes” (2005: 303, my italics). In so many 
words, and in concluding that “the Internet provides subculture members with frequent and vari-
62 
 
ous opportunities to be active media audiences/consumers and producers - roles and identities 
that are also [becoming further] blurred and interconnected” (Ibid., 303) Wilson and Atkinson 
can be taken to suggest that the old boundaries that had long rendered the sub-field of cultural 
knowledge production exclusive to a limited number of individuals have effectively collapsed. 
Micro-media products - be they constitutive of on-line ‘fanzines’, photoshopped flyers, or forum 
threads allowing subcultural participants the ability to forge discourses and debates regarding the 
proper conventions of their scenes (Nogic and Riley, 2007) - are now not only just as accessible 
to mass audiences as are niche and mass media products, but afforded the opportunity to struggle 
against ‘attempts to incorporate their scenes’ within the sub-field of knowledge production itself. 
In essence, then, we might not only deduce that the subcultural micro-media producer and the 
subcultural traditionalist are one and the same person, but suspect that they would retain a pre-
disposition to employ strategies tailored toward challenging the legitimacy of niche-media 
knowledge producers, and the authenticity of aspiring subcultural ‘heretics’, simultaneously.  
 
3.6 To Return to the Genealogical Project: Uncovering Evidence of Struggle in Warring 
Mediated Outputs. 
 
To this point, I have attempted to develop an analytical framework that conceptualises 
the sub-field of cultural knowledge production as a site of potential struggle. I have argued that 
the onset of struggles over the authority to produce ‘legitimate’ cultural knowledge ultimately 
impact the field of cultural production in that they not only contribute to the development of dif-
ferentiating ‘pseudo-concepts’, but effectively ‘create’ pockets of consumers.  I have also argued 
that cultural knowledge producers can be assumed to compete for jurisdiction over the ability to 
construct and legitimate knowledge in such a manner as not only to guarantee implications for 
existing fields of subcultural participation, but that might inspire the emergence of new - and po-
tentially ‘heretical’ - subcultural manifestations.  I have advanced this framework in chorus with 
a decidedly Foucaultian presupposition that those who retain control over the processes of 
knowledge production effectively retain a great power in legitimizing the patterns of consump-
tion and practice that structure both the field of cultural production and the participatory fields of 
cultural consumption. I have advanced the argument that the emergence of new communicative 
technologies has initiated a process through which subcultural ‘micro-media’ producers - once 
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confined to the margins of cultural knowledge production in comparison to ‘niche-media’ 
knowledge producers - have been granted the means through which they can not only reach as 
wide an audience as niche-media producers, but challenge, or strive to counteract, the emergence 
of niche-mediated discourses that might serve to threaten the structuration of the existing field of 
subcultural participation. Finally, I have spoken to the possibility that these struggles will 
achieve a climax of intensification in the event that niche-media producers employ the ‘tactic’ of 
striving to create a pseudo-concept which ‘subcultural traditionalists’ might then aspire to de-
legitimate through utilizing their own role as subcultural knowledge producers. 
 In Chapter Two, I argued that the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil might be perceived, in part, as a 
representation which found construction within the punk subculture as a means of denying those 
identified as ‘emo kids’ the legitimated ability to participate within the established field of sub-
cultural participation. The current Chapter has supplied the theoretical backdrop against which I 
can now advance my central research hypothesis; namely, that the construction of this subcul-
tural folk-devil was simultaneously utilized as a means through which micro-mediated knowl-
edge producers could challenge and de-authenticate the emergence of a discourse through which 
niche-mediated knowledge producers vied to construct the perception of an emergent ‘emo’ 
genre and, thereby, risked inspiring the substantive emergence of an ‘emo’ subculture. Further-
more, in having argued that both sub-fields of cultural knowledge producers utilize the creation 
of mediated products in facilitating the dissemination of their oppositional knowledges, we might 
finally identify the subcultural products that the impending genealogy will take as its artefacts as 
being, on one hand, those niche-media products which concerned themselves with facilitating the 
perception of an emo subculture and, on the other, those micro-media products which not only 
strove to de-legitimize those publications and artistic products heralded as speaking to, or con-
stitutive of, an emo genre, but de-authenticate those subcultural ‘others’ so attracted to the field 
of subcultural participation under the auspices of the presence of an emo subculture.  
In compiling a genealogical account of the emergence of (and subcultural reaction to) 
the emo pseudo-concept, the current thesis will employ a methodological framework which can 
be partitioned into three distinct components. In utilizing the testimonies through which Alterna-
tive Press Magazine founder and executive editor Mike Shea recounts the storied history of his 
publication, I will employ a program of critical discourse analysis in concerning the climate 
within the sub-field of cultural knowledge production (and the wider subcultural ‘underground’) 
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prior to the consecration of the emo pseudo-concept. Above and beyond justifying the adoption 
of our Bourdieuian framework, approaching Shea’s testimony as a discourse that subtly speaks to 
the presence of a climate of struggle between niche-media producers will suffice in supporting 
the notion that the ‘emo’ genre was less an organic artistic advent than a necessitated mediated 
construct. The second component of the genealogical initiative will demand that we employ a 
program of critical content analysis in arguing that the coverage featured in Alternative Press 
Magazine, and concurrent publications like Greenwald’s (2004) Nothing Feels Good: Punk 
Rock, Teenagers, and Emo, can be taken to denote initiatives through which cultural knowledge 
producers vied to substantiate the presence of an emergent ‘emo’ genre. This program of content 
analysis will allow that we observe the means through which knowledge producers subtly strove 
to re-categorize artistic producers, revise the history of choice subcultural works, and extend the 
parameters of the ‘emo’ pseudo-concept as a means of creating (and asserting one’s own author-
ity over) an emergent body of knowledge concerning the genre. Finally, we will employ simulta-
neous programmes of critical discourse analysis and critical content analysis in concerning our-
selves with the manner in which subcultural traditionalists used such micro-media sites as 
Punknews.org to facilitate an anti-emo discourse (which subsequently inspired the emergence of 
anti-emo subcultural products) that was duly tailored toward stigmatizing those associated with, 
and perceived as supportive of, the emergent pseudo-genre. It is within these discursive strate-
gies, and within these subcultural products, that we might uncover the development of the stereo-
types that would come to inform the construction of the ‘emo-kid’ folk-devil.  
In the chapter to follow, I subject the testimonies of those cultural knowledge producers 
which I deem primarily responsible for the emergence of the contemporary ‘emo’ pseudo-
concept to a discourse analysis uncovering the embedded ‘history’ of the struggle over the ability 
to shape the dominant discourse surrounding ‘emo’. In doing so, I will necessarily devote some 
attention to justifying why I have come to extend particular publications and artists a privileged 
role in facilitating the climate in which the ‘emo’ pseudo-concept was allotted the ability to 
emerge and, indeed, the manner in which the term originally came to warrant utilization itself.  
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Chapter Four. The Prelude to the Reconstitution of a Pseudo-genre: Brief Histories of 
‘Emotional Hardcore’, Alternative Press, and the Early 21st
4.1 Introductory Notes 
 Century Subcultural Climate.  
 
In keeping with the analytical framework provided in the previous chapter, the genea-
logical analysis, this chapter will serve to better contextualize this thesis’ two corresponding hy-
potheses. The first hypothesis, to be granted a significant amount of attention in Chapter 5, is that 
the perceived emergence of an ‘emo’ movement can be attributed to processes through which 
select actors within the sub-field of cultural knowledge production (and, in particular, niche-
media producers) attempted to facilitate the construction of a new pseudo-conceptual genre 
(heretofore referred to as the ‘pseudo-genre’) and, in doing so, renegotiate the hierarchy of cul-
tural knowledge producers by formulating new means of acquiring coveted manifestations of 
capital. The second, to be detailed in Chapter 6 considers the possibility that the emergence of 
the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil can be correlated with discursive strategies through which subcultural 
traditionalists, having infiltrated the sub-field of cultural knowledge production through the pro-
liferation of web-based micro-mediated products, strove to protect the consecration of the pre-
existent field of subcultural participation through assassinating the legitimacy of those artistic 
producers - and fledgling subculturalists - who might reinforce the reification of such a move-
ment. Before moving on to these tasks, however, it is important that I substantiate a number of 
the propositions that I have heretofore advanced. One is the notion that this new subcultural en-
tity primarily stood to threaten the conventions of the punk subculture - in no small part because 
the very term ‘emo’ was unapologetically annexed from punk discourse. Another is the presup-
position that niche-media producers are duly engaged in a ruthless struggle for status, the author-
ity in legitimating cultural producers, and commercial viability. Yet another is that the subcul-
tural affront against ‘emo’ simultaneously can be perceived as an affront against those artistic 
producers who came to be associated with the movement (be it by their own design or other-
wise).  
This chapter details the state of relations within the various punk-subculturalist fields 
before the initial movement toward constructing and consecrating the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre found 
initiation. In doing so, I will detail the original genesis of the term ‘emo’ and argue that the term 
came into use as a means through which subcultural traditionalists strove to protect the sanctity 
of the subcultural field in which it arose. My focus will also concern the history of Alternative 
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Press Magazine; the niche-media publication that I will opt to identify as the principal architect 
of the perceived emergence of the contemporary emo ‘movement’. I also comment upon and 
contextually situate Punknews.org, the micro-media entity of my primary focus, subcultural arte-
facts (including Deep Elm records’ Emo Diaries compilation series and Weezer’s 1996 
Pinkerton album) and ‘underground’ artists (including AFI and Saves The Day) who would - 
with intent or otherwise - inevitably come to facilitate the climate in which the contemporary 
emo pseudo-genre would emerge and come to find constitution.  
 I wish to prelude the discussion with a word of preliminary caution. In compiling the ac-
count to follow, I acknowledge the inevitability of pulling information from many of the medi-
ated products that will subsequently be submitted to a critical content analysis centred, in part, 
around advancing the argument that niche-media products attempt to legitimize the pseudo-
genres that they strive to consecrate through constructing ‘artificial histories’ of the genre. As 
such, it is entirely possible that the true ‘history’ of the initial emergence of the ‘emo’ genre, and 
the manufactured history of the emo genre, are indissolubly entwined in such a fashion as to 
bring the legitimacy of any conceivable source into question.  
 
4.2 1978-1980: The Rise of American Hardcore. 
 
Any attempt to explicate and contextualize the emergence of ‘emotional hardcore’, the 
genre which would later come to be heralded as a precursor of contemporary emo music, neces-
sitates (at the very least) a cursory explication of the emergence of the ‘hardcore’ genre itself. 
According to subcultural lore, hardcore came into being as North American youth began to fa-
miliarize themselves with the bands spearheading the politicized punk rock movement in Eng-
land but, simultaneously, also developed a distaste for the highly publicized (and stereotyped) 
conventions as purportedly being endorsed by England’s punk subculture. With the establish-
ment of fanzines like Search And Destroy, Damaged and Los Angeles Flipside (soon after 
amended to Flipside), and a steady stream of debut singles from the likes of The Germs, Fear, 
Black Flag and The Dead Kennedys, the California coast effectively became the region within 
which the conventions set to guide the decidedly American permutation of punk culture were to 
be established (Savage, 1991). However, whereas the latter groups were primarily drawn to punk 
as an avenue through which to merge artistry with counter-hegemonic social commentaries 
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(Grad, 2008), the former appeared to adopt the style by virtue of its appreciation for a lack of 
musicianship and the notion (as likely facilitated by the legendary exploits of Sid Vicious and 
Iggy Pop) that punk culture served to celebrate nihilism, drug abuse and self-destruction (Brake, 
1985).  
By the time Germs vocalist Darby Crash took his own life with a calculated heroin 
overdose in 1980 (Mullen, 2001) and the initial wave of east-coast punk bands reinventing them-
selves as ‘New Wave’ acts, regional hostilities between those collectives that gravitated toward 
punk communalism on the basis of its subaltern ideology, and those collectives which did so on 
the basis of its nihilistic aestheticism, had become so prevalent that a predilection toward engag-
ing in aggressive behaviour seemingly became requisite - regardless of which ‘side’ one had ini-
tially gravitated toward.10 As increasingly aggressive subcultural conventions parlayed into in-
creasingly aggressive music,11
                                                          
10 See Blush (1991) for a plethora of reflective accounts that serve to substantiate these points. 
11 ...which, in turn, begat the influx of increasingly aggressive audiences, not the least of which was those white 
supremacist groups who had become so prevalent as to inspire the Dead Kennedys to record and popularize a 
song (and slogan) entitled “Nazi Punks Fuck Off” in 1981. 
 the term ‘hardcore’, originally coined by the Damaged fanzine in 
regarding Black Flag (and subsequently popularized as Vancouver’s DOA used the term in enti-
tling their Hardcore 81’ album), came to replace ‘punk’ as the signifier of choice among music-
based underground collectivities. As American Hardcore: A Tribal History (1991) author Steven 
Blush recalls, “Hardcore extended, mimicked, or reacted to Punk; it appropriated some aspects 
yet discarded others. It reaffirmed the attitude, and rejected New Wave. That’s why it was hard-
core Punk - [it was] for people who were fed up” (1991: 13, italics in original). 
If the legend surrounding the rise and disbandment of Minor Threat is to be taken at face value, it 
might be said that few regions took the idea of hardcore quite as seriously as did Washington, 
DC. Though the national notoriety afforded to the Bad Brains had previously cemented Wash-
ington’s reputation as a bastion in which ‘punk ideology’ and ‘punk debauchery’ best inter-
twined, the 1980 formation of Minor Threat - and the resultant amount of attention garnered by 
their outspoken front-man, Ian MacKaye - initiated a process through which the Washington 
scene would not only attempt to codify its own definition of what should constitute ‘proper’ 
hardcore conventions, but attempt to enforce those conventions on a national scale. It might be 
said that, by the close of Minor Threat’s short tenure as an active band, the field of subcultural 
participation had undergone a decisively ‘heretical’ shift - due, in large part, to the emergence of 
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the straightedge movement. 
 
4.3 1981: Minor Threat, HarDCore, and the Straightedge Movement 
 
 
In DC, we called ourselves ‘hardcore’ to distinguish between us and the Sid Vicious kind. We 
were ‘hard-core’ Punks - we weren’t into the fashion as much as we were into the approach 
and intensity and urgency. I’ve put a lot of thought to this - even before D.O.A’s Hardcore 81 
record, we’d begun to make a distinction that we were more hard-core. That’s how we came up 
with ‘harDCore’ - a play on the word. It was just zeitgeist or serendipity that we all felt the 
same way. 
Excerpt from an interview with Ian MacKaye, American Hardcore (1991:134) 
 
An early passage in Becker’s The Outsiders (1963) notes that, “whether a rule has the 
force of law or tradition or is simply the result of consensus, it may be the task of some special-
ized body, such as the police or the committee of ethics of a professional association, to enforce 
it” (1963: 2). It would not be a stretch to claim that the Washington Hardcore scene possessed a 
conglomeration of figures, standing in equivalence to a ‘committee of ethics’, by virtue of the 
manner in which MacKaye and Minor Threat’s ardent followers espoused - and enforced - their 
ethics. Having soured on the notion of the potential for intra-regionalized subcultural unity by 
virtue of a failed West Coast tour with his previous band, Teen Idles, MacKaye became enam-
oured with the prospect of strengthening the communal nature of the Washington Hardcore col-
lectivity. MacKaye would later confess to the urge “to create an imprint; I wanted to be part of a 
gang. I wanted to be part of a group…you could identify as a tribe” (Blush, 2001: 136). In con-
currently forming Minor Threat, and founding the independent Dischord Records label, it might 
be said that MacKaye not only succeeded in procuring a viable avenue through which to dis-
seminate music harbouring an ideological dimension paralleling his own (as well as his own), 
but sufficed in providing himself with the means through which he and his inner circle - includ-
ing figures who would go on to establish the seminal Flex Your Head fanzine - a virtual monop-
oly over the field of subcultural knowledge production (Azerrad, 2001). As MacKaye recounts, 
“the older Punk Rockers in DC were off put (sic) because they thought we stole the scene. Damn 
right we did! But we didn’t steal shit - we created something. We came with our own crowds. 
People say, ‘you guys came in and took over.’ Took over what? We built the motherfucker!” 
(Blush, 2001: 136). 
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MacKaye, Minor Threat, and likeminded bands such as Government Issue and S.O.A. 
(which included a pre-Black Flag Henry Rollins) set about ‘building’ a new permutation of the 
Washington scene, in large part, by constructing a decidedly more aggressive permutation of 
Hardcore; songs which proved themselves devoid of melody or any musical eccentricities be-
yond a steady succession of bar-chords, and rarely breaching the two-minute mark, quickly be-
came the norm among Dischord Record’s slate of releases and, by extension, within the commu-
nity of Washington’s hardcore artists. Though these trends in musical execution can best be at-
tributed credit for ensuring that harDCore rendered itself suitable for a limited cast of musical 
connoisseurs, it can safely be said that Minor Threat’s lyrical output can best be held responsible 
for initiating those unsavoury processes through which one’s authenticity as a communal mem-
ber was measured and validated. The song “Guilty Of Being White”, about the hardships 
MacKaye suffered by virtue of being “[blamed] for slavery a hundred years before [he] was 
born” (Complete Discography, 1989),12
Without question, however, the Minor Threat lyrics which left the most indelible im-
print on the collective conscience of the Washington scene - and, by extension, inspired the 
deepest lines of fracture - can be found in such songs as “Bottled Violence” and “Straight Edge”. 
To varying extents, each allowed MacKaye to extol the virtues of committing to a ‘straight’ life-
style prohibiting the use of drugs, alcohol, and casual sexual relations. In describing the initial 
reaction to Minor Threat’s endorsement of a clean lifestyle as “so contemptuous, we couldn’t 
believe it”, MacKaye admits that “I didn’t realize that it was gonna upset the applecart so much - 
the reaction we got made us up the ante. That’s when I realized, ‘Man, I’m saying shit, and peo-
ple are getting angry. This is really effective’.” (Blush, 2001: 26). One might assume that 
MacKaye’s decision to pen “Out Of Step (With The World)”, and therein disseminate the rally-
 effectively served to fracture the Washington scene 
along racial lines.  This is most troubling, and curious, in considering the fact that DC’s Bad 
Brains, an African American group, were revered for breaking down racial barriers within the 
context of the National scene. Just as “Seeing Red” arguably served to problematize subcultural 
cliquishness in just such a way as to incite subcultural cliquishness; “Stand Up” condemns vio-
lent altercations in just such a way as to glorify violent altercations (and, in particular, the danger 
of provoking MacKaye and his ‘friends’ into a fight).  
                                                          
12 I have cited online links to Minor Threat’s lyrics, as provided by Lyrics Domain, for the sake of convenience. 
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ing credo “Don’t smoke/ don’t drink/ don’t fuck/ at least I can fucking think” (Compete Discog-
raphy, 1989), was part of the initiative to ‘up the ante’.  
In proposing that straightedge culture be subjected to sociological enquiry some twenty-
four years after the fact, Haenfler (2004) correctly claims “the movement arose primarily as a 
response to the punk scene’s nihilistic tendencies, including drug and alcohol abuse, casual sex, 
violence, and self-destructive ‘live-for-the-moment’ attitudes” (2004: 409). Though such is true 
in a sense, the testimonies of those involved with the DC hardcore scene would suggest that, 
above all else, the movement served the function of giving the ‘harDCore’ scene leverage with 
which not only to differentiate themselves from other regional scenes, but profess claims of su-
periority. Blush himself recalls how MacKaye and Rollins - heralded as the progenitors of 
‘harDCore’ - often “travelled as a wolfpack to NYC ‘to represent’” (2001: 135). In doing little to 
dispel the accusation, Rollins recalls that, “at that point, we were ‘hardercore’ than anyone. 
There’d be people on the dance floor with cigarettes, talking while a band played. We’d just 
hammer these people. We were definitely into the ‘DC’s in the house’ thing…That’s what we 
liked to do.” (2001:137). “The whole thing was rife with contradiction,” notes Tesco Vee of the 
Meatmen. “Ian, Henry, and Sab Grey, in whatever Skinhead phase they were in, would come to 
New York, cause huge brawls and say they went up and kicked New York’s ass. How stupid is 
that?” (2001: 137).  
By what we might take to be the ‘logic’ informing the Washington hardcore collective 
of the early 80s, the practice of attempting to assert superiority through physicality was likely not 
‘stupid’ in the least. It can, as a point of fact, be conceptualized as an extension of the manner 
through which the various collectives within the Washington scene struggled, amongst them-
selves, to implement their preferred vision of the dominant principle of hierarchization among 
the communal subculture. Though Minor Threat quickly came to resent their status as a ‘straight 
edge’ band, their acolytes nonetheless adopted the practice of broadcasting their adoption of the 
philosophy through scrawling thick black X’s across the backs of their hands and persuading 
others to adopt the lifestyle - be it through applying a stigma meant to ensure conformity or 
through physical altercations. Against the backdrop of escalating hostilities between a semi-
militant straightedge collectivity and a small but virulent minority of non-straightedge Washing-
tonian subculturalites, Minor Threat disbanded in 1983. 
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Though regarded, to this day, as a seminal Hardcore act, one cannot help but wonder 
whether Minor Threat might be held partially responsible for the fact that, to this day, the punk 
and hardcore subcultures are largely homogenous in terms of the racial make-up of their partici-
pants.  Indeed, those resolved with holding a microscope to the contemporary (so-called) ‘emo 
subculture’ might immediately take note of the fact that the movement is framed as – and would 
surely appear to be – an adolescent movement largely catering to Caucasian populations.  Curi-
ously, the topic of the racialized nature of the ‘emo movement’ would not appear to have been 
granted even the slightest hint of mention amidst those initiatives wherein a variety of niche-
mediated cultural knowledge producers later aspired to advance their ‘expert’ synopses detailing 
the emergence – and significance – of the culture.  Rather than arguing, however, that the ‘emo 
culture’ was intentionally framed as a ‘Caucasoid’ movement meant to be sold to largely ‘Cauca-
soid’ populations; I would instead argue that, in spite of the storied history of anthems meant to 
call for substantive racial unity among punk and hardcore artists over the course of the past 30 
years, both these subcultures and their affiliated off-shoot cultures have, nonetheless, earned 
widespread and quasi-commonsensical recognition as a ‘white’ subculture from the point of their 
very genesis.  It would, indeed, be interesting should the racially homogenous make-up of the 
punk and hardcore subcultures be traced back, first, to each movement’s early public misrecogni-
tion as white supremacist movements13
                                                          
13 Punk Historians (for lack of a better term) would unanimously appear to locate the genesis of this misaffiliation 
with the Sex Pistols and, more specifically, Sid Vicious - not only on grounds of the fact that it was the Pistol’s bass-
ist who popularised the incorporation of the Swastika into punk fashion tropes, but also penned the song “Belsen 
Was a Gas”.  According to Lipstick Traces author Greil Marcus (1989) “Belsen Was a Gas” was not only “a musical 
version of the punk swastika” (or, a song absentmindedly meant to provoke outrage for the sheer sake of provok-
ing outrage), but holds the distinction of being a “crude, cheesy, stupid number [as] thought up...[by] the crudest, 
cheesiest, stupidest member of the band” (Marcus, 1989: 116-17).   
 and, furthermore, the manner in which songs such as Mi-
nor Threat’s “Guilty of Being White” did – and continue to – further perpetuate that misconcep-
tion.  Nevertheless, and although the link between the mid-80s Washington hardcore scene and 
the racialization of the contemporary punk and hardcore scenes is tenuous, that between the 
‘Washington HarDCore’ movement and the eventual emergence of the ‘emo movement’ is un-
debatable.     
 
4.4 Washington, 1985: ‘Revolution Summer’ and the Emergence of ‘Emo-core’ 
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Though Minor Threat were no more, the tensions that the band had provoked between 
those who came to embody the straightedge philosophy, and those who were of the opinion that 
MacKaye’s disciples had ‘stolen’ the scene, continued to permeate the hardcore community. 
MacKaye recalls that,  
 
By ‘84, DC was in a depressing situation. There was intense friction within the  
Dischord scene, the shows sucked and violence was so prevalent…I was talking to [an ac-
quaintance] and said…“why do you fight?” [She said] “Because you used to defend the scene 
but now you don’t fight anymore. Now we’re doing it”. That’s when I thought, “I’m not fight-
ing no more - ever”. Also, H.R. [of the Bad Brains] said something like that…I was at a Bad 
Brains gig with him; we were watching the opening band and there was a kid who was being 
crazy dumb. I turned to H.R. and said, “this is ridiculous.” he said, “You created it.” That hurt. 
(Blush, 2001: 156-57). 
 
It might be said that, though MacKaye’s initiative to re-invent the character of the 
Washington hardcore scene was initially successful, the inevitable realization that he could not 
supplant the conventions he had previously contributed toward consecrating, in a manner reflect-
ing his personal shift in ideology, persuaded him to develop a distaste for his own creation. 
Faced with the process wherein contemporaries opted to abandon the subculture altogether, but 
in being armed with an awareness that, “for a lot of us, [the scene] was all we had”, MacKaye 
and a number of like-minded traditionalists deduced that “we were all gonna form new bands in 
October [1984] and create our own scene. Instead of trying to take back the scene, we were just 
gonna let them go, form a new community, and start again” (Blush, 2001: 157). MacKaye and 
those other artistic producers who had congregated in light of this initiative even granted their 
project, which inspired to “reinvolve everybody and remove the parade of macho behaviour” 
(2001: 157) a name: Revolution Summer. The trio of bands that have reflexively come to be 
looked upon as best epitomizing the Revolution Summer movement are Embrace (MacKaye’s 
first post-Minor Threat musical endeavour), Dag Nasty and - perhaps most significantly - Rites 
of Spring (Azerrad, 2001).  
According to MacKaye, the Revolution Summer bands vied to challenge the doxa of the 
scene in a number of ways; be it through “[making] kids sit on the floor, [just] to fuck with 
them” (Blush, 2001: 57) or decidedly more substantive means. “At the beginning of our scene, 
we were very anti-political and in fact ridiculed people who were into politics. But for some rea-
son in ‘85, art and politics suddenly made sense to us and we ran with it. Apartheid, women’s 
issues, and the homeless were really galvanizing issues” (Blush, 2001: 157). Nothing Feels Good 
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(2003) author Andy Greenwald, on the other hand, correlates Revolution Summer - and the 
emergence of Rites of Spring in particular - with a decided shift away from politicized content. 
“With Rites of Spring, the goal was no longer to shake your fist at the injustices of the world, it 
was to shake yourself, to push down…to confront and break down the limitations of the self” 
(2003: 12). Though Greenwald cites Rites of Spring’s innovative artistry as one means through 
which the group “[broke] free of the rigid, self-imposed bonds of hardcore [as] the guitars ca-
reened dramatically and melodically across the songs like paintbrushes on a canvas [and] the 
rhythms enlivened and varied”, he locates the groups true innovation in the lyrics of vocalist Guy 
Picciotto; which “were like nothing ever heard before in punk rock: majestic, poetic, indulgent, 
ecstatic” (2003: 12). Though there is little indication that Greenwald actually attended a Rites of 
Spring show himself, he nonetheless testifies to the fact that the band “brought together an in-
spired hodgepodge of individuals eager to convert private pain into public purging…audience 
members would weep among strangers; hardened cynics would rock and sway like born-agains” 
(2003: 13). Graham McCulloch, of such noted harDCore bands as the Meatmen and Negative 
Approach, and who can be assumed to have actually attended a Rites of Spring show, described 
it as “unbearable. Rich girls would cry and throw flowers at the stage. It became Emotional-
Core” (Blush, 2001: 157). MacKaye concedes that, “the first thing [the Revolution Summer 
bands] found out was all these other kids hated us because we were ‘pussies’” (Blush, 2001: 
157). 
Greenwald states that, aside from the fact that “it first came into common practice in 
1985...the origins of the term ‘emo’ are shrouded in mystery” (2003: 14). I might posit that it 
would not require a stretch of the imagination to suggest that the term rose by virtue of a most 
curious amalgamation of circumstances. It would appear to me that the very cultural producers 
who had entrenched the means through which subcultural ‘authenticity’ was disseminated within 
the Washington hardcore scene - namely, through adhering to extremely rigid conventions in 
musical taste, ideology, and practices in which dominance was asserted through aggressiveness - 
had suddenly moved toward inspiring another movement toward ‘heresy’ through condemning 
the ‘rules’ which had come to structure the field. Whereas the progenitors of the ‘harDCore’ 
movement encouraged that reserved animosities boiled over into violence, many of those same 
figures condemned violence, while promoting self-introspection, under the banner of the ‘Revo-
lution Summer’ initiative. It can be assumed that this movement provided a great deal of strain 
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for those subculturalists who, in having constructed their subcultural identities in correspondence 
with the established conventions of the field, had a great deal to lose should Revolution Summer 
have succeeded in reshaping the conventions of subcultural capital distribution. However, and 
unless it can be assumed that Washington’s hardcore traditionalists had not any qualms with 
pummelling outspoken advocates against violence (or crying ‘rich girls’), it is likely that the tra-
ditional means of reinforcing scene hierarchization were recognized as being off limits.  
We might therefore speculate that the term ‘emotional hardcore’, or ‘emo-core’, devel-
oped as a means through which subcultural traditionalist could assault the authenticity of the 
Revolution Summer movement, and prevent the conventions guiding the structuration of the 
field from undergoing reinvention, through affixing the movement with a discursive signifier 
harbouring pejorative connotations. The testimony of Jenny Toomy, Greenwald’s first-person 
witness to the impact that Rites of Spring had on the Washington scene, can be taken to substan-
tiate this postulation in recounting that, “the only people who used [the term] at first were the 
ones that were jealous over how big and fanatical a scene it was. The bands existed well before 
the term did and they hated it.” (2003: 14-15). Nonetheless, the process whereby the term be-
came prevalent in antagonistic communal discourse - and “immediately became a big joke in the 
fanzines” - led to the onset of a “weird moment…where you were using the term even though 
you hated it” (2003: 15). Even this brief collection of quotes points to the fact that the ‘emo-core’ 
qualifier had so percolated throughout the hostile discourse of subcultural participants and 
knowledge producers as to infiltrate the discourse that others constructed around, and used in 
forming representations of, the artists who they actually supported. If the established Washington 
hardcore community might be said to have engaged in a programme of representational politics 
against the Revolution Summer insurrection, it can be declared a successful affront: there would 
not seem to be any commentators, aside from MacKaye himself, who regard the summer of 1985 
as anything other than that period typified by the onset of the ‘emo-core’ genre. 
The majority of the Revolution Summer bands had dissolved by the summer of 1986. 
Though Fugazi, the band that MacKaye and Picciotto would join forces in forming in 1987, 
would be plagued by the ‘emo-core’ qualifier at their onset, the group’s emergent proclivity for 
defying any and all musical conventions spared them the hardship of being affixed with the cate-
gorization for any great span of time (Sinker, 2008). As the Washington hardcore scene (and the 
militant straightedge movement) largely began to grow stagnant and evaporate, a new wave of 
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musically adventurous groups - including Nation of Ulysses and Shudder To Think - began to 
amass stature and recognition, alongside Fugazi, as the progenitors of the ‘progressive’ - or 
‘post’ - hardcore movement (Blush, 2001: 158). Naturally, as the Washington scene developed a 
tolerance for experimentation, and an intolerance for the machismo that had once proven preva-
lent, the term ‘emo-core’ largely fell into disuse.  
 
4.5 Cleveland, 1985: The Establishment of Alternative Press Magazine 
 
While MacKaye and his affiliates set upon striving to inspire a ‘revolution’ within the 
Washington hardcore community, aspiring fanzine publisher Mike Shea embarked upon inspir-
ing something of a revolution within the underground music scene in Cleveland, Ohio. Shea re-
calls that, “a lot of the fanzines and college radio stations back then were really negative. Every-
body was fighting one another. There wasn’t any kind of a cohesive voice [and] I saw an oppor-
tunity to unite these factions and get the word out” in deciding “to do a fanzine about the punk 
and new-wave music I was into at the time. I always wanted to stand up for the underground and 
unite it” (2003a: 38). Financed through a loan from his Grandmother and a string of successful 
benefit shows, Shea published the first issue of Alternative Press in June of 1985 and, in doing 
so, introduced the wider Ohio region to the ‘AP philosophy’. “I got heavily criticized for putting 
Depeche Mode in the zine next to Black Flag. I didn’t care - we were all one scene; we were all 
in the same boat. We’re all into the underground - lets put it all in the same spot” (2003a: 38). 
Despite the onset of criticism from rival fanzines that “were all about tearing the scene apart [and 
embodied] that whole ‘We were there, these kids don’t know nothing [philosophy]’,” Shea testi-
fies to the fact that “people started agreeing with AP’s philosophy” (2003a: 38). 
Though AP were to be commended on their music coverage philosophy, Shea admits 
that the publication’s business philosophy left a lot to be desired: the publication charged next to 
nothing for advertising space and sternly ensured, over the span of their first six issues, that Al-
ternative Press would not carry a cover charge. Shea admits that, “to even claim that we were a 
business would be a stretch. We were a bunch of fans who lived and breathed underground mu-
sic, and all we wanted to do was write about our favourite bands so that all the cool people would 
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know about them” (2003b, 52).14
On the strength of an additional sixteen thousand dollar loan from Shea’s grandmother, 
Alternative Press would spring back into distribution in the summer of 1988. Though Shea as-
serts that “AP quickly became a ‘must-have’ for anyone who bought zines”, he maintains that the 
staff still “had no idea how to run a business” and likely survived the year by virtue of being “the 
fanzine that was pulling together Cleveland’s underground scene instead of attacking it from our 
own little [point of view]” (2004b: 36). One might suspect, however, that the fact that the fanzine 
succumbed while being run by four volunteer-basis enthusiasts, and re-emerged with a paid staff 
of ten (including, for the first time, an Advertising Director and Marketing and Promotions de-
partment) might not only have ensured some fiscal security, but subtly rendered Alternative 
Press a national magazine (as opposed to a local fanzine). It might be argued here that, though 
the transition was not immediately beneficial, Alternative Press had graduated from being a mi-
cro-media resource to that of constituting a niche-media resource. Shea himself can be taken to 
substantiate this postulation in noting that, “AP was starting to do things that I had thought 
would take years to achieve. We had snatched big interviews [and distribution] across the coun-
try through major record distributors, which at that time were the primary way fanzines ended up 
in cool indie record stores” (2004c: 32). As true as it may be that one can’t judge a magazine by 
its cover, a cursory glance at the collection of Alternative Press covers from the late-80s era 
might be taken to suggest that the magazine was certainly making ‘investments’ that would not 
only bolster its credibility as a legitimated cultural knowledge producer, but one endowed with a 
great degree of foresight. Whereas early cover stories concerned themselves with such well-
established new-wave and punk acts as New Order (AP #4), The Cure (AP #5; # 23) and Circle 
 Though finally having resigned itself with carrying a cover 
charge and becoming a “legit fanzine” (Shea, 2003b: 52) through acquiring nationwide distribu-
tion in early 1986, Alternative Press would cease publication, by virtue of the strain incurred by 
heavy financial hardship, after just eight issues. The magazine’s ‘hiatus’ would extend through 
the entirety of 1987; a period in which Shea came to a grim realization as to “how much AP 
threatened the local weekly entertainment papers. All of a sudden, they were covering more of 
the underground scene than ever before because of AP’s previous encroachment on their music 
coverage” (Shea, 2004a: 40).  
                                                          
14 The continuation of this quote, which has no direct bearing on the present discussion but speaks volumes none-
theless: “of course, we didn’t want the ‘uncool’ people to know about them, because then the bands wouldn’t be 
cool anymore” (Shea, 2003b:52). 
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Jerks (AP # 7), later issues would effectively grant burgeoning groups such as Guns N’ Roses 
(AP #10), Metallica (AP # 14) and “the then-infant Red Hot Chili Peppers [AP # 24]” (Shea, 
2004c: 32) coverage that would, in many cases, prove to be some of their earliest cover appear-
ances. As all three of these particular acts would go on to achieve a staggering popularity with 
mainstream audiences shortly thereafter, it might be prudent that we assume that Alternative 
Press secured some prestige as a viable consecrator of ‘privileged’ cultural knowledge - among 
their readership and their competitors alike.  
 
4.6 1990-95: AP Thrives in the Era of Alternative Rock; Struggles in the Wake of Success  
 
According to Shea, 1990 marked something of a turning point for Alternative Press 
Magazine. Though “‘alternative music’ had been deemed the new trend by MTV”, and despite 
the fact that “USA Today labelled [the magazine] the ‘bible of alternative music’” (2004d: 40, 
italics in original), Shea identifies the point at which he “knew [the magazine] had arrived” with 
the appearance of “a subscription order from Spin publisher Bob Guccione Jr. from his home ad-
dress. I hated Spin with a passion, and here was their leader, subscribing to my magazine!” 
(2004d, 40). Shea recalls that Alternative Press also made a considerably wise investment in de-
veloping a relationship with Trent Reznor - an artist who had just taken to recording a solo pro-
ject under the name Nine Inch Nails. As Shea recollects, when the magazine “launched Trent 
with his first national cover…I knew we had tapped into an artist that was going to explode, and 
I was right…[Alternative Press and Nine Inch Nails] grew up professionally together, and I think 
we’ll always be joined at the hip” (2004d, 40). The process of admittedly “turning into one of the 
country’s premiere alternative rock magazines” (Shea, 2004e: 46) did not, however, come to pass 
without considerable sacrifice,  
 
All small publishers hit a point in their magazine’s lifespan where, due to advertiser pressure, 
they have to increase their circulation substantially to get access to bigger advertising ac-
counts…ultimately, what happens is that small publishers start negotiating with a national 
newsstand distributor to help them increase their circulation beyond the bookstores [and into] 
supermarkets, newsstands at airports, Wal-Mart and so on. These distributors routinely give 
these sales talks to small publishers, making us think they can guarantee that our magazine will 
sell in every store in the U.S….[but] the big mistake we small publishers make is thinking that 
all of our titles belong (and, more importantly, will actually sell) in all these major retail ac-
counts nationwide, regardless of regionalism or demographics. What happens is that because 
15 copies out of every 100 distributed sells, the distributor sends no money to the publisher, 
and the publisher…ends up owing the printer a ton of money (2004e: 46). 
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In resolving to cater to the magazine’s established readership as opposed to the best in-
terest of their distributors, Alternative Press “kept putting our indie-cred bands…on the cover, 
figuring it would sell like crazy”; a decision which ensured that, “within six months of being dis-
tributed to major newsstand accounts, [the magazine] saw [its] finances go from the five-figure 
blacks to the six-figure reds” (2004e: 46). Though Alternative Press had cemented its reputation 
as (ironically enough) an alternative to the mainstream niche media endowed with an established 
record of supporting artists that wider cultural tastes had not yet attuned to, Shea nonetheless 
came to appreciate “the cold, hard reality [that] cool bands on the cover don’t necessarily sell 
magazines”; a fact that Alternative Press “would struggle with over the next five years” (2004e: 
46). Shea nonetheless notes that the conundrum concerning the best manner through which Al-
ternative Press might reconcile retaining credibility as a resource for underground music infor-
mation with achieving the lofty sales expectations demanded of them by distributors was com-
pounded by a climate of unruly competition tactics among niche-media publications. Though 
Shea contends that “the music industry and the music press didn’t take AP seriously enough,” he 
admits to an awareness of the fact that “[they] were keeping an eye on us regardless, ‘cause we 
usually knew what was going on before they did, and they would usually just cop our ideas and 
our new band discoveries and claim them as their own (out of all the corporate magazines, Spin 
was the most notorious for that)” (2004g:50). Nevertheless, Shea still correlates the early to mid-
90s as the period during which Alternative Press developed its own distinct ‘voice’; thanks in 
large part to the presence of a group of writers who “were light years ahead of everyone else with 
their tone - a funny, sardonic style of writing that magazines like Maxim would [later] end up 
making famous” (2004f: 54). The development of a philosophy allowing that staff writers be 
“brutally honest with their opinions” (Shea, 2004f: 54), even should they be concerning them-
selves with the ‘mainstream’ acts that distribution pressures effectively forced the magazine to 
cover, allowed Alternative Press the ability to caustically criticize the mainstream culture indus-
try even as the magazine further came to be assimilated into it.  
We might thus speculate that, as Alternative Press entered the decade of its tenth anni-
versary, it did so within the confines of a curiously precarious position. Its transition from a 
small-scale fanzine to a revered national niche-media publication - with established ‘under-
ground sensibilities’ - had not only awarded the magazine a great deal of power in consecrating 
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otherwise little-known artists (such as Trent Reznor) amongst the circles of ‘cool people’ which 
the magazine aspired to cater to, but had solidified the magazine’s own status as a legitimated 
channel of non-mainstream music information. However, the magazine’s determination to grow 
beyond the confines of its current readership, and its reputation for being an essential source for 
information that was not being offered by ‘corporate’ music magazines, simultaneously thrust 
Alternative Press into two perilous fields of competition. The first, that of the mainstream publi-
cation industry, demanded a measure of conformity with the established processes through which 
music magazines can be assumed to ensure the highest number of monthly sales: by featuring 
artists who are not only well established, but popular with a wide range of diverse audiences. The 
second, to be sure, was the field of cultural knowledge production wherein the consecrators of 
artistic value compete not only for the privilege of being regarded the legitimate source for perti-
nent cultural information, but largely succeed in doing so through developing affiliations with, or 
being the first to ‘discover’, those artists with which targeted audiences enamour (or might come 
to enamour) themselves with. As the magazine entered its eleventh year, it might be said that Al-
ternative Press was burdened by the prospect of having to transform itself into a revenue-minded 
magazine while concurrently struggling to maintain its identity as an authority on the alternative 
music scene as competing publications, like Spin, began intruding upon its territory.  
 
4.7 1994: Punk Infiltrates the Mainstream; The Term ‘Neo-punk’ Emerges in Response. 
In considering the climate of power dynamics that Blush’s (1991) collection of inter-
views would suggest was prevalent within the early 1980s Washington Hardcore scene, I ex-
tended the argument that the initial construction of the pejorative term ‘emotional hardcore’ was 
inspired by virtue of two antagonistic forces: a collection of subcultural producers aspiring to 
restructure the fundamental conventions of subcultural practice, and a bevy of subcultural par-
ticipants who vied to de-authenticate the movement through not only affixing the artistic prod-
ucts propelling it with a derogatory label, but constructing an unsavourily stereotypical represen-
tation of its supporters. Should we consider the subcultural reaction to punk rock’s escalation in 
mainstream popularity in the mid-1990s, I would argue that we can deduce an example wherein 
choice subcultural producers resorted to similar de-authentication tactics in an effort to retain the 
consecration (and exclusivity) of the subcultural field.  
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As any attempt to account for the plethora of significant artists, regional movements and 
distinct stylistic permutations that punk rock underwent in the years spanning from 1987 to 1994 
would doubtlessly result in the compilation of a substantially weighty tome, it might prove most 
pertinent to do little more than highlight the fact that 1994 marked the year wherein select punk 
rock bands came to be awarded a great deal of mainstream attention. Propelled by a memorable 
performance at Woodstock ‘94 and a colourful video for the song “Basket Case”, Green Day’s 
first major label album, Dookie, sold in excess of three million copies within the first year of its 
release; an achievement that inspired “cries of ‘sell-out’ [to begin] rumbling in punk rock cul-
tural centres [as] Green Day [came to be perceived as] the new corporate evil” (Diehl, 2007: 60). 
When the Offspring’s third album, Smash, began to achieve similar sales plateaus (despite the 
fact that it was released on the independent Epitaph Records label), well revered artists and sub-
cultural knowledge producers (perhaps, most notoriously, San Francisco’s Maximum Rocknroll 
fanzine) began disseminating a crisis narrative. To paraphrase: the network of independent la-
bels, grassroots promotional ventures, and the very do-it-yourself ethic that the wider punk 
community had constructed (while happily being ignored by the cultural mainstream) was being 
thrust into a state of crisis by virtue of the fact that the major record labels and mainstream media 
entities, themselves well aware that the popularity of ‘grunge’ had run its course, were in search 
of a fresh movement to sell off as the ‘next big thing’. As the same A&R label reps who had 
swarmed Seattle began infiltrating well-established punk centres (such as Southern California, 
New York and Berkeley), the call was effectively placed to circle the wagons and, as a result, the 
overarching subculture suddenly became very stringent in applying measurements of authenticity 
and enforcing the standards of ‘legitimate’ subcultural practice. 
It was not long before figures within the field of subcultural knowledge production – 
most notably, the San Francisco-based fanzine Maximum Rocknroll - began chastising many of 
its most revered artists in an effort to minimize the looming threat of mainstream co-optation. 
Though Bad Religion, a long-running and well-respected punk outfit, had signed with major la-
bel Atlantic Records in 1994, the fact that the group released their best-selling album, Stranger 
Than Fiction, on the label a year later was perceived as an act of heresy so severe as to allegedly 
inspire Epitaph founder and guitarist Brett Gurewitz to leave the group in protest.15
                                                          
15 Gurewitz would rejoin the band once Bad Religion was dropped by Atlantic Records and, subsequently, opted to 
rejoin the Epitaph roster. 
 Though Ran-
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cid turned down a multi-million dollar deal with Epic records prior to releasing their 1995 album 
…And Out Come The Wolves - a title meant to comment on the mainstream’s newfound interest 
in punk rock - on Epitaph (Gold, 1995), the band nonetheless weathered considerable subcul-
turalist criticism for appearing on the cover of Spin Magazine and, shortly thereafter, performing 
on Saturday Night Live. Though NOFX displayed an outspoken hostility for the mainstream cul-
ture industry - as evidenced through pointed liner notes16 and lyrics such as “its my job to keep 
punk rock elite/ this music ain’t your fucking industry” (So Long And Thanks For All The Shoes, 
1997) - fanzines like Maximum Rocknroll labelled the band ‘sell-outs’ on grounds that their 1994 
Punk In Drublic album was well on its way to achieving gold sales status.17
Though it can be assumed that a plethora of punk bands (and independent punk labels) 
stood to watch their audiences swell far beyond the numbers they had encountered prior to Green 
Day’s mainstream breakthrough, punk did not actually succeed in becoming the ‘next big thing’. 
Ironically, this might be largely attributable to the fact that many of the very artists who were 
garnering criticism for transgressing the conventions of authentic subcultural practice were, at 
the very same time, utilizing their artistic output as a means of introducing those conventions to 
their burgeoning audiences. We might thus speculate that the painstaking effort which a number 
of the high-profile punk bands devoted to crafting songs meant to demonize ‘selling-out’, boast 
of their allegiance to the do-it-yourself ideology, and reinforce the exclusionary us-against-the-
mainstream mindset would ultimately contribute toward assuring that fledging subculturalists be 
properly inculcated in regarding the conventions of the field. Indeed, though those newly at-
tracted to ‘punk rock’ through the exposure granted to acts such as Rancid and NOFX by main-
stream media channels like MTV or Spin Magazine, the bands themselves introduced those same 
 At some point, ‘neo-
punk’ emerged as a term that was not only applied to any group (or independent label) that man-
aged to achieve anything resembling commercial success, but as a means of bemoaning the fact 
that “punk was now manufactured, bottled, and sold for mass consumption” (Diehl, 2007). 
                                                          
16 The insert of NOFX’s Heavy Petting Zoo album (1996) reads as follows:  “No thanx to: MTV – quit bugging us.  
Major labels – quit bugging us.  Commercial radio stations – quit playing us.  We’ve been doin just fine all these 
years without you so leave us the fuck alone!” 
17 The band responded to the accusations levelled against them in Maximumrocknroll (and, more specifically, MRR 
founder Tim Yohannon) by way of a song, entitled “I’m Telling Tim” (1996; 1997), that criticizes the fanzine for hav-
ing granted itself the function of serving as ‘moral entrepreneurs’ within the punk scene.  Folowing Yohannon’s 
death in 1998, NOFX recorded the song “We Threw Gasoline On The Fire And Now We Have Stumps For Arms And 
No Eyebrows (1998) as a means of lamenting the fact that the feud served to ruin the friendship between Yohan-
non and NOFX front-man Mike Burtett. 
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listeners to a subcultural narrative serving to condemn mainstream media channels and the artists 
who overenthusiastically catered to them.18 Furthermore, and in keeping with the credo that ac-
tions speak louder than words, the majority of the bands whose popularity rose markedly in 1995 
resolved to stay with the independent labels which had thus far supported them.  
Alas, one cannot solely attribute punk’s ‘failure’ to become the next big thing to the 
success of subcultural initiatives. The sudden mainstream popularity of such rap-metal fusion 
bands as Korn, Limp Bizkit and Linkin Park would prove to ensure that the wider entertainment 
industry would abandon popularizing punk and, instead, set its sights upon promoting bands 
aligned with the genre that would come to be known as ‘nu-metal’. One of the niche-media out-
lets to begrudgingly participate in this initiative was, in fact, Alternative Press Magazine. 
 
4.8 1996-2001: Alternative Press Enters Its ‘Lost Years’. 
 
In considering the ‘cover’ artists which Alternative Press began to feature beginning in 
1996, it appears obvious that the magazine had begun a process of catering to the demands of 
their distributors over those of their established readership. Shea contends that, “1996 was a 
mixed year…as far as cover choices went. We had alt-rock icons along with credibility-saturated 
indie bands next to punk icons-in-waiting - pretty much the gamut of cool” (2004h: 52). None-
theless, the testimonies offered by the Alternative Press staff, in regarding which cover choices 
resulted in acceptable magazine sales (decidedly mainstream acts like Rage Against The Ma-
chine and Weezer) and which did not (decidedly underground acts like Girls Against Boys and 
the Jon Spencer Blues Explosion), speak volumes in concerning the direction the magazine 
would inevitably take. In reflecting on the course which the magazine took in 1997, Managing 
Editor Dave Segal notes that, “thumbing through 1997’s back issues is sobering. If nothing else, 
it confirms the transient nature of almost all bands…labels…[and] movements” (2004i:60). 
There is something of a confession to be found should we consider the manner in which 
Editor-In-Chief Ron Cherry reflects on the magazine’s 110th
                                                          
18 Though there is a plethora of examples to substantiate this statement, I will resign myself with noting two that 
are attributable to the artists heretofore discussed:  Rancid’s “Disorder and Disarray” (...And Out Come The 
Wolves, 1995) and NOFX’s “The Desperations Gone” (So Long And Thanks For All The Shoes, 1997). 
 issue and the logic by which the 
magazine chose their cover artist,  
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As alternative rock became less commercially viable, we started looking further out for copy-
shifting cover options. Enter nu metal. The seven-string-plinking, Bakersfield-based musical 
aberration known as Korn were selling shitloads of albums to frustrated kids in the hinterland, 
but they’d yet to receive any serious coverage in a non-techie mag. The story made it safe for 
other mags to cover the genre. (2004i: 60).  
 
From that point on, Shea admits that Alternative Press resolved itself with devoting the 
majority of their front-cover attention to artists who had not only established themselves with 
mainstream audiences, but were of little to no interest to their established readership of ‘under-
ground’ music aficionados.  Alternative Press followed the Korn cover appearances with in-
depth features concerning such multi-platinum artists as Fiona Apple (AP #111) and Oasis (AP 
#112). In hindsight, Shea attributes the 1998 cover appearances of artists such as Sarah McLach-
lan (AP #119), Tori Amos (AP #120), Korn (AP #122) and Sugar Ray (AP #116) - the latter of 
which Cherry regards as the “shark-jumping sell-out issue” (2004j: 68) - to the onset of an era in 
which Alternative Press “began [to enter] what I refer to now as ‘The Lost Years’”. (Shea, 2004j: 
68). His commentary, in its near-entirety, reads as follows, 
 
There were a lot of great artists we would’ve liked to slap on AP’s front cover [in 1998]. Un-
fortunately, increasing sales pressure from retailers, along with a highly competitive (and get-
ting worse by the month) atmosphere that had erupted between corporate mags like Rolling 
Stone and Spin, leaving bigger indie mags like us in the middle, was making it near impossible 
to keep what we felt was our credibility while being able to pay the bills and keep the lights on. 
So, as alternative music was wavering and becoming less focused as a genre (was it really ‘al-
ternative’, or was it just pop?), major music magazines were being forced to go after the hottest 
or newest thing, not only to remain ‘relevant’ from a business standpoint, but also to stay on 
top of the next big thing - with grunge on the way out, every music magazine wanted to be able 
to say it could see what was coming next. Practically every staff meeting, much less editorial 
meeting, we spent time strategizing our next moves against Stone and Spin in NYC. Being in 
Cleveland, I think, kept us a bit more objective and less stressed out over the drama that’d been 
playing out between Stone and Spin each issue, but we still got frustrated when we would get 
into a cover battle over a previously B-level band like, you know, the Verve. Eventually, we 
started hearing that the editors of Stone and Spin were now telling publicists to keep us from 
having stories on certain artists (e.g., No Doubt, Marilyn Manson, or someone similarly well-
known who could sell copies)…as [the year] went on [you could feel] that morale was eroding. 
We were starting to have to do things we didn’t want to do in order to survive, and we were 
growing less tolerant of it (Shea, 2004j: 68).  
 
Against our theoretical backdrop, it would not be difficult to argue that Shea is inadver-
tently commenting upon the presence of a climate of intense competition within the field of 
niche-media producers. It is also of dire importance to note the fact that Shea speaks from the 
standpoint of a cultural knowledge producer who is, quite admittedly, grappling with the conse-
quence of having betrayed the sub-field of restricted production in conforming to the conven-
tions demanded of those niche-media products catering to the needs of the sub-field of large-
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scale production. Rather than abiding by its original utility of notifying ‘cool people’ to the pres-
ence of ‘cool bands’; Alternative Press was battling the ‘corporate mags’ over the pleasure of 
featuring such artists as Orgy (AP #130), Kid Rock (AP # 133) and Insane Clown Posse (AP # 
131) on their cover.  
One can also derive the sense that the climate of competition within the field of niche-
mediated knowledge producers was further compounded in light of the fact that, as with grunge, 
nu metal had overstayed its tenure in the mainstream spotlight. There did not appear to be, how-
ever, any substantive movements to which cultural knowledge producers could transplant their 
gaze. Shea recounts that, “at the turn of the millennium, all the major music mags were off chas-
ing the next big thing ‘cause, lets be honest, no one had a clue about what was going to stick” 
(2005b: 40). In the interim, Alternative Press resigned itself to indiscriminately chasing unit-
shifting artists deeper and deeper into credibility-corrosive territory; “Creed on the cover? Why 
the hell not. Slipknot? Sure, lets go for it” (Shea, 2005b: 40). By 2001, Alternative Press was 
haemorrhaging staff who had grown weary of the fact that, “advertisers and distributors wanted 
[the magazine] to sell more copies, while readers wanted more credibility. We couldn’t please 
both, so we got caught in the crossfire - and found ourselves unable to get out of the trenches in 
the process (Shea, 2005c: 42). Shea concedes that “having to discuss Kid Rock or the over-
commercialization of music, and being forced to chase the lowest common denominator just to 
get people to advertise or carry you in their stores” almost inspired Alternative Press to “shut it 
down and move on” (2005a: 50). Of course, rather than ‘shutting it down’, the magazine would 
soon instead pursue the alternative option: moving towards incurring ‘heresy’ by shifting its fo-
cus to an untapped pool of artists who were comfortably amassing prestige within the sub-field 
of restricted production. In the process, the term ‘emo’, which had regained some favour within 
the lexicon of subcultural, micro-mediated discourse, would come to be used in chorus with ini-
tiatives tailored toward advancing the perception of an emerging musical movement. Before de-
tailing the specifics of this process, I would wish to further elaborate on the manner in which the 
field of subcultural knowledge production re-introduced, and utilized, the term.  
 
4.9 “Emo” in the Interim: The Term Re-emerges with “The Emo Diaries”.  
Though I have argued that the term ‘emotional hardcore’ was initially coined as a means 
of stigmatizing a relatively small number of short-lived bands within a decidedly localized scene, 
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it is important to note that the term would subsequently be resurrected, as a positive descriptive, 
just over a decade later. In utilizing interviews conducted with members of those bands who 
would come to be heralded as progenitors of the ‘second wave’ emo movement (Zemler, 2004; 
Hererra, 2006), we might cautiously surmise that the term’s eventual reintroduction into the lexi-
con of subcultural discourse can largely be attributed to the national following, and subsequent 
influence, that MacKaye and Picciotto’s Fugazi project developed in the years following their 
formation. Be they inspired by Fugazi in regards to musical intonation, lyrical content or ideol-
ogy, bands such as Jawbreaker and Sunny Day Real Estate took a great deal of inspiration from 
the ‘Revolution Summer’ mindset in creating their own music. However, though each band did 
garner some positive attention from the mainstream niche-media in the early to mid 1990s, it is 
important to note that they were championed as creative progenitors within the parameters of 
pre-established genres. Though noted for delving in to complex song structures and brandishing 
a quasi-poetic lyrical sensibility, Jawbreaker were comfortably categorized as an adventurous 
pop-punk band with deep-rooted ties with the ‘Gilman Scene’ in Berkeley, California (Bouffon, 
1993; Oh, 1995). While enjoying modest success with their 1994 Diary album, Seattle’s Sunny 
Day Real Estate were - surprise, surprise - garnering national acclaim as an experimental grunge 
outfit (Crane, 1998). Though there is little in the way of evidence serving to contradict the possi-
bility that these groups were recognized as ‘emo’ bands in the eyes of select populations, the 
niche-media artefacts of the period offer no evidence to suggest that the term ‘emo’ had taken on 
any widely regarded currency in being used to describe them. 
The first tangible instance in which the term ‘emo’ was explicitly utilized in describing 
a burgeoning genre of music came in 1997 when Deep Elm Records, a small independent label 
based out of North Carolina, released the first volume of a series of compilation albums entitled 
The Emo Diaries. Though the Deep Elm website describes the album, which featured such soon-
to-be-revered bands as Jimmy Eat World and Samiam, as “the record that started passionate 
waves of discussion about the ‘emo’ scene - where it’s been, where it’s going, and which bands 
to look out for” (Deep Elm Website, Accessed 2008a); it is not entirely clear whether the compi-
lation was developed as an effort to complement the pseudo-generic term or, alternatively, if the 
term was chosen as a means of affording the compilation a sense of cohesion. In stipulating that 
the bands featured on the initial (and subsequent) volumes of the Emo Diaries, “were selected to 
participate based on open submissions of their music,“ and that “only the music mattered” (Deep 
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Elm Website, Accessed 2008a), there is an inkling of evidence that the latter possibility is the 
likely case. The label even takes the initiative of providing what amounts to a disclaimer in 
qualifying their own use of the term in professing that, “Deep Elm has never attempted to define 
any musical style, as we believe any combination of songwriting, lyrics and live performance 
means something different to every listener. We have only intended to share with you the music 
that moves us and support these bands...it's what we do” (Deep Elm Website, Accessed 2008a).  
Nevertheless, and in judging by the critical response that the initial compilation gar-
nered,19 critics within the field of micro-mediated knowledge production focused less on the par-
ticipating artists than the idea of the genre itself. An unaccredited positive review offered by 
Pitchfork Media preludes their overview of the sound that constitutes the genre - “it’s basically a 
lot like hardcore ‘cept that it sounds a little mellower, the themes are more focused on loss than 
pure anger, and they have a new compilation on Deep Elm” - by quipping that, “even the Tin 
Men of the hardcore scene used to wish they had a heart. Nowadays, tho’, the Wizard has 
granted them the niche sound of emo-core, a loosely defined group of bands that many believe 
have been undeservingly ignored” (Deep Elm Website, Accessed 2008b). An unidentified re-
viewer, simply affiliated with “Scratch”20
I would argue that these reviews offer an insight into the manner in which the term 
‘emo’ was used less in describing bands that conformed to an identifiable genre (or harnessed a 
particular sound) than bands that possessed some qualities which were unique to other bands in-
, grants readers a brief - and extremely poetic - lesson 
on the specificities of the genre in stating that, 
 
Emo-core operates on a basic principle: that noise, coupled with strong songwriting and at 
least some semblance of melody, can capture the raw essence of emotion. That drums, gui-
tars and maybe a set of pipes can wedge a screwdriver into the most private pain center and 
pry out a response…All sorts of noise-rock crows and screams for attention these days. 
There's Rollins-style rage-rock, veins a-poppin' and limbs a-thrashin'. Art-noise is interested 
in music as a technical exercise. And there's plenty of acts making noise just to make noise. 
What separates the bands on WHAT'S MINE IS YOURS, the neophytes as well as the griz-
zled vets, is their insistence on building their music upon a base of uncooked, bloody-rare 
emotion. Don't get me wrong, these acts, well, ROCK, but as a means to an end. In the cur-
rent vogue of artifice and irony, it's a novel concept. And that's the golden thread that keeps 
this sloppy genre from flying apart at warp speed. (Deep Elm Website, Accessed 2008b) 
 
                                                          
19 Though the Deep Elm website has select reviews archived on their website, they provide nothing more than the 
name of the fanzine or webzine in which they appeared. 
20 Barring the unlikely chance that this is the popular Scratch magazine that concerns itself with hip-hop, I would 
personally assume that Scratch was either an underground fanzine or a short-lived webzine.  My search for sources 
that speak to the magazine’s existence,  aside from the Deep Elm website, has proven futile.  
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volved with either ‘hardcore’ or ‘noise rock’ scenes. In offering descriptions which substantively 
state next to nothing - describing emo-core as ‘a little mellower’ than hardcore, or as music that 
is built ‘upon a base of uncooked, bloody-rare emotion’ - each critic would seem to be sidestep-
ping the chore of describing what emo sounds like. Instead, they focus on virtues exterior to the 
actual music: it is not as angry as hardcore - a style that, having been concocted by ‘Tin Men’, is 
implied as being, in some manner, intrinsically hollow. While Emo-core bands are not perceived 
to be ‘screaming for attention’ (and thus engaging in narcissistic showboating) or ‘making noise 
for the sake of making noise’ (and thus pretentious), they are ‘undeservingly ignored’ (and thus 
only appreciated by those with unique - and, by extension - superior tastes). In a word, these re-
views speak to the presence of a sub-genre constitutive of a ‘loosely defined group of bands’ 
who not only instil their music with authentic emotion, but create music for authentic reasons. 
Of course, it is of no small measure of significance that each critic subtly extends themselves the 
authority to speak as though they stand among those few who can detect, and are appreciative of, 
this authenticity. 
Regardless of the validity of Deep Elm’s claim to have never vied to ‘define any musi-
cal style’, the label nonetheless released a new Volume of The Emo Diaries every year and, in 
doing so, affiliated a host of new artists with the term. We can safely surmise that the compila-
tion series is likely largely responsible for instigating the process through which the term ‘emo-
core’ came to enjoy a degree of popularity it had previously not experienced. Nonetheless, it is 
worth mentioning here that only two of the bands featured on the compilation - Further Seems 
Forever (Volume 4, 2000) and, to a lesser extent, Jimmy Eat World (Volume 1, 1997) - would be 
deemed significant as niche-media cultural knowledge producers inevitably strove to construct a 
revised history of emo’s genesis - and, by extension, fundamentally alter that which the term was 
meant to denote.  
 
4.10 2001-2002: Alternative Press Moves Toward ‘Heresy’; Modifies the Landscape of the 
Underground. 
 
While Alternative Press were catering to the ‘lowest common denominator’, a number 
of web-based micro-media websites functioned to disseminate (and create) subcultural knowl-
edge for ‘underground’ music enthusiasts. One such landmark web-based micro-media channel, 
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Punknews.org, came into being in October of 2001. Founded in Ontario, Canada by Aubin Paul, 
Punknews.org was created with the intention of providing “an inclusive community-based site 
for the delivery and discussion of music news surrounding punk, ska, hardcore, emo, metal and 
indie” (Punknews.org, Accessed 2008a).  Punknews.org functions less as a site entailing a staff 
of writers than a forum in which any user so inclined might submit music related news, inter-
views or album reviews which will be posted pending the approval of the editorial staff. Another 
of Punknews.org’s defining features is that it grants users the ability to post comments and carry 
out discussions in response to any submission that the website opts to accept. It might be said 
that Punknews.org thus serves not only as a medium through which subcultural participants 
might become subcultural knowledge producers, but as a site wherein subculturalists might ei-
ther reinforce the validity of that knowledge, or subject it to unabashed scrutiny, through facili-
tating the construction of discourse. 
While Punknews.org set about solidifying its status as a popular resource for under-
ground music information, Alternative Press Magazine began to deduce the presence of a surg-
ing audience to whom magazines like Rolling Stone and Spin had not yet set about catering to. 
Shea notes that Marketing Director Aaron Wilson had been “reporting back [from the Warped 
Tour] with some attention-grabbing news: AP readers were coming to our booth and telling him 
how much they totally dug our more punk-rock coverage…these readers were complete fanatics 
of the bands they followed…and [Wilson] felt there was something here we should be thinking 
about” (2005c, 42).  
Wilson’s suspicion was granted some credence when Alternative Press opted to dedi-
cate featured article of the May 2001 issue (AP # 154) to the re-emergence of Weezer. Having 
released a self-titled debut album that became something of a cultural phenomenon in 1994 (pro-
pelled in no small part by the success of such songs as “Undone (The Sweater Song)”, “Buddy 
Holly” and “Say It Ain’t So”), the hardships which befell Weezer following the release of their 
second album, Pinkerton (1996), has become the stuff of subcultural legend. A sombre and stra-
tegically under-produced record, Pinkerton functioned as something of a conceptual album 
through which vocalist Rivers Cuomo unabashedly opened up about his fear of intimacy (“Why 
Bother?”, “No Other One”), his longing for companionship (“El Scorcho”, “Falling For You”) 
and his self-professed failings as a human being (“Across The Sea”, “Butterfly”). The initial 
critical and public reception to Pinkerton was far from kind: in addition to poor record sales and 
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the distinction of being named the second worst album of the year in Rolling Stone’s 1996 Read-
ers Poll (Luerssen, 2004), the album was panned by a sizable contingent of niche-media publica-
tions including Entertainment Weekly (Gordinier, 1996) and, of course, Rolling Stone Magazine 
(O’ Connor, 1998). The scorching response to the album inspired Cuomo to disown the album 
and put the band on a hiatus that would render it silent until the release of its second self-titled 
album in 2001(Luerssen, 2004; Greenwald, 2003). 
The critical reaction to Pinkterton was not, however, entirely negative. Though Pitch-
fork Media had yet to become a micro-media phenomenon, it is noteworthy that Schreiber’s 
(1996) positive review of the album is now heralded as one that had some impact on Pinkerton’s 
ascent to ‘cult-classic’ status (Luerssen, 2004). The subsequent discourse surrounding the album, 
a great deal of which was inspired by a trio of reviews posted on Punknews.org, harbours a sub-
tle narrative regarding the fact that Pinkerton’s mainstream failure only served to render the al-
bum more enticing for underground music fans (‘lolaq’, 2002; ‘EvilMonkey’, 2002; ‘pete21’, 
2001).21
As Weezer readied their comeback effort, Alternative Press proved to be the sole niche-
media publication to have adequately gauged the level of anticipation swirling throughout sub-
culturalist pockets. In opting to tailor its coverage toward detailing the manner in which the band 
made the transition “from has-beens to cult icons” (Alternative Press cover text, 2001), the 
magazine had, furthermore, effectively asserted itself - however briefly - as a niche-media publi-
cation which still retained some sense as to what was occurring beneath the mainstream radar. 
Though the publication once again resigned itself to catering to established popular tastes for the 
majority of 2001, Shea admits to coming to the realization that, “for the past four years we had 
been trying to be something we weren’t and never wanted to be in the first place (i.e., Spin-
like)”, and that - the survival of the publication be damned, Alternative Press had to “return to 
[its] punk-rock roots; the ones [it was] founded upon” (2005c, 42). As Shea recalls, this new ini-
 When Weezer opted to end their hiatus and begin recording a third album in 2000, a 
flurry of news postings on Punknews.org gleefully strove to document the band’s every baby-
step back into being. 
                                                          
21 It is interesting to note that, over the course of the years to follow, this undercurrent of appreciation would suf-
fice in planting Pinkerton upon a substantial number of reflective ‘best of the 90s’ lists (Spin Magazine, 2005; Pitch-
fork Media, 2003) and inspire Rolling Stone to retract their initial review – in favour of publishing a much more 
positive critique – some eight years later (Edwards, 2004).  As will be considered in the near future, the album 
would also come to be recognized, quite reflectively, as one of the most significant progenitors of the ‘emo’ 
movement. 
90 
 
tiative, combined with the fact that “it was now October, and our 100 bands You Need To Know 
issue was around the corner”, inspired the magazine to focus on “finding two bands that were 
cool, full of integrity and unknown to the NYC rock media elite. Norman and the editors came 
back with AFI and Saves The Day” (2005c, 42).  
 
4.10.1 Notes on the Underground: The Subcultural Significance of AFI and Saves The Day 
 
A self-professed affiliate of the ‘East Bay Hardcore’ scene, AFI had unquestionably be-
come one of the most revered bands within the underground punk scene. Though having estab-
lished a commendable following on the strength of three full-length albums on the independent 
Nitro Records, the band’s greatest brush with underground success came with the 1999 release of 
Black Sails In The Sunset. As opposed to previous releases, which did not stray far from conven-
tional punk and hardcore in execution and lyrical content, Black Sails In The Sunset succeeded in 
infusing the band’s sound with a number of dark, quasi-gothic qualities which better served to 
reflect the influence that the band derived from artists such as the Misfits, the Cure and Joy Divi-
sion. In concocting lyrics imbued with a gothic poeticism largely foreign to the punk and hard-
core genres, vocalist Davey Havok successfully strove to construct songs that spoke of persecu-
tion (“Malleus Maleficarum”), self-destructive impulses (“The Last Kiss”, “Exsanguination”) 
and a self-loathing born of marginalization (“At A Glance”). However, the darker lyrical offer-
ings - some of which detailed self-inflicted wounding and likened adolescent persecution of non-
conformists to the Salem witch trials - were offset by songs calling for the development of com-
munal bonds through which those so afflicted by disconsolate emotionality could take strength 
(“Porphyria Cutanea Tarda”, “The Prayer Position”, “Narrative Of Soul Against Soul”). Having 
shortly thereafter released the Halloween-themed All Hallows EP (2000), the band began to de-
velop a quasi-gothic aesthetic meant to complement their burgeoning sound. Havok took up the 
ritual of donning a decidedly gothic ensemble for the band’s performances, replete with a tight-
fitting ‘pleather’ bodysuit, jet-black hair fashioned into a pronounced ’devilock’,22
                                                          
22 The ‘Devilock’ hairstyle, as popularized by the Misfits, consists of congealing one’s hair into a long tail-like forma-
tion which is to be draped down the centre of the face. 
 and white fa-
cial make-up offset by black lipstick. A grainy black-and-white video for the band’s All Hallow’s 
track “Totalimmortal” (another song detailing a tumultuous struggle with inner demons) featured 
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the band performing in a cemetery. By virtue of the depth of connection that the band had begun 
developing with their increasingly growing fan base, and though outright ignored by the main-
stream niche-media, AFI developed such an underground following that their subsequent Nitro 
album, The Art Of Drowning (2000), served to register on the Billboard charts at 174th 
(Punknews.org, 2000). 
New Jersey’s Saves The Day, on the other hand, had garnered a great deal of attention by 
virtue of the fact that the pop-punk outfit released two well-received albums - Can’t Slow Down 
(1998) and Through Being Cool (1999) - while its members were still attending high school. 
Unlike AFI, Saves The Day had developed a reputation for crafting easily digestible pop songs 
that typically harboured downright malicious - and unabashedly juvenile - lyrical themes. By 
way of example, a lyrical excerpt from Through Being Cool’s title-track reads, “You know 
what?/ The next time you see Nick, tell him I'm gonna stick some needles in his face and watch 
him on his knees/ Watch him when he sees that I'm not fooling / 'Cause I'm through being cool 
and he keeps telling everyone about me/ Like how I'm such a fool and that I'm so deceptive/ I 
think I'll make him eat the ground” (Conley, 1998). The song “Rocks Tonic Juice Magic”, from 
the same album, continues in this spirit as vocalist Conley serenades the recipient of his unre-
quited affections: “Let me take this awkward saw and run it against your thighs/ Cut some flesh 
away / I'll carry this piece of you with me because all I can say tonight is that I hate you / But it 
would be all right if we could see each other sometime/ If I could somehow make you mine/ And 
if not I'll take my rusty spoons and dig out your blue eyes” (Conley, 1998). 
The band signed with Vagrant records before the release of their subsequent album, Stay 
What You Are (2001), a move of which the significance might be lost should we fail to recognize 
that, just as the field of niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers were desperately scram-
bling to deduce what the ‘next big thing’ would be, so too were a host of independent record la-
bels. However, and as nu metal continued to usurp the mainstream attention that had been af-
forded the punk and hardcore underground when labels like Vagrant were forming, the climate in 
which upstart independent punk labels could easily thrive had been replaced by one entailing a 
struggle to survive. Greenwald (2003) contends that a number of to-be significant independent 
labels thus reconciled themselves with signing “a seemingly interchangeable crop of young, 
vaguely punk boy bands that produce entirely hummable guitar in the vein of Blink-182 and 
New Found Glory [with] themes [that are] limited to girl trouble and hangin’ with the dudes” 
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(2003: 129). Greenwald specifically references Vagrant in contending that Egan, less a bona-fide 
subculturalist than an aspiring label mogul, devised a strategy wherein he might “[ride] the ex-
plosion of internet use among high school students and the universal appeal of his musical for-
mula (cute, bruised boys who fall in love too easily and tour too much)” (2003: 70) in an attempt 
to win consumer allegiances with a market that most credibility-saturated independent punk la-
bels rarely aspire to attract: adolescents for whom a band’s image, though not everything, was an 
important aspect of their appeal. In this respect, we might speculate that Saves The Day - a band 
of adolescents striving to make music specifically catering to adolescents - served as the perfect 
artist through whom Vagrant could connect with their aspired fan-base.  
Not unlike AFI, however, Saves The Day would not seem to have drawn any significant 
amount of niche-mediated attention prior to January of 2002 when, alongside AFI, Alternative 
Press allotted them one of the two cover slots on issues 164.1 and 164.2 (respectively). In re-
garding how the AP readership reacted to the relatively drastic move, Shea testifies that, “readers 
went bananas for it. We got more positive letters about that single issue than we’d received for 
the past several year’s worth of covers. Best of all, it felt like the readers were actually appreciat-
ing us again” (2005d, 46). In response, Shea and the editorial board devised a program of action 
whereby the publication would initiate a series of ‘baby-steps’; “we’d test a relatively unknown 
band on the cover, then give the cover to another supposed alt-rock heavyweight, then go back 
again to the lesser-known band, and so on” (Shea, 2005d, 46). Thus, alongside mainstream bands 
as Puddle of Mudd and Disturbed, Alternative Press extended a number of soon-to-be revered 
artists their first instance of significant niche-media attention. Having left the aforementioned 
Further Seems Forever for the sake of focusing on an acoustic project christened Dashboard 
Confessional,23
                                                          
23 ...not to mention having elicited a significant amount of discussion on websites such as Punknews.org when Va-
grant and Drive-Thru records – another independent label vying to cater to decidedly younger audiences – en-
gaged in a public feud when Carrabba opted to sign with the former over the latter(Punknews.org, 2001). 
 Chris Carrabba graced the June cover of the magazine (AP #168); an issue which 
enjoyed sales so healthy as to ensure that the magazine would “never have to worry about Limp 
Bizkit again” (Pettigrew, 2005: 158). New Jersey’s Thursday, a post-hardcore act who had built 
a strong following on the strength of their 2001 Victory Records album, Full Collapse, were ex-
tended the same opportunity with the August 2002 edition (AP #170). Shea notes that, “I had 
started 2002 not sure if we were going to survive this return to our original punk-rock vision, but 
by the time we printed our second AFI cover in December, I knew we had turned the magazine 
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around and returned to it something it had been missing for some time: spirit” (2005d, 46). Shea 
does not, however, hazard to mention the impact that granting relatively unknown artists as AFI, 
Saves The Day, Dashboard Confessional and Thursday would have on the wider music industry. 
In each case, the Alternative Press cover exposure translated into increased album sales, in-
creased support from music video channels and mainstream radio stations and - most importantly 
-increased ‘buzz’ within the sphere of niche-mediated cultural knowledge production. By the 
close of 2002, three of the aforementioned acts had left the sub-field of restricted production for 
the sake of signing with major record labels; AFI and Saves The Day with Dreamworks 
(Punknews.org, 2001; 2002a) and Thursday with Island (Punknews.org, 2002b). We might fur-
ther consider the ramifications of this trend in chapter six.  
 
4.11 Closing Thoughts: Toward the Onset of the ‘Summer of Emo’ 
 
In concerning itself with the genesis of the term ‘emo’ and charting Alternative Press 
Magazine’s storied evolution, this chapter has attempted to provide something of a history of 
struggles. I have argued that the term ‘emo’ was originally born by virtue of the Washingtonian 
hardcore subculture’s initiative to prevent ‘heretical’ artistic producers from modifying the con-
ventions serving to structure their field of subcultural participation. In briefly detailing some of 
the repercussions befalling those artistic producers who came to be affiliated with the mid-90s 
‘neo-punk’ movement, I have attempted to demonstrate the manner in which the punk subculture 
reacted to the potential co-optation of their culture through applying standards of demarcating 
revised - and inherently exclusionary - means of determining ‘authenticity’ for subcultural con-
sumers and producers alike. I have also explicated the process through which Alternative Press 
Magazine successfully strove to penetrate the sub-field of niche-mediated cultural knowledge 
production and, in effect, sacrificed the standing it had possessed within the sub-field of re-
stricted cultural knowledge production in conforming to the ‘rules’ enforced within the sub-field 
of large-scale cultural knowledge production. Finally, I have detailed the process through which 
Alternative Press moved toward committing ‘heresy’ within the sub-field of niche-mediated cul-
tural knowledge producers by re-shifting its coverage focus to artists native to the sub-field of 
restricted production (and, thereby, artists over whom entities within the micro-mediated field of 
subcultural knowledge production, like Punknews.org, held implicit jurisdiction).  
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I have not yet, however, adequately explicated the means through which the pseudo-
generic signifier ‘emo’ - a pejorative term originally meant to denote (shall we say) ‘emascu-
lated’ artistic products, but more recently utilized in consecrating works deemed to be ‘authentic’ 
within micro-mediated circles - came to be granted such a level of significance in the wake of 
this heretical initiative. To put it simply: as Alternative Press vied to introduce its readership to a 
new flock of noteworthy bands, so too did it introduce its niche-mediated competitors to the ill-
defined pseudo-generic signifier of our focus. It had furthermore done so, in large part, by way 
of a caption, featured on Saves The Day’s 164.2 cover appearance, which heralded the band as 
“pop-punk’s emo-tional rescue” (Alternative Press, 2002: Cover). In chorus with the meagre cur-
rency which the term was compiling by virtue of ‘Emo Diaries’ alumni Jimmy Eat World’s bur-
geoning mainstream success (Walters, 2001), we might speculate that the manner in which Al-
ternative Press flaunted the term - while in the process of asserting their expert jurisdiction over 
‘new’ movements in music, no less - effectively tantalized a niche-mediated sphere which had 
long been aspiring, yet failing not only to deduce what the ‘next big thing’ would be, but to 
brand it. The following chapter will explicate the manner in which Alternative Press, in addition 
to a plethora of niche-mediated figures ranging from Spin Magazine contributor Andy 
Greenwald (2003) to TIME Magazine contributor Josh Tyrangiel (2002) and, most infamously, 
Seventeen Magazine (Schwartz, 2002) would vie to develop an ‘expert discourse’ regarding the 
emergence of what was quickly being heralded as an ‘emo movement’. 
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Chapter Five. Constituting a Pseudo-Concept; Manufacturing a Movement: The Niche-
Mediated Construction of an Expert Discourse on the Emo Pseudo-genre. 
 
“I don’t really know what emo means…but apparently I had something to do with it.” 
- Rivers Cuomo, 2001 interview (Sullivan, 2001) 
5.1 Introductory Notes 
 In chapter four, I argued that the term ‘emo’ was annexed into the lexicon of niche-media 
discourse by virtue of the process through which select cultural knowledge producers strove to 
focus their attention on those artists, within the sub-field of restricted production, who had de-
veloped considerable followings amongst ‘underground’ music enthusiasts. It is, however, im-
portant to note that the term was primarily used as a descriptor when it first came into popular 
niche-mediated use. Though magazines such as Alternative Press, Blender and Rolling Stone in-
voked the term in describing acts like Jimmy Eat World, Weezer and Saves The Day, they de-
voted little attention toward explicating what, in fact, rendered such acts ‘emo’ as opposed to, 
say, ‘pop punk’ or ‘alternative rock’. We might speculate that this practice of utilizing a unique 
term without adequately justifying its application rendered the term popular but hollow; a seman-
tically ill-defined signifier granted utilization less for the sake of describing artists with distin-
guishable qualities than for the sake of describing them in a novel way. In light of this, and al-
though a number of artists came to find introduction to niche-mediated audiences under the aus-
pices of the ‘emo’ description, they shared little in the way of any unifying trait beyond the fact 
that their increased niche-mediated attention was translating into increased audiences. The term 
itself was effectively ‘empty’; fit for utilization, at the discretion of the cultural knowledge pro-
ducer, in cases wherein the overarching goal lay not only with being the first publication to in-
troduce audiences to a scarcely-known artist, but to do so while implicitly presenting oneself as a 
source for - and authority on - privileged information on a scarcely-known genre.  During the 
early months of 2002, a curious variety of niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers were 
allotting ‘emo’ the role of the signifier; an adjective meant to orient, or ‘frame’, the manner in 
which the reader would conceptualise the signified artist of focus. The primary objective of such 
instances or reportage, however, would appear to have lain with constructing the perceived 
emergence of a burgeoning youth-cultural movement; one replete with distinct tastes in artistic 
producers and aesthetic practices.   
 This chapter will focus on a number of the niche-mediated texts which strove to focus on 
‘emo’ in and of itself and, in so doing, succeeded in not only framing ‘emo’ as less a signifier 
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than that being signified, but drawing the pronounced ire of web-based subcultural discourse cen-
tres in misappropriating, reinventing, and widely disseminating ‘privileged’ subcultural knowl-
edge. I argue that those cultural knowledge producers not only strove to manufacture the percep-
tion of a burgeoning ‘emo movement’, but asserted their own jurisdiction over the authoritative 
ability to identify, define, and speak about the specificities of the emo pseudo-genre. I will sub-
ject a cross-section of the niche-mediated texts that strove to grant the emo pseudo-genre consti-
tution to a program of analysis concerning itself with two questions.  First, what do these texts 
aspire to ‘say’ to those populations who we might assume constitute their ‘intended’ recipients; 
i.e., those adolescent populations who are either presumed to be interested, or presumed to be 
potential adherents of, the emo pseudo-genre?  Second, what information might they inadver-
tently convey to those subculturalist populations that might take a pronounced interest in what 
such niche-mediated texts aspire to say (and who they aspire to say it to)?   Finally, and in re-
gards to this second question, I will demonstrate the manner through which these instances of 
high-profile niche-mediated coverage not only assured that the term ‘emo’ would come to denote 
a lack of subcultural legitimacy and once again take on pejorative connotations within the arena 
of subcultural discourse, but provoke the construction of an unsavoury ‘emo kid' stereotype; a 
burgeoning conceptualization of a problematic population of impending subcultural ‘others’ that 
would, indeed, suffice in evolving into the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representation as annexed by the 
‘emo reports’ of early 2007. 
 
5.2 “Emotional Rescue”: TIME Magazine on the ‘Emo Movement’.  
 Though an array of niche-media publications – primarily Alternative Press, but also Spin 
and Rolling Stone - had sporadically taken to invoking the term ‘emo’ in describing rising stars 
as Dashboard Confessional and Jimmy Eat World, one of the first accounts meant to focus on 
‘emo’ itself came courtesy of TIME Magazine. In including a Josh Tyrangiel article entitled 
“Emotional Rescue”, The May 21st edition of the weekly news magazine effectively took it upon 
itself to notify its readership about a musical style that, though “having been around since the 
mid-’80s… [was] only now developing into a broad cultural phenomenon” (Tyrangiel, 2002); 
one replete with fans imbued with a “spooky intensity” (Ibid. 2002) and the fixated interest of 
the wider music industry. In leading off with a brief overview of Dashboard Confessional’s bur-
geoning success that takes pains to note that, “[though one] might think Carrabba is a rock 
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star…he is not. He’s an emo star” (ibid. 2002), the article affords itself an over-arching purpose, 
and approaches its dominant theme, in postulating that, “emo might be even bigger if anyone 
knew precisely how to define it” (ibid, 2002). Armed primarily with the educated testimony of 
Deep Elm Records founder John Szuch and Tyrangiel’s personal insights, the remainder of the 
article concerns itself with doing just that in denoting a number of qualities which are ostensibly 
advanced as being unique to the emo genre.  I wish to focus on how, in the process of so doing, 
Tyrangiel would effectively advance a rudimentary depiction of a homogenous ‘movement’ of 
‘sensitive’ emo kids, strive to affiliate choice artistic producers with the ‘movement’ for the pur-
pose of fulfilling potentially ingenuous purposes, and inspire a reactionary subcultural discourse 
that would not only strive to problematize the manner in which Tyrangiel aspired to characterize 
the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre, but bemoan the sheer fact that an inauthentic cultural knowledge pro-
ducer was aspiring to re-constitute the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre at all. 
 
5.2.1 The Content: An Overview 
 Though Tyrangiel almost immediately threatens to derail his own intentions in declaring 
that, “emo is musically broad enough to include country, thrash, acoustic, and traditional pop 
sounds”, he nonetheless argues that the term is applicable to artists who focus on “the specific 
hurt of a bad relationship” in a manner so autobiographical as to ensure that, though the lyrics are 
not “abstract and thus accessible to lots of listeners…a fragile teen being broken up with for the 
first time will wear the repeat button down to a nub” (2002, online). For the most part, however, 
Tyrangiel locates that quality rendering an artist’s output ‘emo’ less in the nature of the music 
than in the manner of its distribution in stating that, 
 
True to its punk roots, emo has a self-sufficient community that functions outside the 
mainstream. While dozens of emo bands have signed with major labels, the great major-
ity remain on independents like Deep Elm and Jade Tree. These labels put out Cds and 
compilations like The Emo Diaries on the cheap, and they don’t have major record-store 
distribution (2002).  
 
 Above all else, the Tyrangiel text vies to describe the particularities of the ‘emo kid’ and, 
by extension, the ‘self-sufficient community’ that Chris Carrabba is quoted as describing to be 
“cultlike (sic)” at the onset of the piece (2002, online). Beneath a passage entitled “Sensitive 
Kids Love Emo”, Tyrangiel opines that “adolescents can be divided into two categories: those 
who pretend to feel nothing and those who aspire to feel everything. The latter make up the emo 
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demographic” (2002, online). The adolescents who constitute the “emo community” are de-
scribed, on the one hand, as being prone to “buy albums… [and] then huddle online at diary-
land.com, makeoutclub.com and the emo post-punk Web ring to bare their souls and trade re-
views” and as a collectivity harbouring “domineering and spiteful” traits, on the other. Citing the 
instance in which “emo fans howled” because The Promise Ring’s Wood/Water album not only 
“sounded overproduced”, but was released through Epitaph Records as opposed to the “tiny, 
emo-friendly Jade Tree” label, Tyrangiel cautions that “emo fans go ballistic when they think a 
band is selling out” (2002, online).  
 Despite his own comments regarding both the musical breadth of the genre and the ve-
hemence the emo community purportedly reserve for popular artists, Tyrangiel nonetheless iden-
tifies Dashboard Confessional and Weezer as the flagship bands of the genre. In arguing that 
“Emo is the antipop”, Tyrangiel subjects Dashboard Confessional’s most recognizable song, 
“Screaming Infidelities”, to a deconstruction tailored toward deducing its widespread appeal. 
Noting that “[Carrabba’s] guitar is mournful [and] his voice strained”, and that, “the song isn’t 
about being cheated on; it’s about Carrabba’s being cheated on”, Tyrangiel essentially heralds 
“Screaming Infidelities” as the quintessential representative of a musical genre that “shuns ab-
straction to drive home a single point: woe is me” (2002, online). Weezer’s popularity with the 
emo community, on the other hand, is described as being by virtue of the fact that “[Rivers] 
Cuomo is an emo everyman”; a statement which finds accompaniment with a brief - and largely 
incorrect - account of the process through which Cuomo reformed the band once having “real-
ized that Harvard was not a cure for feelings of social inadequacy” (2002, online). In noting that 
Weezer find favour with emo enthusiasts despite having committed such ‘sins’ as signing to a 
major label and selling almost four million albums, Tyrangiel concludes his article in noting that 
Weezer’s appeal proves, “that emo kids - who pride themselves on not being like everybody else 
- don’t mind living vicariously through a star, particularly an overwrought one…It’s tough to 
avoid the conclusion that the emo faithful, like Red Sox fans, are only happy when they’re sad.” 
(2002, online). 
 
5.2.2 The Nature of the Text: Contrasting Themes 
 In essence, the Tyrangiel article is an odd amalgamation of unsubstantiated claims and 
contradictory information. Though speaking to the fervent dedication of the ’emo faithful’, the 
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article does not include a single first-person testimonial from anyone who might self-identify as 
part of the ‘emo community’. It strives to celebrate emo as ’the anti-pop’ while, quite concur-
rently, ridiculing the ‘sensitive kids’ which make up its fan base. In noting that, “most emo band 
names blend irony and sincerity as if they were the same thing (which, in the current adolescent 
idiom, they are)” (Ibid, 2002), Tyrangiel even subjects the bands constitutive of the genre to a 
subtle derision. When subjected to any measure of scrutiny, it becomes clear that the piece lacks 
a cohesion of narrative; it advances statements prone to contradicting all that have come before it 
and which will themselves find contradiction in those that follow. There is no thematic unity. 
The author takes on a multitude of positions - from expert to befuddled spectator, advocate to 
unflattering critic - all within a single paragraph. These qualities necessarily demand that we 
speculate as to which the audiences to whom the text means to speak and, furthermore, the over-
arching intentions of the piece. In doing so, I must admittedly take some liberties with Barthes’ 
(2006) notion that an author’s intentions should not be taken into consideration when examining 
the various ways in which an audience might interpret, and pull significance from, a text. I argue 
that this particular article was constructed in a manner allowing that a multiplicity of audiences 
could extract unique sub-narratives which cater directly to them while, at the same time, pulling 
one uniform meta-narrative from the piece; namely, that emo is the emergent ‘big thing’, and 
that Dashboard Confessional and Weezer, specifically, are the flagship acts associable with it. 
 In concerning the sub-narratives, I wish to speculate that one might identify three unique 
audiences, aside from that completely oblivious to the prevalence of the term ‘emo’24
                                                          
24 Ironically, we can safely assume that the gross majority of TIME Magazine readers warrant categorization 
amongst this ‘completely oblivious’ audience 
, to whom 
the article vies to extend differing narratives. First, we might consider the themes which might 
purport themselves as pertinent for adolescents who are either supportive of the emergent ‘emo 
movement’ or, to some extent, interested in knowing more about it. The article opens and closes 
by identifying artists with whom this audience, more likely than not, will already have some de-
gree of knowledge. Through invoking reference to widely known artists, it invites this audience 
to approach the remainder of the text from the standpoint of one who is already, to some degree, 
‘in the know’. The text also panders to this audience in deducing that, lest one is ‘in the know’, 
emo is almost impossible to identify and, in doing so, suggests that those with some familiarity 
with the applicability of the term harbour a privileged knowledge; they are already part of a 
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movement that ‘outsiders’ are described as being unable to understand. From thereon, the article 
can be taken as providing a number of pointers in regarding how the privileged audience can best 
interject themselves into the movement in providing an overview of the genre’s history (here, 
Rites of Spring are heralded as the progenitors of the movement), some little-known celebrated 
subcultural artefacts (the Emo Diaries compilation) and some of the conventional practices used 
to signal participation with the subculture (like utilizing livejournal.com, a practice that we might 
assume the gross majority of readers already partake in). The article also offers pointers on how 
to pass oneself off as an authentic member of the ‘emo community’: allow yourself to live vi-
cariously (or present yourself as if living vicariously) through your favourite ‘emo stars’; keep 
close watch out for artists who might be vying to ‘sell-out’, but don’t forbid yourself to develop 
close affinities with emo ‘everymen’ like Chris Carrabba and Rivers Cuomo just because they’ve 
infiltrated the mainstream. Oh, and don’t hesitate to celebrate your sadness.  
 The article simultaneously vies to credit the intelligence of a second prospective audi-
ence: the longstanding, and decidedly ‘authentic’ subculturalist. The article can only stand to re-
inforce its reputation as a credible text - and, by extension, its authority in speaking on this sub-
ject matter - in name-dropping little-known but widely-revered bands like Rites of Spring, in-
cluding comments from the likes of Szuch and The Promise Ring’s Davey von Bohlem. It also 
vies to cull credibility among less pretentious subculturalists in bemoaning the manner in which 
fledgling subculturalists condemn a “lovely, mature rock album” (Tyrangiel, 2002) like The 
Promise Ring’s Wood/Water on such inconsequential grounds as its production value. For the 
longstanding subculturalist audience, the article essentially serves to celebrate the genre while 
problematizing the influx of ‘emo faithful’ and, in doing so, more likely than not stands to parrot 
those lines of discourse fluctuating throughout ‘authentic’ websites like Fourfa.com and 
Punknews.org. Finally, and in regarding that inevitable audience of ‘emo detractors’, the article 
presents themes allowing that it be perceived as a tongue-in-cheek diatribe that relies heavily on 
ridiculing the ‘emo faithful’ through playing on ‘sensitive adolescent’ stereotypes and focusing 
on the glaringly hypocritical traits of the ‘movement’. It would be difficult to assume that the 
article is less politely ribbing the ‘emo faithful’ than catering to those who would laugh directly 
at them in deducing that emo fans “are only happy when they’re sad” or that they sing along with 
“[Carrabba’s] desperate, heartbroken lyrics in a sort of primal-scream karaoke” (Tyrangiel, 
2002). The manner in which the article compares ‘emo kids’, en masse, to popular culture’s most 
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recognizable caricature of the anomic young intellectual in suggesting that readers, “think Lisa 
Simpson: she values her individuality and brainpower while bemoaning the loneliness that goes 
along with being smart and artistic” (Tyrangiel, 2002) all but ensures that even the least cultur-
ally-cognizant reader will extract a sense as to why self-obsessed emo kids are deserving of some 
ridicule. 
 I here draw attention to the presence this multiplicity of audience-specific sub-narratives 
for the sake of extending the speculative argument that the Tyrangiel text concurrently strives to 
‘legitimize’ itself with three distinct audience and, in doing so, panders to diffuse populations of 
prospective readers in a bid to ‘authenticate’ its authority in speaking on its subject matter; albeit 
regardless of the nature of the publication in which it appears.  It could be argued that the 
Tyrangiel text strives to not only authoritatively interject itself into terrain better suited to those 
niche-mediated publications concerned specifically with catering to music afficianados, but also 
purports itself the ability – by very virtue of its exteriority from the cultural field under analysis – 
to frame the pseudo-genre as an event without (ostensibly) serving the purpose of detailing the 
particularities of any specific artists.  The text allows that Tyrangiel, in other words, might ad-
vance an authoritative synopsis on the burgeoning ‘movement’ despite the fact that – and, in-
deed, precisely because – he is an ‘outsider’ who, nonetheless, incorporates allusions to his ‘le-
gitimate’ understanding of the phenomena irregardless of the particularistic vantage of the texts’ 
recipient.  Catering to a multiplicity of readership populations while simultaneously situating it-
self as a commentary from an ‘outsider looking in’ effectively grants the text the credibility req-
uisite in reporting on the ‘bigger picture’ as might only be denoted by an auteur who is not so 
close to the event as to be rendered oblivious to its procession.   
 
5.2.3 The Meta-Narrative: ‘Emo’ is, and this is Emo. 
 In focusing on the differential themes which this particular text means to purvey to the 
differential audiences which it potentially stands to attract, it is easy to lose sight of the overarch-
ing meta-narrative; or, the one piece of information that any reader, regardless of their subjective 
standpoints, cannot help but extract from the piece: namely, that the ‘emo genre’ - and, by exten-
sion, the ‘emo community’ - is an entity that exists. Though the article mulls over the difficulties 
intrinsic to the task of defining ‘emo’, it never hazards to risk extending the impression that the 
term is, in essence, hollow; that it cannot substantively be taken to refer to any tangible quality 
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of an artistic work. Instead, the piece assures the reader that ‘emo’ is whatever ‘sensitive kids’ 
define as being ‘emo’. Should the reader ask, “how can one deduce that these ‘sensitive’ kids 
are, in fact, ‘sensitive kids’?”, the text replies, “well, look at how they relate to ‘sensitive artists’ 
like Chris Carrabba and Rivers Cuomo - they are obviously sensitive kids”. If the reader then 
asks, “but how can one definitively deduce that these artists are emo?”, it replies “Because the 
emo community is buying their albums and talking about them on Livejournal”. And what, ex-
actly, is the ‘emo community’? A community of sensitive kids. How do we know that they are 
sensitive? “Well,” the text replies, “just look at what they are listening to”. A circular logic to be 
sure, but nonetheless effective should the targeted audience be assumed unlikely to instigate a 
deep interaction with the text. However, should the article be perceived as failing to succeed in 
substantiating the notion of the genre by associating it with a wealth of longstanding (and cultur-
ally prevalent) adolescent stereotypes, it simultaneously cites relatively easily identifiable artists 
as ‘living proof’ of the genre’s reality. It is important to note that, though the term was previ-
ously used in aiding the cultural knowledge producer in framing the manner in which readers 
might orient themselves with a lesser-known artist, two relatively well-known artists are here 
identified as a means of framing the manner in which readers might orient themselves in ap-
proaching the topic of this lesser-known pseudo-genre. Even then, should the suspect evidence 
supporting the notion of the emo pseudo-genre attract the attention of the critical reader, the arti-
cle nonetheless succeeds in not only interjecting the term ‘emo’ into the wider current of public 
discourse, but indelibly ensuring that certain artists will come to be affiliated with it. In essence, 
we might deduce that the intentions inspiring the publication of this article are threefold. It in-
forms the reader of the fact that ‘emo’ is an existent youth-oriented musical genre. It identifies a 
shortlist of artists who epitomize the genre. It renders it likely that, should the reader opt to con-
verse on the topic of the ‘emo’ genre -or its corresponding movement - they will not only do so 
in a manner that reinforces the genre’s status as something that exists, but invoke reference to a 
specified roster of artists in so doing.  
 The reader might be forgiven for harbouring a healthy degree of scepticism at this junc-
ture. True enough, given the information that I have thus far granted, it would not be difficult to 
presume that a niche-media publication dedicated to disseminating music coverage might jockey 
to shape the manner in which its readership accepts the reality of, and conceptualizes, a thereto-
fore poorly explicated artistic pseudo-genre. It is quite plausible that a music magazine might do 
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so in vying to retain jurisdiction over the legitimate ability to profess oneself as being the one 
and only authentic source for ‘privileged’ information regarding the ‘new’ and ‘unique’ musical 
style that is certainly destined to prove itself the ‘next big thing’. Claiming exclusive dominion 
over the ability to consecrate those artists to be affiliated with the ‘movement’ would indeed be a 
wise ‘investment’ for any niche-media publication so aspiring to improve their positioning 
amidst the hierarchy of cultural knowledge-producing institutions. But can we assume that TIME 
Magazine so abruptly aspired to interject itself into the field of niche-mediated cultural knowl-
edge production for the purpose of making a bid to be regarded the authoritative source on emo 
music? Is it truly credible to insinuate that such an esteemed news publication would harbour any 
substantial degree of interest in ‘selling’ the wider populace on the validity of such a question-
able pseudo-genre or, for that matter, ensuring that the term might immediately conjure a heuris-
tic association with such specific artists as Dashboard Confessional and Weezer? We likely can-
not. It is, nonetheless, pertinent to note that, should we connect the requisite dots, the publication 
of the article potentially served to benefit the AOL Time-Warner media conglomerate for which 
TIME magazine is, arguably, a flagship publication. A run-down of the assets in possession of 
the company following the 2000 merger between AOL and Time-Warner (McAvoy, 2000) 
serves to reveal that, at the time of the “Emotional Rescue” article’s publication, AOL Time-
Warner not only owned TIME Magazine, but Weezer’s Geffen Records, Jimmy Eat World’s 
Dreamworks Records25
5.2.4 “Because You Asked For It…”: The Subcultural Response 
 Regardless of the Tyrangiel article’s overarching intentions, one of its inarguable effects 
proved to be that of drawing the ire of those subculturalists frequenting the Punknews.org web-
site and, by extension, inspiring the creation of a subcultural discourse that framed the preva-
 and, finally, Interscope Records - which had quietly purchased a portion 
of Dashboard Confessional’s Vagrant Records in early 2001 (Punknews.org, 2008c). One can’t 
help but speculate that the Tyrangiel article might best be categorized as a text through which the 
largest corporation in the mainstream music industry vied to usurp the role of the niche-media in 
disseminating an ‘expert knowledge’ that strove to reify the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre in a manner 
suiting their fiscal interests.  
 
                                                          
25 Though Jimmy Eat World is not spoken of in the text, their photograph accompanied the online version of the 
article. 
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lence of the ‘emo’ term as an emerging problematic. A news contribution, authored by a user 
identified simply as ‘travis’ (2002) and entitled “Because you asked for it: TIME defines Emo”, 
appeared on the main page of the website on the evening of the twentieth of May. Along with 
providing a brief synopsis of the article and an online link to the piece, the contributor posts the 
rhetorical question, “is there any band that actually accepts the label of ‘emo’ anyway” 
(Punknews.org, 2002). Over the span of the following two days, the news posting had attracted 
52 comments; the majority of which either vied to attack the term and those artists associated 
with it or, most poignantly, the Tyrangiel article itself.  
 If the Tyrangiel article strove to extend an ‘expert’ knowledge aspiring to frame emo as 
less a frivolous descriptor than a substantive genre - or, an entity worthy of consideration as 
something in and of itself - we might take the comments that the news-posting inspired as fledg-
ling initiatives meant to facilitate the creation of an antagonistic counter-knowledge – or, a dis-
course-based resistance initiative - within the subcultural sphere. It might be prudent to map the 
implicit exchange between the ‘expert’ voice of the Tyrangiel article and the ‘educated’ re-
sponses on behalf of those subculturalists so interested in contesting the former as an instance of 
call-and-response. Whereas Tyrangiel claims that, though all music is emotional, “Emo 
fans…say comparing emo with mainstream rock is like comparing The Bell Jar to a Hallmark 
card” (Tyrangiel, 2002), a litany of Punknews.org users, who admit to enjoying a number of 
(quote-unquote) ‘emo’ bands, counter the statement in testifying to their lack of interest in sub-
stantiating the discursive divide between styles of music. “I listen to music,” notes user 
‘Exar_Kun’, “I don’t call the bands emo…I call them music” (2002). Punknews.org user ’Yel-
lowTrash’ counters Tyrangiel’s notes on the evolution of the genre in testifying to the fact that, 
“Emo’s dead. Seriously, all bands that were labelled emo who didn't care for the term have either 
broken up, or are wondering what the hell that means. The other bands who call themselves emo 
are basically rehashed pop-punk or power-pop” (Punknews.org, 2002). In focusing specifically 
on Tyrangiel’s claim that “[Emo’s] subject matter has gradually narrowed from the general pain 
of being an outsider to the specific hurt of a bad relationship” (Tyrangiel, 2002), ’Big Letter 
Guy’ deduces that, “that line is perfect! It sums up about 50 billion bands” (Punknews.org, 
2002).  
 There is a pair of posts that I would argue to be deserving of specific attention. 
Punknews.org user ‘cuzima’ (2002), for one, berates the article’s intentions, the ostensible rela-
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tionship between ‘emo’ and punk rock and the validity of the notion of the emo pseudo-genre 
altogether in posting, 
 
You know...I really hate misinformed articles...especially from time magazine...I'd ex-
pect some journalistic integrity. As much as the media would like to associate emo with 
punk rock, the connection just isn't there. Sure, in the 80s some bands turned from po-
litical overtones to more emotionally driven music, but comparing the styles of dag 
nasty or fugazi to that of dashboard confessional or bright eyes and saying you see a 
similarity is just outrageous. Sure, fugazi songs have rollercoaster vocals and swaying 
emotions, but they also had varied topics not just dealing with sorrow. If anything emo-
tional in music makes it emo, than Hank Williams Sr. singing "There's a tear in my 
beer" would classify as emo. Do hate and anger classify as emotions? If so, than Skrew-
driver and Brutal Attack can be emo bands too. Garth Brooks, Snoop Dogg (who really 
loves his gin and juice...love is an emotion), and Tom Waits are all emo too. What about 
feelings of disgust or isolation? I guess we can throw every political punk band in the 
emo category too. The fact is, the acoustic guitars and whiny vocals don‘t equate to any-
thing to do with other types of music. I have no problem with emo standing on its own, 
but people need to quit reaching for connections with other scenes (Punknews.org user 
‘cuzima’, 2002). 
 
 In likewise aspiring to problematize the emergence of the perception of a revised ‘emo’ 
pseudo-genre, an anonymous Punknews.org user (2002) dedicates his or her post toward the ill 
consequence intrinsic to the process of having a subcultural ‘outsider’ strive to further substanti-
ate the reification of the ‘emo’ label within the subcultural sphere and beyond,  
The problem with having a middle-aged, bespectacled, shirt and tie wearing journalist 
defining a music genre is not only the fact that he's misinformed or anything other prob-
lems you all came up with, the problem is it's just adding to the problem of everyone 
having a serious desire to label stuff. i mean, when did punk and emo become personali-
ties? if i hear one more "that guy is so fuckin' punk" i think i'm going to lock myself in 
my house. but this middle-aged journalist isn't really writing for people like all of us 
who've known about emo, like it or not. he's writing it to the middle-aged parents who 
want to know what's in their kids' cd players. yippy. if overbearing parents want to take 
this article seriously when it says "emo hurts" and "sensitive kids love emo," go right 
ahead. i know some assholes that listen to emo, too. (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 
2002). 
 
 Though each of these posts subtly calls the validity of the pseudo-concept into question, 
their overarching concern would appear to lie with the manner in which Tyrangiel article either 
affiliates ‘emo’ with punk rock or, alternatively, demands that categorical lines be erected in de-
ducing the difference between ‘emo’ and punk rock. Though ‘cuzima’ would appear to harbour 
the opinion that ‘emo’ is too broad a categorization to harbour any validity as a genre, he or she 
nonetheless demonstrates some unease in concerning the fact that the article associates punk rock 
with the ‘acoustic guitars and whiny vocals‘ which they associate with the ‘emo’ genre. The 
anonymous poster, on the other hand, would primarily seem concerned with the fact that emo’s 
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graduation from a signifier to that being signified necessitates the onset of a counter-productive 
process whereby the entire field of subculturalists will inevitably come to be partitioned into an-
tagonistic camps.  
 In sum, it is important to note that, while the Tyrangiel article moved toward introducing 
an expert discourse through which non-subculturalists might extract an understanding of what 
‘emo’ was, the manner in which the article framed ‘emo’ as a genre in and of itself inspired a 
subculturalist discourse largely concerned with determining what ‘emo’ was not. Suffice it to 
say, and less but one post,26
5.3 “Am I Emo?”: Seventeen Magazine and the Constitution of a Fashion 
 It is also of significant note that, in regarding this particular cross-section of subcultural 
discourse, the gross majority of respondents vie to distance themselves from being classified as 
‘emo kids’ without utilizing a discriminatory discourse meant to stereotype those subcultural 
‘others’ who might warrant such a classification. This pattern whereby self-professed ‘legiti-
mate’ subculturalists would vie to assert their subcultural authenticity through assailing the 
‘genre’ in lieu of assailing those presumed to be supportive of it would, however, begin a sparse 
 every respondent strove to argue against the prospect that the artists 
who they admire were constitutive of an ‘emo’ artist or, by extension, that they constituted one of 
the ‘emo kids’ of whom Tyrangiel spoke; evidence, indeed, that the term was well on its way to 
once again sufficing as a derogatory signifier within the subcultural field. However, and despite 
the presence of a sparse number of posts that move toward bringing the validity of the idea of an 
‘emo’ genre into question, the majority implicitly succeed in substantiating the reified presence 
of a bona-fide ‘emo’ pseudo-genre in the process of differentiation; for one cannot extend a justi-
fication regarding what does not deserve to be regarded as ‘emo’ without implicitly granting cre-
dence to the notion that ‘emo’ is something that is.  In essence, then, while the Tyrangiel article 
succeeded in working toward the reification of the perceived ‘emo’ pseudo-genre, the strategy 
that the text employed in striving to be recognized as a legitimate source of authentic knowledge 
effectively failed (in regards to established subculturalist audiences, at least) and, in so doing, 
inspired a subcultural discourse wherein the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre was allotted framing as an 
emerging problematic.  
 
                                                          
26 ...made on the behalf of another anonymous user in taking advantage of an opportunity to argue that “punks say 
emo is whiny, yet punks have to be the whiniest people on earth (Punknews.org, 2002) and, in doing so, only fur-
ther reifying the ‘reality’ of feuding subculturalist pockets. 
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two months later as trends in ‘emo’ fashion came to draw the interest of the editorial staff of Sev-
enteen Magazine. One of North America’s self-professedly pre-eminent youth magazines, Seven-
teen Magazine is a publication that unabashedly strives to extend tips on fashion, diet, and dating 
to “the largest, most affluent teen audience” (Seventeen Media Kit, 2008). Having already estab-
lished a penchant for publishing content meant to introduce perceptively ‘hip’ youth movements 
to their readership27
 
 - and suspected of doing so in collusion with established clothing companies 
vying to either penetrate ‘subversive’ youth markets or co-opt ‘subversive’ youth fashions 
(Moore, 2007) - it is somewhat unsurprising that the magazine featured a two-page spread on 
‘emo fashion’ in its August 2002 edition. 
 Published in conjunction with an article authored by Mara Schwartz (2002), the arguably 
tongue-in-cheek photo spread (Fig. 5.1) essentially strives to dissect the particularities of ‘emo’ 
fashion. Though the piece, entitled “Am I Emo?” boasts a cognizance in regarding the fact that 
“Emo’s a music thing, not a fashion movement”; it nonetheless offers a rundown of all the fash-
ion accessories that “all true Emo kids swear by”. According to the corresponding captions,  
 ‘emo boys’ can be taken to swear by “Geeky Glasses (with thick frames, of course. Think 
Weezer’s Rivers Cuomo or your science teacher)...Too Small Sweaters (to help you with that 
slouchy, disaffected look)” and “Deep Reads” from Salinger and Marcus - not to mention “a 
notebook to express your innermost thoughts” (Seventeen, 2002: 176-77). ’Emo girls’, on the 
other hand, purportedly require “Black Hair Dye (because blondes don’t have more fun - not at  
the Get-Up Kids show, anyway)...Studded Belts ( to show [one’s] punk roots)” and “lots of 
pretty bracelets to express one’s softer side” - and a “Discman loaded with seminal emo Cds 
from Hot Water Music, Rival Schools and Sunny Day Real Estate” (2002:  176-77). As ‘DIY’ 
and ‘subversive’ as these models are portrayed as being, a number of well-established companies 
surface amidst the run-down of featured clothing and accessory details: The ‘emo girl’ sports 
Dickies Jeans, a Sony Discman, Old Navy socks and Doc Martin shoes; the ‘emo boy’ Calvin 
Klein jeans, Converse shoes, and ‘Rivers Cuomo’ glasses courtesy of Cohen’s Optical. In what 
can seemingly be interpreted as a further assurance that the feature would draw the ire of devout 
                                                          
27 Moore (2007) details the process through which Seventeen sought to educate their readership about the ‘riot 
grrrl’ movement by way of a 1992 article that noted, among other things, that “riot grrrls don’t shave and deliber-
ately give each other bad haircuts” (Moore, 2007:9); it is once again difficult to definitively ascertain whether Sev-
enteen intended to promote the movement or lampoon it. 
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Fig. 5.1:  The “Am I Emo?” photo-spread 
 
 
underground music subculturalists, a number of ‘Emo pick-up lines’ - such as “wanna trade mix 
tapes?” and “is that a Promise Ring 7” in your pocket, or are you just happy to see me?” (2002: 
177) - are also included. As with the Tyrangiel article, we might speculate that the Seventeen 
photo-spread vies to speak to a multiplicity of distinct audiences at once; those whom it vies to 
inform (potential consumers) and those who might derive entertainment value from the manner 
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in which they ridicule the former group in the process of doing so.  
 The corresponding article, a short piece by Mara Schwartz entitled “Music Doesn’t Have 
To Suck”, offers little beyond brief biographies of six bands deemed the most prominent 
within the emo pseudo-genre,28 a host of recommended websites,29
 It is interesting to note how Schwartz, not unlike Tyrangiel, preludes her explication of 
what emo is with a statement that is critical of both the term and those who ostensibly deem it 
necessary to affix the transpiring musical ‘movement’ with any label whatsoever.  The manner in 
which Schwartz strives to demonize those major labels that are ‘eager to make emo the next big 
thing’, and are thus apt to incite an onslaught of ‘copycat bands looking to cash in’, might lead us 
to speculate that the author is vying to embody the persona of a legitimate subculturalist for the 
sake of advancing what might thus appear to be an ‘authentic’ commentary concerning (and 
serving to constitute) the emo pseudo-genre.  In a sense, then, Schwartz’s brief introduction 
would appear to be promoting the emo pseudo-genre while, at the same time, inculcating readers 
with the proper cognition – or method of position-taking – that one should endorse for the sake 
of passing off as an ‘authentic’ participant amongst the ‘true emo kids’ as alluded to in the pre-
ceding photo-spread.  The conventions of legitimated subcultural practice, in other words, find 
reflection in a text that strives to disseminate privileged subcultural knowledge to an outsider 
 and a very brief introduction 
serving to notify Seventeen readers to the fact that, 
 
There’s more to life than what’s on the radio.  Yes, there are bands out there who write their own 
songs, play their own instruments and steer clear of shiny, polished studio perfection in favour of 
something that sounds real.  People who like to label things are calling it “emo” (short for emotional), 
although that doesn’t say much.  Isn’t all good music emotional?  And just as in life, emo covers a 
broad spectrum of feelings – from loud to soft, from mad to glad to sad.  But the one thing these artists 
do have in common is that they’re all independent-minded rock acts.  Some, like Jimmy Eat World 
and Thursday, have already been snatched up by major labels eager to make emo the next big thing.  
We kinda hope it’s not.  If this stuff sells a gazillion copies, we’ll have to hide from the copycat bands 
looking to cash in (Schwartz, 2002: 178). 
 
 
                                                          
28 Those six bands include Dashboard Confessional, Jimmy Eat World, The Rocking Horse Winner, Onelinedrawing, 
Desaparecidos and Thursday. 
29 One of the websites listed is Andy Radin’s (2008) Fourfa.com; a very detailed page constructed for the purpose 
of countering the initial misuse of the term ‘emo’ by offering a detailed history of the dispersed ‘emotional hard-
core’ scenes that arose following the dissolution of the ‘Revolution Summer’ bands.  It would be very, very inter-
esting should one be able to deduce whether the fourfa.com site served as one of the primary resources from 
which niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers extracted the information to then be used in constructing 
their own ‘expert discourse’ on the term...      
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population who might thus accordingly berate major label taste-makers, develop a proclivity for 
supporting artists within the sphere of ‘independent-minded rock acts’ (i.e., the sub-field of re-
stricted production), and keep a keen eye out for inauthentic ‘copycats’ should emo artists begin 
to sell a ‘gazillion’ copies of their albums.  One might wonder whether the fact that the Schwartz 
article subtly offered Seventeen readers something of a ‘window’ into the consecrated subcul-
turalist mindset sufficed in rendering the piece particularly offensive to the field of subcultural 
participants or, at the very least, the sizable body of Punknews.org users who either read the arti-
cle (or feigned having done so) for the sake of fashioning a condemnatory response. 
  Before continuing, it might be prudent to recall the means through which the punk sub-
culture effectively ‘delegitimized’ a number of formerly renowned artists once they had effec-
tively penetrated the mainstream and came to be celebrated by non-subculturalist populations of 
listeners.  Should I have succeeded in substantiating the prospect that the field of subcultural par-
ticipation entails a ‘symbolic economy’ wherein an individual’s affinity for certain artists is no 
longer taken to deduce ‘authenticity’ once said artists come to be granted mainstream attention in 
briefly detailing the emergence of the ‘neo-punk’ signifier, one can only imagine how the sub-
cultural capital-stocks of those having ‘invested’ their affinity in such lesser renowned artists as 
Thursday, Desaparecidos, and Onelinedrawing – not to mention the distinction inherent to being 
‘aware’ of websites like Fourfa.com – suffered a marked depletion when each was granted cen-
tral attention by Schwartz’s Seventeen exposé.  As Bourdieu is decidedly resolute in positing that 
the economy of ‘symbolic capitals’ depends upon a certain degree of secrecy, on the part of 
those involved with it, for its continual perpetuation,30
5.3.1 Toward the Emergence of a Counter-Knowledge. 
 As far as the manner in which emo music is concerned, neither the Seventeen photo-
 any and all allusions regarding the manner 
in which texts like the Seventeen article suffice in upsetting one’s individualistic capital-stocks 
will, inevitably, be buried within the deepest subtextual recesses of one’s reactionary discourse 
(if, indeed, it is alluded to at all).  Nonetheless, the reader might wish to retain a general sense of 
the ‘crises of subcultural capital’ that these niche-mediated texts might have incurred when pe-
rusing the excerpts of subcultural discourse provided throughout the remainder of this thesis.      
 
                                                          
30 To quote Bourdieu directly:  “to utter, ‘in public’ the true nature of the field, and of its mechanisms, is sacrilege 
par excellence, the unforgivable sin which all the censorships constituting the field seek to repress.  These are 
things that can only be said in such a way that they are not said” (1993: 73).    
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spread nor the corresponding article deviate in offering examples of artists who had not previ-
ously been characterized as ‘emo’ artists in the Tyrangiel article, selections of Alternative Press 
magazine, or by their respective record labels. Nonetheless, the publication of the “Am I Emo?” 
feature further elicited the vehemence of subculturalists; less on grounds of the content contained 
within the piece than by virtue of the reputation of its source. Red and Black Website columnist 
Leah Newman (2002), who admittedly harboured a prejudice toward Seventeen as a magazine 
that “makes its money…[by] telling our little sisters what to wear and what’s hip and cool” pub-
lished a piece regarding her reaction to the Seventeen piece and, ultimately, her thoughts con-
cerning its inevitable impact on the ‘emo’ genre,  
 
‘Hopefully Ian McKaye hasn't seen this,’ I think. I'm a fan of his, and the heart attack it 
could cause won't be good for any upcoming Fugazi tour dates. Let me start off by say-
ing whoever started calling this latest rash of trendy indie rock "emo" needs to get a lit-
tle more creative. That name's already been taken. Who was it that first decided 
Dashboard Confessional was emo? Bands like Embrace and Rites of Spring who helped 
found the genre involved up-tempo cries and screams set to heavy guitar riffs. Emo 
sprung from the bowels of Washington during the mid-80s. Yeah, that's right, most of 
the Seventeen readers were just coming into the world. Real emo still does exist, and it 
is worth checking out. I mean, look up Autumn to Ashes or Indian Summer sometime. 
That's emo. It's emotional -- as is all music from Cyndi Lauper to Garth Brooks -- but 
it's also hardcore, a definitive characteristic of the genre. But labeling difference aside, 
Seventeen still goes against most of what indie rock itself is. Indie rock -- think about it. 
Independent rock, as in not supported by major mainstream labels, radio or press. That 
usually translates into working your tail off and touring most of the year just to ensure 
you have enough money to eat and clothe yourself. It's not so glamourous, and it's cer-
tainly not the picture Seventeen portrays. [Emo’s] become trendy, however, because 
that's what Seventeen told us would be cool. Prada will no doubt make emo sneakers 
and graffiti logo tees, and Old Navy will help all the bargain shoppers out by doing the 
same. 
 
 Interestingly enough, and beyond expressing the author’s distaste for Seventeen, New-
man’s response can be approached as a text that strives to de-authenticate the contemporary 
‘emo’ pseudo-genre, while, quite simultaneously, constructing a discourse that strives not only to 
celebrate (and distinguish) ‘real’ emo, but frame it as a genre under threat of transitive de-
legitimization. In speaking from the vantage of a ‘legitimate’ subculturalist (as demonstrated via 
her ability to invoke mention of Ian MacKaye),31
                                                          
31 ...even should she be unable to spell his name correctly 
 Newman assumes herself the authority to speak 
on behalf of that bevy of ‘legitimate’ emo artists whom she perceives as having been done of-
fence against twice over. The first slight, manifested in the ‘latest rash of trendy indie rock art-
ists’ to whom the term has been applied, is derived courtesy of the fact that contemporary under-
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standings of emo fail in recognizing the fact that ‘hardcore is a definitive characteristic of the 
[true] genre’. The second offence against ‘true’ emo is the process through which niche-media 
outlets of questionable repute are further tarnishing the term in vying to render it commercially 
viable, depriving it of its ‘independence’ and - perhaps worst of all - striving to assure that it will 
be the next ‘big trend’ among adolescents. As with the mid-90s problematization of ‘neo-punk’s’ 
popularity, we can take Newman’s piece as an initiative to deduce and disseminate standards of 
authenticity against which ‘legitimate’ emo artists might be identified (and, by extension, legiti-
mate ‘emo’ subculturalists identified). 
 Mind you, it is also of note that the entire text can be interpreted as an initiative solely 
meant to construct and reinforce not only Newman’s reputation as a ‘legitimate’ subculturalist 
but, more importantly, her status as an ‘expert’ source on ‘real’ emo - an authentic subcultural 
knowledge producer hazarding to surface in calculated response to an emergent field of inau-
thentic opportunists. Alas, we might deduce that the publication of the Seventeen photo-spread 
inspired the onset of a climate in which subcultural commentators, like Newman, could not only 
adhere to convention in condemning such a blatant movement toward co-opting the notion of the 
‘emo’ genre (in the interest of manufacturing a new adolescent ‘style’), but stake claim over the 
authority to advance a legitimate ‘expert knowledge’ meant to contrast that percolating through-
out the mainstream niche-mediated spheres. Though the Newman text ostensibly asserts itself as 
a resource striving to extend fledgling ‘emo’ enthusiasts a proper inculcation regarding the par-
ticularities of the ‘real’ genre, we can cautiously infer that the article’s main priority rests with 
speaking directly to those already possessed of a cognizance regarding the risks inherent to the 
renewed popularity granted the term ‘emo’ by virtue of its misappropriation. It insinuates that 
those whose ‘subcultural capital’ is deeply tethered to their affinity for ‘emotional hardcore’ (in 
the traditionalist sense) must strive to condemn the affiliation being drawn between the term and 
those artistic products coming to be associated with it - lest, of course, they want to see their 
prestige within subculturalist circles be tarnished by virtue of their affiliation with the Seventeen 
readership. In so many words, Newman advances the suggestion that ‘emotional hardcore’ en-
thusiasts strive toward adopting a generic signifier underwriting the hardcore element. Alas, it is 
of peculiar note that, soon thereafter, niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers burdened 
with the dual task of investing in ‘emo-core’ artists while doing so without risking their claims to 
authenticity in invoking the term ‘emo’ would do just that. By way of example, we might con-
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sider the process through which bands that Alternative Press had formerly heralded as flagship 
‘emo’ bands - like Thursday and Brand New - came to be granted re-categorization as ‘post-
hardcore’ acts by 2003.32
It's very typical for a mainstream media co. to skew something because they have no 
idea what they're really talking about. Anytime you hear a description of some under-
ground scene of any sort it's always so off. What really bothers me about these things is 
they try to pass it off as something it's really not and it tricks the mindless readers. 
These 'emo' bands they talk about are hardly emo at all…Songs about girls do not make 
you emo. Alot of it just trickled down into punk rock and now we have bands that are 
  
  
5.3.2 Punknews.org and the ‘Emo Monster’: The Reactionary Discourse.  
 As with the Tyrangiel piece, Punknews.org featured a news contribution serving to notify 
its readership of the “Am I Emo?” article shortly after its publication. The news posting, tactfully 
titled “Emo Monster Must Die!” by its anonymous contributor (2002c), went on to attract over 
100 user responses – a considerably higher-than-average amount - over the span of the subse-
quent three days. Though the contribution primarily concerns itself with ridiculing the quality of 
the information offered by the Seventeen piece - “time to cut your moppy hair and take back 
them big thick glasses,” warns the contributor, “‘cause emo is not going to be ‘hip’ by next 
summer with all the attention it is getting from these shit mags” (Punknews.org, 2002c), the 
gross majority of the replies it so inspired concern themselves, to varying extents, with the prob-
lematic repercussions which the Seventeen piece might facilitate.  
 As with those posts advanced in reaction to the Tyrangiel article, a significant number of 
the comments supplied by Punknews.org users strive to criticize the manner in which, and means 
through which, the niche-media are attempting to define and promote the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre. 
Punknews.org user ‘sincerely me’ (2002), as one example, asks, “why does every one of your 
shit magazines want to classify emo?…I love some *emo* bands but I don’t feel the need to 
right (sic) some fucking essay about what it is”. It is important to note, however, that the ques-
tionable manner in which the niche-media are attempting to frame the emo pseudo-genre is no 
longer regarded as being the most pressing problematic in the opinion of the majority of respon-
dents. As the following excerpts serve to insinuate, the overarching problematic would now seem 
to reside in the types of readers that the Seventeen coverage would be most likely to attract to the 
ostensible ‘emo’ movement and, by extension, the wider field of subcultural participation. 
 
                                                          
32 Thursday on the cover of AP # 184.1; Brand New on the contents page of AP #185 (p. 15).  
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semi-emoish and semi-punkish and it all gets passed off by alot of people and now, me-
dia companies as a fashion and hip style. I think people need to get a grip on what emo 
is/was before they use the word to describe anything in the indie scene that doesn't have 
a typical punk sound. Yes, I understand emo means emotional, but it still is used to de-
scribe a certain sound of emotional music (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2002; my 
italics). 
 
When will they be satisfied? Have they not already ruined half the shows I actually en-
joy going to? What next, are they gonna throw Rancid and NOFX on the cover and send 
their legions of screaming girls to those shows too? Fucking hell! Yes, I do enjoy music 
that could be classified "emo" (although I still stand by my assertion that Saves The Day 
and Get Up Kids are not emo) and I've even been in a band that played a couple of 
"emo" songs ourselves, but none of us ever went out of our way to attempt to "look" 
emo. It's a musical subgenre, not a fucking clothing style. Tommy Hilfiger is never go-
ing to make an "emo" sweater or "emo" jeans (hopefully). Still, the simple fact that now 
I'm going to have to put up with all these insolent fucks trying way too hard to be "cool" 
and acting like idiots at the shows I go to during my entire senior year is a big fucking 
downer...gah. (Punknews.org user ‘Daegan’, 2002, my italics). 
 
In a really big nutshell emo is just punk with feelings (i might be wrong, but that's my 
opinion) and now, if you are going to just consider certain bands that sing of heart-
breaks, relationships, anger, happiness, sadness whatever then you're considering every 
god damn band in the world emo. I mean, every song by every band is based on some 
type of feelings or emotions. Sure, some people may say that Seventeen catching the 
emo scene very bad or whatever. But then again, it's somewhat good in a way, a lot of 
bands who've been working their asses off for a really long time are finally getting no-
ticed. To you it may not be the right type of people (posers, blink182 freaks who only 
wear hurley and atticus because tom and mark do) but at least it's somebody….don't 
really let all this bullshit get to you like that. Sure, the whole article is pretty much tell-
ing mindless readers to just do whatever the hell the magazine tells them to. Big deal! 
and if all you people are so punk.........then why are you giving a damn fuck?…Don't 
care if mainstream takes away your little underground scene. It's not like we won't find 
another scene to belong to. and like one person said: "Rancid was mainstream at one 
point." and same as emo's going to be. Pretty soon nobody's going to give a rat's ass. so 
don't get all bent out of shape about it! Just because the people you wouldn't like to find 
out about the scene doesn't mean u have to find a new scene to belong to...this just 
makes it more fun to kick people's asses because they have no fucking idea why they're 
at some emo show other than the fact that they saw it in some girlie ass magazine! 
(Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2002; my italics). 
 
 Be it through subtle or explicit means - and by design or accident - each of these posts 
serves to correlate the Seventeen photo-spread with the actions, or forecasted emergence, of a 
problematic population of subcultural ‘others’. In following suit with Tyrangiel’s critics, the au-
thor of our first example castigates the niche-media for assuming the authority to issue a credible 
account of the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre. He or she also succeeds, however, in problematizing that 
population of ‘mindless readers’ assumed destined to be ‘tricked’ into absorbing that false in-
formation as provided. Furthermore, and while this particular author decries the lack of general 
awareness concerning what constitutes ‘real’ emo in a similar manner as Newman, they primar-
ily trace the root of this facetious manifestation of cultural knowledge less to a corporate initia-
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tive to co-opt (or manufacture) the emo pseudo-genre (and corresponding ‘style’) than to those 
within the subcultural field who have been using the term in an improper manner. By this ac-
count, Seventeen is not responsible for the fact that their ‘mindless readers’ now harbour a fledg-
ling knowledge about a style and a cohort of bands who are erroneously being classified as ‘emo’ 
- responsibility rests with the presumed-to-exist bloc of subculturalites who have improperly 
been utilizing the term in describing their tastes in music or, alternatively, their tastes in style.  
 In a similar fashion, ‘Daegan’ - the author of our second example - laments the likelihood 
that the Seventeen feature will attract a very clearly identified population to the field of subcul-
tural participation: namely, the ‘legions of screaming girls’ and ‘insolent fucks’ who, we are 
made to believe, have already developed a tendency toward ruining the author’s concert going 
experiences by ‘trying way too hard to be cool’ and ‘acting like idiots’. In carefully asserting 
himself as an ‘authentic’ subculturalist through including key statements concerning some of his 
own personal qualities - the ability to discern between ‘real’ emo and bands so mislabelled, his 
experiences playing in a band - Daegan’s post might conceivably be taken as a text through 
which the author vies to lash out against illegitimate ‘others’ whom he fears might be endanger-
ing the sanctity of his own subculturalist identity - be it because they haven’t the capacity to de-
tect or dutifully respect his status, or because his own musical tastes put him at risk of being 
identified as an ‘other’ himself. One cannot help but assume that, should it be the case that ‘half 
the shows’ the author enjoys attending have been ruined by the presence of subcultural ‘others’, 
it is likely that said ‘others’ have gravitated towards half of the bands with which Daegan strives 
to affiliate himself with. Alas, the author must assert his superiority over those fledgling subcul-
turalists with whom he might be confused by resorting to other measures through which to 
broadcast his legitimacy. In a previous posting, Punknews.org user ‘JoSH’ (2002c) admits that, 
“I feel bad for the people who always liked this music and who always dressed that way. Now 
they’ll just be lumped in with the posers” (Punknews.org, 2002c). It would be difficult to avoid 
making the educated assumption that a substantial number of the postings which, similarly, be-
rate the audiences to whom such niche-mediated reportage is tailored while, simultaneously, ad-
mitting to harbouring an affinity for those artists and conventions of dress endorsed therein, con-
stitute something of a strategy through which to prevent that such might happen to them. 
 Whereas the former two posts can be taken to suggest that their respective authors are 
speaking from within a subcultural field now bracing for an emergent influx of illegitimate ‘trend 
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followers’, the third excerpt renders itself unique in the fact that it explicitly references this cli-
mate of apprehension while it further contributes to the unsavoury representation of the impend-
ing influx of inauthentic ‘emo faithful’. Though this anonymous commenter agrees that the arti-
cle is likely to attract ‘mindless’ Seventeen readers who do not constitute the ‘right type of peo-
ple’, he or she also chastises the ‘authentic’ faithful for overlooking those benefits which might 
be imparted upon subcultural producers by virtue of a wider audience base. In a sense, this com-
mentator would appear to be challenging the counter-intuitive logic of those orthodox subcultural 
conventions which call for stern judgement within a subculture purporting itself as a ‘safe haven’ 
for those who often bear the brunt of being unfavourably judged within the wider society. The 
derisive tone of the reference to the ‘little underground scene’ adequately serves to bring the au-
thenticity of those forum users who are boasting of harbouring such a fervent indignance into 
question on grounds that true ‘punks’ would not hesitate to create ‘another scene to belong to’. 
Nonetheless, and in so many words, the author also indirectly advances the opinion that an influx 
of misinformed fledgling subculturalists would also serve the benefit of reinforcing the stratified 
nature within the field of subcultural participation; it will be good sport to observe and ridicule 
those who gravitate toward subcultural spaces solely because of the fact that they came to be 
aware of them ‘in some girlie ass magazine’. In advancing a similarly themed response, 
Punknews.org user XxvanessaxX (2002) posted the following comment, 
 
Kay... first of all, if everyone is so punk, wtf do you care what some 12 yr old kids are 
doing? Everyone knows that article was mad commercialization but WHO CARES... 
They aren't changing your mind. Thats what matters. Besides, if these kids are stupid 
enough to follow that (they all are of course) then that just creates fuel for future punks 
of North America. Lets just thank sweet jesus they aren't doing any punk articles... for 
now. Oh, yeah. They'll get us too (Punknews.org user XxvanessaxX, 2002). 
 
 I might wish to speculate that this particular comment, and those with which we con-
cerned ourselves before it, grants us a greater understanding as to why so many Punknews.org 
users might have chosen to devote their attention toward critiquing an article that, we might 
safely assume, the majority of them did not actually read. In judging by this thread of subcul-
turalist discourse, the niche-mediated movement toward mass-popularizing the emo pseudo-
genre, and attempting to demarcate and promote an emo fashion, are being framed as threats 
against the exclusivity of the closely associable punk subculture. In Bourdieuian terms, one 
could claim that each of these responses denotes an opportunity through which each respective 
commentator - subtly but surely -strove to protect their ‘positions’ within the symbolic economy 
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of subcultural capital. Some strive to assert their own status as a legitimate subculturalist through 
imparting their own ‘informed’ wisdom (or, perhaps, their familiarity with the accepted subcul-
turalist line) on the ‘true’ nature of emo. Others tailor their comments toward subtly attesting to 
their seemingly inborn ability to deduce mainstream initiatives to co-opt a pseudo-generic sect. A 
select number even implicitly cite their longstanding residency within the subcultural field in 
referencing the process through which niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers attempted 
(and failed) to render ‘ska-punk’ the ‘next big thing’ in speaking to the fact that the mainstream 
popularity of ‘emo’ would surely be fleeting . Albeit through various means, the gross majority 
of the comments posted in reference to the “Emo Monster Must Die!” bulletin suffice in allow-
ing their authors the ability to testify to their possession of the subcultural habitus while, concur-
rently, contributing to a discourse meant to reinforce the consecration of those character traits 
becoming of an authentic subculturalist: the possession of a ‘legitimate’ knowledge running 
counter to that purported by mainstream sources, a cognizance toward those processes tailored 
toward inciting subcultural co-optation, the ability to deduce - and attest to an intolerance for - 
the presence of illegitimate subcultural ‘tourists’. These are the character traits that not only 
serve to protect the sanctity of the subcultural field, but allow those within to broadcast their po-
sitions within the echelons of the internal hierarchy. 
 Suffice it to say, any discursive movement toward securing one’s own claim to superior-
ity necessitates the identification of an inferior counterpart; and it is interesting to note the proc-
ess through which these comments, by and large, uniformly construct the representation of the 
problematic population of subcultural ‘outsiders’ who are widely assumed likely to constitute 
subcultural ‘others’ in gravitating toward the field by virtue of the Seventeen article. In this case, 
many of the unsavoury traits ascribed to this particular manifestation of subcultural ‘other’ are 
derived from the stereotypical representation of the inauthentic ‘posers’ (so described as ‘mind-
less’ vessels who will latch themselves to whatever practice or fashion the mainstream deduces 
to be trendy). This particular ‘other’, however, would also seem to harbour particularistic traits 
so ascribed in correlation with the character of the publication in which this particular piece sur-
faced. The offending (or to be offensive) population is forecasted as being young, decidedly fe-
male, and prone to engage in practices more becoming of an N’ Sync concert than, say, a Thurs-
day performance. Between the stereotypical traits ascribed to the ‘emo faithful’ by the Tyrangiel 
article and those developing amidst threads of subcultural discourse such as this, we might de-
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duce the presence of a prototypical representation of what would inevitably become the ‘emo 
kid’ folk-devil. 
 As one final observation before moving on to identify the authoritative text on the emo 
pseudo-genre, it must be noted that the collective subcultural response underwent something of a 
discursive ‘shift’ at some point between the publication of the Tyrangiel article and the Seven-
teen piece. Whereas responses to the TIME article entailed something of a narrative proving 
critical of the concept of a substantive emo genre, Newman’s ‘expert’ counter-discourse and 
those replies levied against the Seventeen piece suggest the impression that the subcultural field 
had also come to extend the concept of the emo pseudo-genre some degree of credence; even if 
only for the sake of differentiating between the ‘authentic’ emo genre and its modern, illegiti-
mate counterpart.  It might thus be suggested that, at some point amidst the pattern of call-and-
response generated between the niche-mediated field of aspiring subcultural knowledge produc-
ers and those self-proclaimed subculturalists so disgruntled in their stead, the contemporary emo 
pseudo-genre took on an aura of legitimacy as a verifiable entity; some degree of substantiation, 
or reification, even despite the fact that there would not appear to have been any self-referential 
conglomeration of emo enthusiasts possessed of any desire to identify themselves as the ‘emo 
kids’ that the niche-media had been advertising (and the subcultural field had been condemning).  
This significant detail would be granted little in the way of concern until the following fall of 
2003, wherein Andy Greenwald’s Nothing Feels Good: Punk Rock, Teenagers and Emo sug-
gested that the absence of any self-referential emo culture could easily be attributed to the fact 
that those adolescents constitutive of it may or may not have been cognizant of their own partici-
pation within it.  It is to the Greenwald text which we now turn. 
 
5.4 The Authoritative Text: Greenwald’s Nothing Feels Good 
 
While shallow celebrities dominate the headlines, pundits bemoan the death of the mu-
sic industry, and the government decries teenagers for their morals (or lack thereof), 
earnest, heartfelt bands like Dashboard Confessional, Jimmy Eat World, and Thursday 
are quietly selling hundreds of thousands of albums through dedication, relentless tour-
ing, and respect for their fans. This relationship - between young people and the empa-
thetic music that sets them off down a road of self-discovery and self-definition - is 
emo, a much-maligned, mocked, and misunderstood term that has existed for nearly two 
decades but has flourished only recently. In Nothing Feels Good, Andy Greenwald 
makes the case for emo as more than a genre - its an essential rite of teenage hood. From 
the ’80s to the ’00s, from the basement to the stadium, from tour busses to chat rooms, 
and from the diary to the computer screen, Nothing Feels Good narrates the story of 
emo from the inside out and explores the way this movement is taking shape in real time 
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and with real hearts on the line. Nothing Feels Good is the first book to explore this ex-
citing moment in music history, and Andy Greenwald has been given unprecedented ac-
cess to the bands and to their fans. He captures a place in time and a moment on the 
stage in a way only a true music fan can. 
Back cover explication of Andy Greenwald’s Nothing Feels Good (2003).  
  
 To this point, the only niche-media texts with which this analysis has concerned itself 
have been magazine articles; texts that, while capable of disseminating knowledge to a wide 
population of recipients, do not retain a notable degree of pedagogic durability. In so many 
words, the magazine article suffices less in providing a ‘deep’ knowledge than a superficial 
overview; it is meant to facilitate knowledge pertinent ‘to the moment’ and does not assume it-
self a knowledge-source fit for re-visitation. In regards to the types of publications that we have 
heretofore examined in the course of this chapter, it can safely be assumed that neither TIME nor 
Seventeen aspired to advance texts that might, years later, be heralded as those definitive texts 
successfully having encapsulated the phenomenon from every conceivable vantage point - nei-
ther, in essence, aspired to advance an authoritative text. I might wish to utilize the term ‘authori-
tative text’ regarding Greenwald’s (2003) Nothing Feels Good: Punk Rock, Teenagers, and Emo 
because it does aspire to profess itself a definitive resource on the emo pseudo-genre and, by ex-
tension, the presumed ‘emo culture’. It asserts itself as the benchmark text against which all sub-
sequent texts must regard, be taken in light of and contrasted with. It aspires, in other words, to 
become the quintessential source for ‘expert’ knowledge and to grant Greenwald the distinction 
of having ‘written the book’ on the pseudo-genre.  
 Seeking a means to justify relocating to New York during an interim between terms as an 
English major at Brown University, Greenwald procured an internship position with Spin Maga-
zine and, by his own account, quickly secured the position of managing the magazine’s website. 
As Greenwald recounts, the inspiration for compiling a book to document the rise of the ‘emo 
movement’ arose in the wake of, 
 
…a series of stories I did for Spin in 2001 and 2002. The first was on Dashboard, 
Makeout club, blogs. They were totally outside of my experience, but I was really ex-
cited. I felt there was a connection between the three. What was really appealing about 
the genre was the teenagers themselves. I’m fascinated by fandom. The love and devo-
tion people have towards music and the music they discover during that time of life. I 
was really interested in it. I felt I’d have a unique perspective, since I was an outsider 
(Stover and Carlson, 2005). 
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 Armed with considerable access to many of the artists affiliated with the emo genre and, 
we might assume, with the blessing of a magazine whose authors had achieved notable success 
in the wider literary market,33
Originally, emo was short for ‘emocore,’ a strain of hardcore punk…then it started to be ap-
plied to bands that weren’t punk, to fashion trends, to sad-eyed kids in the back of class. It’s 
always been mildly derisive, a term used by haters and critics to dismiss something that’s 
overly weepy, self-indulgent, or unironic. Every generation that loves emo bands simultane-
ously rejects the term while claiming ownership of it - meaning even if they won’t admit that 
 Greenwald set about compiling an account meant to document the 
pseudo-genre, “during the big boom of emo [when] the fans and bands were getting signed” 
(Stover and Carlson, 2005). Named after a seminal Promise Ring album, Nothing Feels Good 
essentially concerns itself with striving to cast contemporary youth culture as the emo culture to 
which the likes of Tyrangiel and Schwartz referenced without adequately situating. It is also sig-
nificant to note that Greenwald breaks company from our aforementioned columnists by virtue 
of his care in attempting not only to compile an authoritative text on the pseudo-genre, but to do 
so in a manner meant to reflect, and reinforce, his own status as an authentic subcultural knowl-
edge producer with his ‘legitimate’ subculturalist sensibilities firmly intact. The final text proves 
to stand as an expert discourse that succeeds in creating a great deal of the privileged ‘subcultural 
knowledge’ that it disseminates, a document fit for utilization by fledgling ‘emo subculturalites’ 
vying to penetrate the barriers of the subcultural field and a resource through which established 
subculturalists might better come to conceptualize - and recognize - the problematic population 
of insurgent subcultural ‘others’. In dissecting the diverse narratives underlining the Greenwald 
text, we can gain a sense of the manner in which this text reified and reinforced the already 
prevalent, but ill-defined, construct of the subcultural ‘other’ in a manner that would reverberate 
long after the popularity of the emo pseudo-genre, as Greenwald vies to characterize it here, no 
longer came to be heralded as the most pertinent threat to the consecration of the subcultural 
field.  
 
5.4.1 Redefinition, Interpellation and the Direct Text: Striving to Actualize the Audience 
 In what might appear to be an odd choice of preliminary focus, Greenwald aspires to 
prelude his exposé on the emo pseudo-genre (and movement) with an introduction fit to bring the 
validity of the term’s applicability into question,  
 
                                                          
 33 I here refer to Chuck Klosterman, who afforded Spin a great deal of prestige when his excellent account of heavy 
metal fandom, Fargo Rock City, was published in 2002.  
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they love emo, they certainly will say how much they hate everything that’s been called emo 
since then. But still, no one knows what it is (Greenwald, 2003: 2). 
 
 The author, furthermore, recounts the fact that none among the “dozens - if not hundreds 
- of people” he had spoken with in compiling his text had ever “encountered a band that claimed 
to be emo” (2003:2). He explicitly invokes reference to ‘grunge’ in raising a red-flag in regards 
to emo’s status as a “media buzzword [that has been] thrown at bands” (2003: 2). He even attests 
to the fact that “emo is a lame word,” and asks as to why “anyone in their right mind [would] 
choose to be called something so silly, reductive, and confusing?” (2003:2).  
 Suffice it to say, within the first two pages of Nothing Feels Good, Greenwald asserts his 
legitimate ability to speak on the subject by echoing the very same sentiments voiced within the 
Punknews.org discussion threads inspired in the wake of the Tyrangiel article - albeit while si-
multaneously alluding to - and chastising - the manner in which the term has been used in the 
context of the capital-based ‘game’ at play within the field of subcultural participation. In one 
fell swoop, Greenwald highlights the ambiguous nature of the term, decries the manner in which 
“the marketers, the publicists, and the radio formatters who refer to music by genre” (2003: 2) 
have striven to co-opt it,34
The truth is, the thread that connects the D.C. hardcore bands of the ’80s with the lovelorn, 
clean-cut pop-rockers of the ’00s doesn’t lie in the music at all; it’s in the fans. Emo isn’t a 
genre - it’s far too messy and contentious for that. What the term does signify is a particular re-
lationship between a fan and a band. It’s the desire to turn a monologue into a dialogue, to be a 
part of the art that affects you and to connect to it on every possible level - sentiments particu-
larly relevant in an increasingly corporate, suburban, and diffuse culture such as ours. Emo is a 
 and subtly criticizes the means through which it has been utilized as a 
derogatory label by those so eager to differentiate themselves from those attracted to the sphere 
of subcultural participation in the wake of its reinvention. In sum, Greenwald successfully as-
pires to notify the emo label’s vocal detractors of the fact that he is of the same mindset as them 
while in the process of subtly deconstructing the term in a manner fit to frame it as symptomatic 
of one overarching issue of concern. Namely, that mainstream forces have extended their con-
tinuing effort to colonize the ‘underground’ by co-opting a pseudo-generic qualifier that has, in 
response, become a derogatory subcultural slur. 
 By the introduction’s end, however, Greenwald parlays a narrative that is openly critical 
of the misuse of the emo pseudo-generic signifier into one that purports to harbour a revelation 
regarding the true nature of the emergent ‘emo culture’: 
 
                                                          
34 Suspiciously, but unsurprisingly, ‘entertainment journalists’ are spared inclusion within this list. 
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specific sort of teenage longing, a romantic and ultimately self-centered need to understand the 
bigness of the world in relation to you. In short…[Emo’s] too contentious, too stylistically and 
generationally diverse to be a genre, too far-reaching to be a subculture. Emo is an essential 
element of being a teenager. It is the sound of self-making…It’s the desire to make yourself 
bigger by making yourself part of something bigger (Greenwald, 2003: 4-5; italics in original).  
 
 In essence, Greenwald elects that ‘emo’ is less a musical sub-genre, or a youth subculture 
based around a musical pseudo-genre, than a fitting term with which to conceptualize an emer-
gent manifestation of contemporary youth culture. As the provided quote would suggest, 
Greenwald argues that today’s youth culture constitutes an ‘emo’ culture by virtue of the means 
through which, and desperation with which, they strive to forge humanistic connections within 
the confines of a wider mass culture that is largely prefabricated, impersonal, and decentred. 
Here, ‘emo’ is described less as an entity than a communal practice whereby adolescents come 
to better assert their own identities - as ‘authentic’ human beings in an increasingly ‘inauthentic’ 
world - in connecting over, and living vicariously through, a small movement of cultural produc-
ers who utilize their art, for lack of a better term, as a confessional. As Greenwald later muses, 
“after a lifetime…of hearing voices obscured by crashing hip-hop beats, squealing electric gui-
tars, and meaningless, scripted lyrics…hearing something as simple as an acoustic guitar and a 
voice is revolutionary. It is, quite literally, the sound of not hiding, of being yourself, of being 
real” (2003: 60). 
 Lest the reader be tempted to confuse the contemporary ’emo’ movement with the Post-
war ‘folk’ movement (as exemplified, most easily, by Bob Dylan, another artist who gave the 
notion of ‘revolution’ some substance with little more than ‘an acoustic guitar and a voice’), 
Greenwald takes pains to explicate a pair of traits fit to render this new manifestation of adoles-
cent culture unique and decidedly postmodern. First, the ‘emo culture’ is primarily an online 
phenomenon; a digitized subcultural manifestation. As Greenwald attests, 
 
Online, a message board is a rock show - you’ve got your moderators on stage, setting 
the tone. You’ve got the loudmouths in the front, pushing everybody around with their 
attitude, their righteousness, their need for attention. You’ve got the lurkers in the back, 
taking in all the action, not saying a word, holding their opinions close to their chest, 
giving nothing away but taking what they need and more. But both, at their most basic 
level, are invented, temporary spaces. A common interest has filled them with people, 
but all are free to leave whenever they like, and the people who fill them are there as 
whoever they want to be. They are presenting an idealized version of themselves (2003: 
57-58). 
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 A second important quality, related very closely to the first, is that ‘emo culture’ con-
dones - and, in fact, promotes - the practice whereby participants utilize various enclaves of web-
based discourse - be it music-minded message boards, online diaries, or personalized web-pages 
- to feature a running commentary on their every feeling, personal tribulation, and introspective 
feat. “In a world supposedly desensitized to extremes of sex, violence, and media,” posits 
Greenwald, “teenagers online immerse themselves in a heightened reality, one where emotions 
are currency and instant messaging never means having the time to say your sorry” (Ibid., 284). 
In including excerpts from a number of decidedly sensationalistic (and, one would hope, atypi-
cal) Livejournal diaries, Greenwald strives to demonstrate the therapeutic value that online dis-
course - and, it is implied, the output of the ‘emo’ artists with whom they have allegiance - pro-
vides to members of the ‘emo culture’. However, there is a deducible subtext meaning to suggest 
that the popularity of online journals, in combination with the onset of the aforementioned youth 
culture wherein ‘emotions’ act as sought-after ‘currency’, has led to a climate wherein confess-
ing to one’s own emotional throes breeds stature within these spheres of adolescent discourse. In 
a sense, and although Greenwald strives to celebrate the fact that web-based connectivity has fa-
cilitated an avenue through which interpersonal connectivity (albeit as impersonal as web-based 
relations are), he simultaneously raises a red flag in concerning the onset of a quasi-narcissistic 
youth culture in which traits best associable with bi-polar personality disorders are celebrated - 
and implicitly encouraged.  
 Less the limited (but notable) number of instances in which Greenwald vies to explicate 
the particularities of the ‘emo culture’ for the benefit of the assumed outsider, the majority of the 
text strives to speak directly to those amidst the ‘emo culture’ itself. Chapter five of Greenwald’s 
text, entitled ‘who are the emo kids?’ and functioning to denote the symbiosis between emo cul-
ture and online culture, concludes with an interesting passage. Having dedicated just over half a 
dozen pages to characterizing the particularities that distinguish ‘emo kids’ from the general ado-
lescent population,35
                                                          
35 In this case as elsewhere, those traits used in deducing who are the population of concern are actually com-
posed of declarations regarding who the emo kids are not: “They’re not traditional punks; they’re not frustrated 
indie kids or disillusioned college English majors.  They’re not wearing glasses to be cool and they’re not wearing 
vintage t-shirts to impress...” (Greenwald, 2003:55). 
 the chapter’s concluding two paragraphs are meant to speak directly to the 
‘emo kids’ themselves, 
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You are disenfranchised, your parents don’t understand you. You like girls/boys, they 
don’t like you. You are smart but not smart enough. You are too fat. You are too thin. 
You have to get into college but you have to finish your eighteen extracurricular activi-
ties first. Your best friend betrays you, your girlfriend/boyfriend cheats on you. Your 
parents get divorced. People offer you drugs/drinks. Maybe you take them, maybe you 
don’t. People are mean to you. Again and again and again. When you come home from 
school, you sit in the bathroom and cry for an hour. Every day. With the door closed, 
you turn on the stereo. Someone is singing about problems just like yours. They’re not 
commenting on them, not judging them, just echoing them, making them real, validating 
them. You sing along and your tears dry up. You switch on your computer. You’re safe 
in your room. You control everything. You’re alone. But you check your buddy list and 
know, you are anything but alone (2003: 62-63).  
 
 I would argue that this might perhaps be the most significant passage in the entire text. 
Having just extended a highly romanticized overview of the evolution of the ‘emo’ genre (which 
we shall focus on soon), Greenwald invokes reference to a wide range of unsavoury (but decid-
edly commonplace) life-experiences and introspective anxieties in probing the reader to come to 
the realization that they, themselves, might be one of the ‘emo kids’ about whom the author is 
speaking. This passage would appear to be, in essence, an initiative through which to facilitate 
the self-recognition, or self-actualization, of a potential audience of ‘emo kids’ who aren’t even 
aware of the fact that they are ‘emo kids’.  
 It can be argued that Greenwald here strives to inspire something akin to Althusser’s 
interpellation in coaxing the reader to see themselves reflected in the text and, by extension, re-
interpret Greenwald’s overview of the history of the emo pseudo-genre as a history of a cultural 
movement - of which, they might suddenly realize, they are a part. If the passage does not speak 
directly to the reader’s experiences, however, it might be assumed to aid in the construction of a 
very particularistic - and highly stereotypical - representation of the readership to whom 
Greenwald is aspiring to speak directly: over-sensitive (and arguably emotionally unbalanced) 
youths who have no respite for coping with their problems aside from forging deep connections 
with their artists of choice and the ‘friends’ on their ‘buddy list’. Therein, I would argue, lays one 
of the overarching criticisms that the suspicious reader might voice in relation to Greenwald’s 
text: in an effort to speak directly to the largest population of adolescents possible, and coax 
them into ‘seeing themselves’ in his text, the author inadvertently tailors his discourse toward 
those who embody a wide range of the stereotypical traits largely associated with overly-
sensitive adolescent populations. In doing so, the utility of his quasi-sociological narrative con-
cerning the rise of a web-based adolescent culture simultaneously facilitates, reifies and rein-
forces the stereotypical representation of the highly effeminate, emotionally unstable generation 
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of modern youth as rendered prevalent within Western popular culture. In other words, it feeds 
into the representational politics as problematized by Giroux and detailed in the first chapter. 
 A more pertinent criticism, in the context of the discussion at hand, would be that 
Greenwald strives to frame the manner in which adolescent populations are utilizing web-based 
discourse as indicative of the onset of a burgeoning ‘emo culture’. As valid as many of the argu-
ments that Greenwald extends in reinforcing this argument may be - that, for example, many 
‘emo’ fans utilize web-based forums in discussing musicians of common interest, or that a band 
like Thursday crashed the Billboard charts, in part, on the strength of strong ‘internet buzz’ 
(2003: 58) - the author cannot substantiate any unique link between ‘web culture’ and ‘emo cul-
ture’ without referring back to the ‘sensitive adolescent’ stereotype. Though Greenwald succeeds 
in describing a number of the ways in which ‘web culture’ has modified the means through 
which music-based discourse is carried out and ‘buzz’ is disseminated, he presents little in the 
way of grounds on which to suggest that these practices should warrant specific affiliation with 
the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre or, indeed, punk subculturalists in general. There is no commonsensical 
reason to equate the exclusive prevalence of internet use with the populism of ‘emo’ music (and 
vice-versa), and Greenwald’s implicit initiative to argue that there is - on the sheer basis that the 
popularity of online diaries and the commercial success of bands like Dashboard Confessional 
are both largely attributable to adolescent populations - lends little weight to the overarching ar-
gument that web-situated youth culture is ‘emo culture’.  
 
5.4.2 Icon Narratives and the Romanticization (And Revision) of Subcultural History  
 Needless to say, extending the argument that the entirety of web-savy adolescents should 
be taken to constitute an ‘emo culture’ is only one of Nothing Feels Good’s overarching agendas. 
Another, despite Greenwald’s early assertion that emo is “far too messy and contentious” (2003: 
4) to classify as a genre, rests with providing a detailed overview of those artists, and music in-
dustry figures, whom Greenwald aspires to identify as responsible for having shaped the genre. 
Though Greenwald, not unlike Tyrangiel, locates the genesis of ‘emo-core’ with the Washington 
hardcore movement, his analysis also stretches itself to cover the intervening fifteen years be-
tween Rites of Spring and Dashboard Confessional. In so doing, however, it might be said that 
Greenwald takes some liberties not only with the artists that he chooses to advance as ‘second-
generation’ emo bands, but the manner in which he strives to encapsulate their significance. Al-
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though many - if not all - of the late 1980s to mid 90s-era bands that Greenwald mentions had 
previously been affiliated with the emo-pseudo genre in some capacity, I wish to argue that the 
manner in which he speaks on the legacy of these artists might warrant interpretation as an initia-
tive through which the text not only disseminates ‘privileged’ subcultural knowledge to outsider 
populations, but allows Greenwald the opportunity to revise it in the process. 
 I have already, in chapter four, alluded to the means through which Greenwald describes 
Rites of Spring in a highly sensationalistic, quasi-poetic manner serving to accentuate the band’s 
significance as a cultural (or emotional?) force. Now, I might wish to grant a more detailed 
analysis to the manner through which Greenwald frames Rites of Spring vocalist Guy Picciotto 
under the auspices of the overarching goal of probing the self-actualization of an ‘emo culture’. 
In particular, I wish to highlight the manner in which the text strives to simultaneously personal-
ize and aggrandize Picciotto as something of an artistic revolutionary in the process of forming 
what I wish to refer to as an icon narrative.  
 
Guy Picciotto, a tall, wiry, handsome student at the elite Georgetown Day School, was a 
huge Minor Threat fan and, though he had little musical training or inclination, he rev-
erently believed in the power of music. Harnessing all of his anger, disillusionment, 
paranoia, and fear to which MacKaye had given a voice, he turned every last drop of it 
in on himself. The name of the band he formed, Rites of Spring, was cannily chosen - it 
echoed the riot-inducing Stravinsky piece that had shocked the world seventy years be-
fore, a true example of artistic expression fomenting a cultural and political shift (2003: 
11).  
 
In introducing the notion of an ‘icon narrative’, I mean to refer to the manner in which 
the author frames the subject - in this case, Picciotto - as a subcultural luminary; a ‘heroic’ figure 
whose ‘special’ characteristics grant them the ability to epitomize all that was unique and au-
thentic about past manifestations of the emo pseudo-genre. Though absolutely average in de-
meanour and situation (he was, after all, little more than a ‘tall, wiry, handsome student’ to the 
untrained eye), Greenwald contends that the struggle wherein Picciotto grappled with his lack of 
‘musical training and inclination’ for the sake of reinforcing his unwavering belief ‘in the power 
of music’ resulted in the creation of a band of such significance as to justify their self-affiliation 
with a ‘true example of artistic expression fomenting a cultural and political shift’: the Stravin-
sky piece Rites of Spring. Doing so was not, however, without personal cost: Picciotto had to 
harness all of his ‘anger, disillusionment, paranoia, and fear’ and turn ‘every last drop of it in on 
himself’ in order to create art as uncompromisingly sincere, and as authentic as Rites of Spring 
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are here described as being. Suffice it to say, this is the type of narrative far more often used in 
describing the ascent of superheroes than short-lived hardcore bands; or, to put it another way, 
the type of aggrandising discourse meant to appeal to young readers in desperate search for ‘un-
derdog’ archetypes. Though we might assume that Greenwald’s intentions in offering a quasi-
comic book rendition of Rites of Spring’s history might have rested with rendering a palpable 
overview for readers more familiar with the Harry Potter series than Blush’s American Hard-
core, it is equally likely that a great deal of information was lost - and manufactured - in the tran-
sition from verifiable fact to ‘emo lore’. 
 Greenwald does not let the icon narrative rest once having trod the familiar terrain (to 
those keeping up with the niche-mediated treatment of the emo’s genesis, at least) of mid-80s 
Washington.  It surfaces, once again, in light of Greenwald’s initiative to demonstrate that, con-
trary to popular belief, “two bands stand out as advancing the emo cause into the 1990s…[both 
of which] fostered similar cult followings and, in so doing, redefined, reintroduced, and recon-
textualized the word ‘emo’ for an entirely new generation” (2003: 19). Those two bands, by 
Greenwald’s account, were Jawbreaker and Sunny Day Real Estate,  neither of which, as men-
tioned in chapter four, were actually heralded as ‘emo bands’ to any degree worthy of attracting 
denotation by the niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers of the early 1990s. Nonetheless, 
Greenwald assuages any doubts that the reader might harbour regarding the validity of categoriz-
ing each band as ‘emo’ in granting both Jawbreaker’s Blake Schwartzenbach and Sunny Day 
Real Estate’s Jeremy Enigk the idol narrative treatment. In regarding Schwartzenback, 
Greenwald attests that, “[his] throat sounded like a rust corrogated pipe pumping ache and bile 
from his heart directly to the microphone; his hoarse cries gave voice to scores of similarly disil-
lusioned post-collegiate souls…his appeal was his publicly private torment. There was a bitter-
ness and frustration in his lyrics that was both universal and magnetic” (2003: 20, 22). Of the 
band itself, Greenwald opines that, “Jawbreaker songs weren’t overly sentimental and their 
shows weren’t displays of excess or indulgence. They merely communicated an intangible sense 
of longing that triggered young people’s hearts like defibrillators” (2003:21). Enigk, on the other 
hand, is described as having, “gathered all of his seething torment and [throwing] it to the 
winds…the odd and occasionally invented words on [the Diary album] suggested speaking in 
tongues…so intense was Enigk’s desire to subsume his own problems into something larger, he 
loses track of language” (2003:29). So intense would seem Greenwald’s desire to herald 
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Schwartzenback and Enigk as the heroic progenitors of the emo pseudo-genre - while demon-
strating his personal ability to construct arguably ridiculous analogies – that he loses sight of his 
original claim that there is no substantive emo genre. Nonetheless, Greenwald notes that Jaw-
breaker and Sunny Day Real Estate, 
 
Pointed the way toward a new underground consensus and aesthetic…[the] bands were 
doomed…but the roads were paved. Over the next decade emo would retreat again, re-
form, and be reborn both as a national subculture and, eventually, as something even 
greater, but in terms of scope, style, passion, and emotion, all of the bands that came 
next were following Jawbreaker and Sunny Day Real Estate’s tearstained map (2003: 
33). 
 
 5.4.3 Greenwald on Authenticity; Inspiring Heresy in the Subcultural Field 
Though Greenwald goes on to utilize an idol narrative in recounting the artistic proclivi-
ties of such figures as The Promise Ring’s Davey Vonbohlen, Braid’s Bob Nanna and - indeed - 
Weezer’s Rivers Cuomo, I do not wish to dwell on the matter. Instead, I wish to point out the 
manner through which Greenwald’s text asserts itself as the authoritative text on the emo 
pseudo-genre while, simultaneously, vying for legitimacy in parroting that subcultural discourse 
meant to deny the presence of that very same emo pseudo-genre. At its very onset, Greenwald 
claims that ‘emo’ is, in a manner of speaking, solely recognized and deduced under the auspices 
of the beholder; it is less a genre of music than the practice of “seeking a tangible connection out 
of intangible things…the act of reaching out towards something larger to better know your-
self”(2003: 5). It follows that the ‘emo culture’ constitutes that population of web-savvy adoles-
cents who cull their personal identities through on-line interaction with others that, similarly, 
come to better grasp an understanding of their own emotionality in living vicariously through the 
artists whose works they consume. In the admitted absence of any objective means of identifying 
an ‘emo’ band, Greenwald posits that one can only be identified by virtue of the fact that ‘emo 
kids’ identify them as such. In the absence of any objective means through which to identify an 
‘emo kid’ - aside from the fact that they are young and familiar with web technologies - 
Greenwald deduces that they can be identified by virtue of their musical tastes; the ‘emo’ artists 
whom they speak about and support. Lest the text is critically deconstructed, Greenwald suc-
ceeds in implicitly reifying both the ‘emo band’ and the ‘emo fan’ while explicitly denying the 
objective existence of either. 
  All the while, a text purporting that its main directive should be to educate the external 
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reader to an emergent culture strives, in many ways, to indoctrinate readers into that culture. The 
early chapter’s utilization of the icon narrative in characterizing the progenitors of the emo genre 
frames those bands - and, more particularly, their front-men - as the underappreciated heroes of a 
largely underappreciated, but nonetheless significant, musical force; artists whose abundant au-
thenticity went overlooked amidst the confines of a mass culture that is described as celebrating 
inauthentic artistry. The likes of Rites of Spring, Jawbreaker and Sunny Day Real Estate are de-
scribed as artists having inflicted suffering upon themselves as a means of producing a heartfelt 
art that, tragically, found appreciation from but a small (and otherwise inadequately described) 
population of similarly ‘authentic’ subculturalists. It was real art that spoke to real people with 
real emotions. Though Greenwald neglects to identify those comparatively inauthentic artists, 
people and emotions, his narrative nonetheless succeeds in alluding to the presence of an ‘under-
ground’ pocket of authentic artists whose brilliance can only be perceived by a select population 
of cultural consumers; it only ‘speaks’ to those endowed with particularistic ‘authentic’ qualities. 
And how might one deduce whether or not they possess the privileged ability to identify and ap-
preciate this brilliance? Just as the text grants itself the authoritative ability to denote and expli-
cate those qualities inborn to uncompromisingly authentic music, so too it claims itself the ability 
to characterize the authentic recipient; they are ‘disenfranchised, their parents don’t understand 
them, they like ‘girls/boys’ who don’t like them, and so on and so forth.   
In a nutshell, then, Greenwald’s Nothing Feels Good speaks to the presence of an emer-
gent subcultural manifestation in which one’s claims to authenticity are indelibly tethered to 
one’s ability to relate to the artists whom they covet in a distinctly personalized way.  The text 
reports on a collectivity in which subcultural capital is not only meted out on the basis of one’s 
ability to relate to authentic artistic products, but one’s ability to affiliate themselves with those 
artists through a variety of measures; including (but not limited to) engaging in intense rites of 
fandom in the context of the live performance and posting testimonials regarding the context in 
which such works ‘spoke’ to and ‘saved’ the emo culturalist on personalized websites.  The 
‘rules’ of the ‘game’ have been modified to allow, first, that the depth with which one can relate 
to an artist is deemed a pinnacle in deducing one’s subcultural authenticity and second, that 
broadcasting one’s allegiance to select artistic works takes precedence over protecting conse-
crated subcultural knowledge from outsider populations.  In regards to the punk subculture, it 
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goes without saying that both of these measures run counter-intuitive to the orthodoxy informing 
the structuration of the established field of subcultural participation.  
 The Greenwald text does not, however, merely aspire to actualize a subcultural manifes-
tation endowed with a differential means of amassing subcultural capital and deducing authentic-
ity as compared to the punk subculture; it actively strives to characterize ‘emo culture’ as the 
new (and superior) embodiment of the punk subculture.  This task is implicitly executed by vir-
tue of the manner through which Greenwald assimilates crucial elements of the aforementioned 
counter-discourse on ‘real’ emo into his history (or revision) of the genesis of the emo pseudo-
genre and, in doing so, definitively recasts well-respected punk acts like Jawbreaker and The 
Promise Ring as the progenitors of a movement that stood to offend the exclusionism of the es-
tablished punk subculture just as much as it strove to promote cathartic emotional expression.  
Whether factual or not, the recurring utilization of the icon narrative succeeds in extending the 
impression that each of the artists inflicted torment unto themselves as a means of countering the 
implicit hierarchies sufficing to divide their subcultural communities and reinvigorate the spirit 
of the music produced therein.  As Greenwald contends, “after years of raging sameness, hard-
core desperately needed a brain; after years of studied, ironic detachment, indie desperately 
needed a heart.  What they found was each other, and what it got called was emo” (2003: 34).  
Greenwald furthermore contends that the music bore “a welcoming, self-affirming community.  
All the kids who listened to emo in the ‘90s were seeking to validate themselves, to join in some-
thing shared and secretive” (2003: 48).  Alas, what might be read as a text celebrative of inclu-
sive communality by the fledgling subculturalite might read like a critique of the established 
subcultural order for the long-entrenched subculturalist.  That latter audience might thus per-
ceive the text as a thinly-veiled attempt through which Greenwald aspires to arm a contingent of 
potential subcultural ‘others’ with a revised (but nonetheless pertinent) stock of privileged sub-
cultural knowledge with which they might inject themselves into the established field of subcul-
tural participation.  Unlike your run-of-the-mill subcultural ‘other’, however, the text might be 
perceived as imparting this particular bloc of conspirators with something akin to a ‘manifest 
destiny’ whereby they might conceive of themselves as those imbued with the distinct ability to 
materialize the vision set forth by those underappreciated icons of the emo genre; a vision 
whereby establishing emotional connectivity trumps and eradicates the validity of all other 
measures through which subcultural capital has heretofore been disseminated and collected.  In 
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other words, the established subculturalist might perceive that the Greenwald text vies to de-
scribe, inspire, and empower a heretical movement within the field of subcultural participation 
that might not only fundamentally alter the ‘rules’ of the ‘game’, but unapologetically reorganize 
the distribution of spaces - and thus the hierarchical organization - within the field itself.   
 Finally, Greenwald further reifies the projection of a substantive ‘emo culture’ in dedicat-
ing a brief chapter of his text toward considering pre-established claims that the emo pseudo-
genre promotes sexism and the subcultural marginalization of female participants.  Inspired in 
large part by a Punk Planet column wherein renowned subcultural critic Jessica Hopper (2003) 
deduced that “Emo became just another forum where women were locked in a stasis of outside 
observation, observing ourselves through the eyes of others,” and that “Women in emo songs are 
denied the dignity of humanization through both the language and narratives, we are omnipres-
ent, but our only consequence is in romantic setting; denying any possibility or hope for life out-
side the margins, where they express a free sexual, creative or political will” (Hopper, 2003), 
Greenwald concedes that the general absence of ‘emo bands’ featuring female members – and 
the fact that “some emo bands...make songs that can be heard as virulently anti-women” 
(Greenwald, 2003: 135) – indeed serves as a notable point of dire concern.  However, whereas 
Hopper essentially argues that emo’s sexist undercurrent serves as the common thread through 
which the genre gains weight as an identifiable genre, Greenwald deduces that the marginaliza-
tion of women’s participation simply serves as the primary element of the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre 
that must be rectified should the ‘emo’ culture’s status as a morally superior field of subcultural 
participation find substantive realization.  “Perhaps when this generation of emo fans begins to 
form their own bands,” Greenwald writes, “a new female-voiced wave of heartbreak songs will 
emerge” (Greenwald, 2003: 138-39).  Nevertheless, Greenwald counters Hopper’s claim that 
‘emo’ serves as the generic embodiment of subcultural misogyny in noting – without, mind you, 
substantiating – that “the place where the real male/female dialogue is occurring and the rules are 
being rewritten is not on record, but online, where the huge number of women fans have their 
say and assert themselves in varied and surprising ways” (Greenwald, 2003: 139).  In advancing 
one final and arguably dismissive statement in noting that “it’s also possible that fearing for the 
ears of young female fans is presumptuous – that the unifying appeal of emo may just be that, at 
heart, emotional devastation knows no gender” (Greenwald, 2003: 139), Greenwald effectively 
grants the issue of sexism within the ‘emo culture’ voice while, concurrently, arguing for its 
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status as a soon-to-be non-issue.  Taken in chorus with the presupposition of the ‘manifest des-
tiny’ that Greenwald subtly prescribes for those who might extract their self-actualization as 
‘emo kids’ from his authoritative text, the author downplays the significance of the contemporary 
subculture’s inherent sexism in not only forecasting the inevitable emergence of blocs of 
counter-hegemonic female artistic producers, but in subtly arguing that the unifying thread which 
renders participation with the ‘emo’ culture appealing to both genders has simply, heretofore, 
been misinterpreted as sexism.  By virtue of a strange twist in logic, then, Greenwald arguably 
strives to frame a subcultural sphere that appears rife with sexism at first glance as the best con-
tender to be that which dissolves gender stratification – and, ironically, thus retracts the percep-
tion that subcultural critics like Hopper even need speak to the issue of sexism within the subcul-
tural field. 
 Given the inarguably sexist nature of the material being created by those artists alleged as 
being ‘emo bands’ - and in noting the notable number of adolescent females that would subse-
quently gravitate toward the ‘emo movement’ - one cannot help but wonder how affiliating one-
self with the ‘emo’ subculture might impact the identity-formative processes of female adher-
ents.  Above and beyond being once again marginalized to the status of ‘spectators’ (as opposed 
to artistic ‘creators’), it would be difficult not to assume that the highly misogynistic nature of 
the content ostensibly propelling the ‘emo culture’ would not have a negative impact upon lis-
teners who might surely come to conceptualize themselves, to some degree, as representative of 
the ‘problematic’ population against whom much of the subculture’s material is meant to demon-
ize and strike out against.  Though it is not yet time to concern ourselves explicitly with Hannah 
Bond - a British girl, aged just thirteen years, whose suicide was attributed with her participation 
with the emo subculture - it might nonetheless be worthwhile to ponder how one’s self-esteem 
might ultimately be impacted by participating within a ‘movement’ that strives to vilify a sizable 
contingent of it’s adherents on the sheer basis of gender alone and, furthermore, whether those 
correlating the popularity of ‘emo culture’ with particular incidents of adolescent self-harm 
might be (theoretically) justifiable – albeit that correlation oft bolstered by misinformation and 
the utilization of derogatory adolescent stereotypes. 
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5.4.4 The (Lack Of) Subcultural Response: A Pejorative Re-designation? 
 Though news bulletins had promptly been posted in notifying users about the publication 
of the TIME and Seventeen articles,  and although the Greenwald text arguably takes the greatest 
pains in extending an authoritative body of knowledge concerning the emo pseudo-genre, it 
would not seem to have elicited any immediate subcultural response from the Punknews.org 
online community.  Though there is a plethora of speculative points that might be invoked in at-
tempting to account for this seeming lack of subcultural interest – ranging from the fact that the 
Greenwald book is considerably longer than either of those previous niche-mediated articles, to 
the fact that very little of the Greenwald text appeared online36 - the most likely possible expla-
nation rests with the prospect that ‘emo’ had once again taken on subcultural currency as a de-
rogatory term long before Nothing Feels Good achieved publication.  One might extract some 
support for this assumption from the fact that Alternative Press would essentially seem to have 
retired the term following its September, 2003 edition, in which Thursday and Thrice were sud-
denly proclaimed to be ‘post-hardcore’ acts and the AP poll, a monthly feature in which readers 
and musicians are given opportunity to weigh in on an issue of debate, concerned itself with the 
question as to whether or not ‘emo’ is sexist (Simon, 2003a: 21).  Following this, and even 
though the magazine offered extensive ‘retrospective’ articles on many of the bands featured 
prominently in the Greenwald text (Schulz, 2003; Ryan,2004a; 2004b), the term ‘emo’ was sel-
dom invoked.37  More generally, the term would appear to have been used in near-exclusive38 
collusion with negative criticisms as confined to the publication’s album review section;39
                                                          
36 It is worth noting here that, at the time of this research, very little of the Seventeen piece – save poor resolution 
recreations of the fashion spread – could be located online.  
37 One notable exception is Kyle Ryan’s (2004b) Braid article wherein the band members are probed to offer their 
negative feelings regarding their treatment within the Greenwald text.  Greenwald’s response to the criticisms 
levied by the band (and within the article) was published with the September, 2004 edition’s letters section (Alter-
native Press, 2004: 16).  One might be enticed to note that the feud within the sub-field of cultural knowledge pro-
duction rarely manifests quite as explicitly as it would appear to in this case. 
38 I wish to bracket the curious case of Coheed and Cambria, who are granted positive coverage despite not only 
being categorized as an emo band on numerous occasions, but being a band whose entire catalogue concerns it-
self with a science-fictional creation myth that (as best as I can tell) takes place in outer space.  
39 Exceptional examples of this can be found in Hawthorne’s (2003: 76) review of Blue Sky Mile’s Sands Once Seas, 
Kelley’s (2003: 120) review of Time In Malta’s Alone With The Alone and, most memorably, Bennett’s review of 
Haste The Day’s Burning Bridges: “Someone should really invent an Emo-Removal Machine.  The way it would 
work is that you could take a CD, put it in the ERM, and it would erase all the shitty crying parts from discs that 
would otherwise be totally decent metal albums...”(2003:100) 
 a fact 
perhaps rendered no more evident than by the fact that, whereas a positive article concerning 
Saves The Day does not contain a single instance in which the term ‘emo’ is used (Simon, 
134 
 
2003b), a negative review of the group’s In Reverie album, published in the very same issue, 
snidely refers to the band as “emo superstars” in the course of its critique (Bayer, 2003:120).  
Granted, whether the term ‘emo’ largely fell out of favour with the majority of the Alternative 
Press staff because using it might harm their reputation as a legitimate source of subcultural 
knowledge, or because a Spin Magazine affiliate had effectively written the authoritative text 
concerning it, is entirely debatable and empirically impossible to deduce. 
 
5.5 Concluding Thoughts: The Niche-Mediation and the Damage Done 
 
This chapter has reviewed three texts in hopes of demonstrating how an ‘expert knowl-
edge’ concerning the emo pseudo-genre was constructed and disseminated by an array of niche-
mediated cultural knowledge producers.  Even though all three dedicate some effort to critiquing 
the utility of the ‘emo’ classification, each circumvents its own criticism by extending a com-
mentary concerning the history of the pseudo-genre, the particularities of the pseudo-genre, and a 
run-down of those significant artists who are representative of the pseudo-genre in a manner 
which nonetheless assumes, and thus reinforces, the reification of the pseudo-genre.  The chapter 
has also noted that, though the overarching intent of these three niche-media texts undoubtedly 
rests with advancing a body of knowledge meant to explicate (and, simultaneously, constitute 
and consecrate) the particularities of the emo pseudo-genre, all three concurrently extend a body 
of knowledge concerning adolescent populations allegedly constitutive of an emergent ‘emo cul-
ture’.  The subcultural discourse that we have thus far encountered would appear to indicate that 
these niche-mediated texts facilitated a predictable problematic by virtue of their proclivity for 
not only maligning the privileged subcultural knowledge on which they focus, but disseminating 
it to a burgeoning population of ‘mindless twelve year-old girls’ (to paraphrase those responses 
heretofore encountered) whose sheer presence would seem to offend the sensitivities of the ‘le-
gitimated’ subcultural habitus.  In examining that subcultural discourse which arose in response 
to the Tyrangiel article and the Seventeen photo-spread, I have attempted to demonstrate how 
these niche-mediated texts helped inspire the first incarnation of an ‘emo kid’ stereotype repre-
sentative of a population coming to be perceived as a threat to the sanctity of the subcultural 
field.   
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 To this point, the astute reader might have already noted that the ‘emo kid’ stereotype 
that arose in response to the niche-mediated constitution of the emo pseudo-genre in the summer 
of 2002 only vaguely resembles the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil as detailed by the inventory provided in 
chapter one.  Chapter six seeks to flesh out the process through which the ‘emo kid’ came to 
function as a subcultural ‘other’ whereby entrenched subculturalists might problematize, and 
strive to battle against, a multiplicity of forces and trends that placed the consecration of the es-
tablished subcultural field under duress.  I will now consider the re-constitutional permutations - 
and the various mediums of transmission - through which the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil came into be-
ing by virtue of those discursive and representational processes through which subcultural tradi-
tionalists endeavoured to retain authority over the ability to deduce, demarcate and reinforce the 
conventions shaping the symbolic economy within the field of subcultural participation. 
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Chapter Six. The Multiplicity of Crises and the Construction of the Emo Kid Folk-Devil. 
6.1 Introductory Notes 
   Over the course of the past two chapters, I have outlined the process through which the 
emo pseudo-genre was invoked by a variety of niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers in 
aspiring to meet a variety of ends. Chapter four detailed the process through which Alternative 
Press Magazine sought to ensure its survival in annexing the term ‘emo-core’ from the lexicon 
of the sub-field of restricted production.  This move had the potential to constitute ‘heresy’ 
within the field of niche-mediated cultural knowledge production as it allowed that the publica-
tion might invest its consecratory authority in a new bloc of artistic producers so endowed with 
the potential of epitomizing a new ‘movement’ in modern music - and to whom their competitors 
had paid scant attention. I touched on the fact that this strategy was successful in that Alternative 
Press’s abrupt shift in coverage not only served to increase the magazine’s commercial viability 
dramatically, but also to thrust those subculturally revered artists so described as being ‘emo’ (be 
it explicitly so or by insinuation) onto ‘mainstream radar’. Chapter five concerned itself partially 
with the means through which a number of niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers strove 
to assert their expertise in constructing a ‘body of knowledge’ meant to concern - and, simulta-
neously, reify the notion of - a substantiated emo pseudo-genre that was poised to constitute the 
‘next big thing’ and, by extension, a body of knowledge sufficing to detail the emergent ‘culture’ 
of ‘emo kids’ ostensibly propelling this movement. I brought the preceding chapter to a close in 
noting that, while Spin Magazine’s Andy Greenwald had delivered what can be taken as the ‘au-
thoritative text’ concerning the emo pseudo-genre and its correlative youth culture in the fall of 
2003, the manner in which Alternative Press subsequently utilized the term ‘emo’ in a deroga-
tory manner might lead one to speculate that the niche-mediated attention granted to the process 
of constituting the emo pseudo-genre in a manner meant to instigate the emergence of an adoles-
cent ‘emo culture’ had effectively stripped the term of any legitimacy in the context of the estab-
lished field of subcultural participation. I argued that we might cull some evidentiary support for 
this assumption from the manner in which the subculturalist community of Punknews.org users 
tailored their responses to news bulletins concerning the publication of the TIME Magazine and 
Seventeen pieces toward two distinct threads of condemnatory discourse: in regards to the 
Tyrangiel article, a discussion serving to problematize the means through which ‘outsider’ niche-
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media forces strove to construct a misguided characterization of an emo pseudo-genre while si-
multaneously vying to co-opt it; in response to the Seventeen piece, a discussion serving to per-
petuate a stereotypical representation of the problematic bloc of fledgling subcultural ‘others’ 
who might surely gravitate toward the field in the wake of the article’s publication.  This ‘emo 
kid’ stereotype was, in other words, the initial by-product of a programme of a struggle wherein 
the field of subcultural participants formed a derogatory discourse in attempting to counteract the 
niche-mediated field’s authoritative ability not only to create an erroneous ‘body of knowledge’ 
concerning an ostensible ‘emo’ pseudo-genre, but potentially inspire that the subcultural field 
undergo an incursion by those unsavoury populations characterized as being part of the ‘emo cul-
ture’.    
  In chapter six, I examine the manner in which this initial emo kid stereotype evolved in 
an effort allowing it to function as a subcultural folk-devil; a representation serving to condemn a 
wide range of de-legitimized subcultural practices (and those that might engage in them) in an 
effort to protect the sanctity of the field of subcultural participation and the ‘subcultural capital-
stocks’ of longstanding field participants. I argue that the evolution of the emo kid folk-devil rep-
resentation was informed by the presence of a multiplicity of distinct forces that were perceived 
as endangering the exclusivity of the established field and the integrity of the conventions 
through which authenticity was traditionally disseminated and deduced, and that the stereotype 
sufficed as a means through which elements within the punk subculture strove not only to repre-
sentationally problematize a new manifestation of subcultural ‘other’, but disempower and dele-
gitimize those artists and actors, within the sub-field of restricted production and the wider cul-
ture industry, taken to be threatening consecrated subcultural practices by virtue of, first, the 
methods of subcultural position-taking they implicitly espoused and, secondly, the inauthentic 
audiences which they served to attract. This chapter will contextualize the manner in which the 
emo kid folk-devil came to serve as a means through which punk subculturalists stigmatized 
fledgling subcultural ‘others’ who were not only young, but also aspired to assert their own le-
gitimacy through adopting particular styles of dress and aligning themselves with ‘heretical’ ar-
tistic producers; two traits that either threatened to alter the manner in which subcultural capital 
was deduced and disseminated, or threatened to ‘devalue’ the subcultural capital of longstanding 
subculturalists and, thus, deplete their distinction (and power) within the field.  I argue that the 
primary incentive propelling the construction of the emo kid folk-devil rests not only condemn-
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ing a distinct population of fledgling subculturalists, but also that range of illegitimate subcul-
tural practices, having been popularized by a bevy of unauthenticated artistic producers and 
‘mainstream’ cultural forces, that found popularization when certain factions of ‘underground’ 
artistic producers were believed to be (or were feared destined to become) inheritors of the stat-
ure of being the ‘next big thing’.   
  The first section of this chapter concerns itself with the emergence of that which I refer to 
as a ‘multiplicity of crises’ that potentially endangered the consecrated conventions of subcul-
turalist position-taking in 2002. It argues that the impetus for the emo kid folk-devil resides not 
only in concerns regarding the misappropriation and exploitation of the emo pseudo-genre, but 
with concerns stemming from the perceived implementation through which corporate ‘outsider’ 
forces were taken as attempting to colonize the subcultural underground. In utilizing instances of 
subcultural discourse regarding the career trajectory of AFI and My Chemical Romance as my 
primary examples, I analyze the manner in which discussions regarding artists so accused of hav-
ing ‘sold out’ through signing with major record labels, initiating marketing deals with clothing 
manufacturers and retail chains and drastically altering their aesthetics and artistic output reflect 
subcultural tensions regarding how the mainstream popularization of de-legitimated practices 
and position-takings might influence the sanctity of the subcultural field. I examine how the per-
ception that these fears might have found fruition can be deduced by the evolving nature of the 
content featured in Alternative Press magazine, that niche-mediated publication which I allege 
came to be used as the knowledge reservoir from which the particularities informing the emo kid 
folk-devil were drawn upon and revised. The second section will endorse a program of critical 
content analysis in investigating those products (as constructed within the sub-field of restricted 
production) and instances of discourse (as featured by subculturalist micro-media sites) that con-
tributed to the problematization of this ‘multiplicity of crises’ in a manner serving to perpetuate, 
and further construct, the representation of the emo kid folk-devil. I concern myself here with 
such cultural products as Adam and Andrew’s infamous “Emo Kid” song, Steve Emond’s (2006; 
2007) Emo Boy graphic novel series and, finally, a selection of the derogatory Youtube.com vid-
eos - such as the “How To Be Emo” (2006) and “Lars the Emo Boy” (2006) - that became popu-
lar over the course of 2006. Finally, I comment on the means through which the ‘emo kid’ folk-
devil’s transition from a discursive construct to a multi-modal cultural archetype allowed that it 
might be problematically regarded without any requisite familiarity with the crises facing the 
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field of subcultural production and, thus, incited its induction into the wider programme of repre-
sentational politics being levied against non-conformist adolescent populations. 
 
 
6.2 The Multiplicity of Crises: The Colonization of the Underground and the Onset of the 
Gothic Aesthetic.  
 
  As it may be recalled, chapter four utilized the recollections of Alternative Press founder 
Mike Shea in demonstrating the overarching inspiration for those processes through which the 
publication transformed from a ‘legitimate’ niche-mediated resource for ‘privileged’ subcultural 
knowledge to one that concerned itself with covering decidedly ‘mainstream’ acts in the interest 
of catering to the demands of its national distributors and, by extension, conforming to the con-
ventions of the ‘corporatized’ sub-field of large-scale cultural knowledge production.  In so do-
ing, Alternative Press had effectively ‘sold out’ its status as a legitimate information source in 
the context of the sub-field of restricted cultural knowledge production, a fact that Shea corre-
lates with the onset of a near-catastrophic climate of disillusionment, within the AP offices, that 
almost brought the publication to its end.   
  It follows that the January, 2002 publication of Alternative Press Magazine’s 164th issue - 
featuring alternate cover appearances by Saves The Day and AFI - might be regarded as some-
thing of a landmark: it evidences a junction where the field of niche-mediated cultural knowl-
edge production served as the stage upon which a movement toward ‘heresy’ had been under-
taken. In breaking with field orthodoxy in featuring artists theretofore unfamiliar to the main-
stream culture - and being duly rewarded with a substantial increase in both sales and reader-
assigned credibility as a legitimate source of information on ‘authentic’ artists - Alternative Press 
had effectively gained the requisite confidence in challenging the field of positions internal to the 
field of niche-mediated entertainment magazines and in identifying an oft-neglected pocket of 
cultural connoisseurs to whom it could cater coverage and, effectively, become considered an 
authoritative source for ‘expert’ knowledge.  Ultimately, however, I have argued that this ‘he-
retical’ move also sufficed in granting the ‘emo’ signifier prominent attention among cultural 
knowledge consumers, drastically increased the profile of a great number of theretofore ‘under-
ground’ artists and – in light of the fact that the magazine’s foray into underground coverage sold 
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notably well - ultimately demonstrated to the wider cultural industry that the punk subculture 
(and its immediate affiliates) entailed a notable degree of market potential.      
 It is thus crucial to note that the increased coverage that such ‘authentic’ artists thus en-
joyed subsequently placed them in something of a precarious position with not only their estab-
lished fan-base, but with the wider subcultural field of which they were inevitably a part. The 
manner in which those bands affiliated with the ‘neo-punk’ movement had their reputations as-
sailed in accordance with the degree to which they had allegedly forsaken their claims to subcul-
tural ‘authenticity’ (chapter four) might serve as a reminder, in part, of the subcultural field’s 
proclivity for attempting to stave off mainstream co-optation by manner of collectively revising 
the nature of the ‘consensus’ on those artists should they be willing to cater to the sub-field of 
large-scale production.  Alas, one might be curious to know what types of cause-and-effect cor-
relations those subculturalists, devoted to the sub-field of restricted production, began to draw as 
Alternative Press cover appearances began to parlay into major label recording contracts for the 
likes of Saves The Day, Thursday, and - albeit on the sly - Dashboard Confessional. 
 I would furthermore suggest, however, that examples wherein established punk subcul-
turalists strive to tailor their discourse toward de-legitimizing ‘heretical’ artistic producers might 
simultaneously be a by-product of the nature of the economy of individualistic subcultural capi-
tal.  Just as Bourdieu posits that the cultural knowledge producer strives to build a reputation for 
legitimacy in ‘investing’ their attention in artists endowed of certain qualities, so too might the 
subcultural consumer gain ‘capital’ by ‘investing’ their allegiances in those artists so perceived 
as epitomizing one’s conceptualization of ‘proper’ subcultural ethos.  In essence, I would argue 
that one’s specific ‘taste’ in subcultural artists essentially serves as an avenue through which 
one’s status within the field can most easily, and instantly, be deduced by pertinent onlookers.  In 
the early 90s and prior to the emergence of the ‘neo-punk’ movement, for example, asserting a 
subcultural identity professing a pronounced fondness for Bad Religion or NOFX could be taken 
to comment on more than one’s mere tastes in music; these signifiers implied that the ‘investor’ 
was familiar with and committed to the ideals of the ‘underground’, were possessed of the ability 
to implicitly extend respect to ‘progenitor’ artists, and need not resort to mainstream music in-
formation channels in order to deduce the existence of ‘authentic’ artistry.  However, when each 
of these bands came to surface on the ‘mainstream’ radar in the mid-1990s and, thus, attracted 
attention from extra-subcultural audiences, we might easily imagine that the ‘subcultural capital’ 
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possessed through being a vocal supporter of either band was either devalued or, as is more 
likely the case, completely eradicated as Bad Religion fanship, for example, collectively came to 
be perceived as the mark of an insurgent, ‘trend-following’ subcultural outsider.  In these cases, 
and for those so interested in protecting their subcultural distinction, the logical counter-strategy 
would appear to be a process of publicly disaffiliating oneself from the offending artistic produc-
ers and, perhaps most importantly, those having gravitated toward the group following their 
movement toward ‘heresy’.  I might thus posit that the ‘degradational’ subculturalist discourse 
that circulates regarding ‘heretical’ artistic producers thus serves concurrent functions in regards 
to both the collective goal of assuring subcultural sanctity and the individualistic ‘game’ of pro-
curing subcultural capital.  Of course, and as I briefly made mention of in chapter five, it is only 
the collectivist function that can be granted explicit denotation within a subculturalist discourse 
that might hazard dissolving the implicit economy of subcultural capital by the sheer process of 
attesting to its existence. 
 In chapter four, I briefly alluded to the sizable ‘underground’ following that the group 
AFI had attracted following the release of the albums Black Sails in the Sunset (1999) and The 
Art of Drowning (2000).  Unfortunately, as the bands 1999-2000 era website is no longer avail-
able, and nor are the ‘fansites’ that have arisen in dedication to the band at this same time, the 
reader must largely take my word for it that the group’s fusion of quasi-gothic musical under-
tones and traditional hardcore, unique approach to live performance and highly poeticized lyrical 
content inspired something of a phenomenon – relatively speaking, of course – within punk sub-
culturalist circles.  AFI tattoos had so become something of a popular commodity during this era 
that the band took pains to make direct mention of this in The Art of Drowning album’s liner 
notes.  Having taken on such a subcultural momentum, AFI translated their newfound main-
stream exposure, following their first Alternative Press magazine cover appearance, into a bevy 
of initiatives that would draw the ire of the subcultural field to such a pronounced degree that I 
might hazard the opinion that the bulk of those traits destined to epitomize the emo kid folk-devil 
found their genesis in the subcultural reaction levied against this particular band. For the sake of 
explicating the manner in which AFI’s ‘transgressions’ against subcultural convention served to 
converge upon and reiterate one another, I might opt to divide their mainstream ascent into three 
different eras.  
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6.2.1 The Dreamworks Deal and  the Depletion of Subcultural Authenticity 
 Following the modest success of The Art of Drowning album, rumours concerning 
whether the band would remain with the independent Nitro Records label, or sign with a major 
label, ran rampant throughout circles of subculturalist discourse. Rumours of their impending 
major label jump were somewhat quelled, however, with a post, as submitted by Punknews.org 
user ‘Goldstein books’ (2001), entitled “AFI Sticking to Nitro Records”, 
 
I had the opportunity to catch the tail end to a radio interview with AFI on 102.1 The Edge (out 
of Toronto). During the interview, the band confirmed that the rumors are false and they are 
and always will be on Nitro Records. “That's where we started and that's where we'll finish,” 
said lead singer Davey Havok. Also, the band was confronted with their new found mainstream 
chances. They responded by stating that they just want to play and keep playing and wherever 
it takes them is where it takes them. 
  
  
 The band indeed left Nitro, however, for the sake of signing with Dreamworks Records 
just one month later. On December 12th, an anonymous Punknews.org user (Punknews.org. 
2001) posted a bulletin, entitled “AFI signs to Dreamworks, Its Official”, that reproduced a per-
sonal message40
 Hey Everyone, We know there's been tons of speculation recently about us signing to a new 
label and we apologize for the lack of information, but our future plans hadn't been decided up 
until now. Ok, here goes: A couple of months ago, Dexter (owner of Nitro Records, as I'm sure 
you know) came to our show in Ventura and sat us down to talk. He told us that he believed we 
were at a point where we were outgrowing Nitro's resources and he thought it was a good time 
for us to move on. As you can imagine, we were quite taken aback; we owed him another re-
cord and were very happy on Nitro but he went on to explain that a different label could offer 
us things he felt we needed. From the start, we all agreed that we wanted to continue to work 
with Nitro, even though we'd be on a different label, Nitro would be involved. After a few 
months of research, we decided on Dreamworks as our new home based on a few important 
things. First and foremost, we're able to keep the complete artistic freedom and control that we 
had at Nitro; in other words, we can make the music we want and no one can tell us otherwise. 
Second, Dreamworks is a privately-owned label that is free from a lot of the corporate bullshit 
that other labels face. Third, our good friend Luke Wood works there, a guy who completely 
understands what we're about, and played a large part in our decision to go there. So that's the 
big news. We know that you guys have always had faith in us and trusted us to make music 
that we're passionate about, and we'll continue to do just that. Those who truly understand us 
will know that none of this will ever change us or our music. We're sure many of you have 
questions or comments about all of this so we'll be doing an online chat through our website to 
 to the fans that the band had provided on their website in its entirety,  
 
                                                          
40 It is perhaps worth mentioning that, following AFI’s decision to construct a personal message to their fans in 
light of acting in a manner that might have been perceived as selling out, subsequent much-beloved punk acts opt-
ing to engage in similar criticism-inducing deals - such as Rise Against (Punknews.org, 2003) and Anti-Flag (Anti-
Flag website, 2005) crafted similarly-themed messages for their assumptive disgruntled subculturalist fan-bases. 
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answer them. Thanks... Love, Davey, Jade, Hunter, and Adam 
  
  
 As might be expected, those replies posted in response to the bulletin were largely un-
kind.41
 I wish to highlight the manner in which each of these replies, in its own manner and to 
varying degrees, seems to criticize the band, less for signing with Dreamworks than for concoct-
ing what is taken as a fraudulent story concerning the impetus for the move and striving to con-
ceal speculation concerning the ‘true’ nature of the corporation under which the group was newly 
contracted. Though the statement issued by the band in no way conceals its objective of assuring 
those so concerned that the major label transition will in no way translate into the creation of ‘in-
authentic’ art, the zeal with which the aforementioned subculturalists deconstruct and dissect the 
bases on which the band asks that their audience’s faith rest assured exudes little effort to veil 
something which registers as betrayal. In light of this, it must be kept in mind that the Dream-
works deal was announced very shortly before the band was featured on the cover of Alternative 
 Though the majority of responses concerned themselves with the hypocrisy inherent in 
signing with a major label just weeks after being publicly affiliated with statements serving to 
suggest that this would never occur, select responses took issue with the ‘strategies’ which they 
felt that the band were trying to employ within their statement. Punknews.org user ‘punky’ 
(2001, p.28) took particular grievance with the band’s claim that, “‘Dreamworks is a privately-
owned label that is free from a lot of the corporate bullshit that other labels face’ Oh I feel so re-
lieved now...Dreamworks is just like nay other major, and FUCK OFF TO AFI for trying to tell 
us otherwise”. An anonymous poster (2001, p. 7) admits to considering it “cool of Dexter to take 
all of AFI's heat and let the blame go to him, cause without this ‘excuse’ they are using about 
being too big for Nitro (what a bunch of crap), they would be called sell outs in a second!”. Yet 
another anonymous user (2001, p. 20) offers a comment concerning,  
 
the hilarious statement: "our good friend Luke Wood works there, a guy who completely under-
stands what we're about, and played a large part in our decision to go there." Well, i referr 
you to Steve Albini : "After meeting "their" A&R guy, the band will say to themselves and eve-
ryone else, 'He's not like a record company guy at all! He's like one of us.' And they will be 
right. That's one of the reasons he was hired." Ah, its all falling into place… 
  
  
                                                          
41 Above and beyond that, Punknews.org user ‘major_scam’ (2001) even offered a post meant to manufacture 
suspicion that those responses voiced in support of the signing were, in fact, Dreamworks employees attempting 
to quell the impression that the fans had been perturbed. 
144 
 
Press magazine, and one may thus assume that these responses were tempered by the fact that, 
though the group had signed to a major, there was little in the way of grounds on which to as-
sume that they would successfully be thrust onto the mainstream radar. 
 
 6.2.2 The Hot Topic Distribution Deal: Fashion, Co-optation and Illegitimate Fandom  
  By the same point the following year, and despite having released nothing in the way of 
new material, the band had already garnered so large a following as to have attracted its second 
Alternative Press cover appearance on the January, 2004 edition, replete with a glowing article 
proclaiming the band’s then as-yet untitled impending major label debut album the most antici-
pated of the year (Downey, 2003:38). The corresponding photography also served to suggest that 
the band - or, more specifically, vocalist Davey Havok - was in the process of undergoing some-
thing of an aesthetic transition: having abandoned the devilock and the ghost-white pancake 
make-up formerly attributed to his on-stage persona, Havok was now found to don thick mascara 
and sternum-length black hair that, curiously, manages to partially drape just one eye in all but 
one of the featured photographs. 42
                                                          
42 Over the preceding years, it is of prudence to note that Havok would reinvent his personal image in drawing 
from a variety of tropes pulled equally from gothic and 70s-glam fashion. One might wish to imagine a number of 
looks that pull, from varying degrees, from the Cure’s Robert Smith and Ziggy Stardust-era David Bowie. 
 
 Though the band drew some criticism in the wake of found-
ing The Despair Faction - an AFI fan-club that demanded its members pay for the pleasure of  
induction (user ‘childofpunk76, Punknews.org: 2002) - the band did not draw its second wave of 
pronounced subculturalist criticism, until an anonymous Punknews.org user (Punknews.org, 
2002) submitted a bulletin announcing that AFI harboured plans to release a limited edition ten-
inch ‘picture disc’ vinyl record that could only be purchased through two exclusive avenues. One 
such avenue was through the band’s website. The other, however, was through Hot Topic retail 
outlets, a chain founded by Orv Madden in Westminster, California in 1989 for the sake of capi-
talizing on the prevalence of the fashion accessories made popular by those artists propelling the 
80s ‘hard rock’ industry. According to the biography offered on the Hot Topic website, the com-
pany inevitably “found a niche[,] and its name was music-influenced accessories. Whether it was 
fingerless gloves like Billy Idol or glam metal bootstraps like Poison, music was definitely the 
driving force behind teen fashion” (2008). By the mid-90s, the mall-based outlet had transformed  
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Fig. 6.1: The aesthetic evolution of AFI’s Davey Havok; Left October 2003 (Saskatoon); 
Right August 2007 (Calgary).  Photos courtesy of Ryan Jackson. 
 
 
 
 
itself from a retailer on the perpetual brink of folding to a lucrative company by focusing its at-
tention solely on providing youths with music-based attire and, eventually, “the underground car- 
toon, cult movie and comic book scenes. It was a unique culture they could call their own, and it 
was difficult to find merchandise from these licenses” (Hot Topic Website, 2008).  
 Suffice it to say, the prospect that the band had developed a distribution deal with a mall-
based outlet that also specialized in Care Bears merchandise did not sit well with elements 
amidst the Punknews.org community. Though the bulletin announcing plans for the record drew 
little in the way of responses,43
                                                          
43 One notable exception comes courtesy of Punknews.org user ‘Timis’, replying simply with, “woo-
hoo..."exclusively in Hot Topic stores"....all i have to say is WOW, how did punk or whatever you want to call it 
come to this?????? 
 
 the pleasant review as contributed by Punkews.org contributor 
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JanelleJ (2002) served to incite a number of vindictive comments from a largely anonymous pool 
of Punknews.org users,   
 
The Goth Topic sucks. I've never been there, but thats where my poser little sister goes to buy 
her Brody Armstrong shirts. AFI only selling their music there proves what corporate slime-
balls they must be (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2002). 
  
I'm not a big AFI fan, but only selling this at hot topic is really wack. That is exactly what punk 
rock should not be about. I remember what AFI said when they went to a major label, some-
thing along the lines of how they wouldn't change and the label will be good for them. If being 
forced to or agreeing to only selling something only at the most ridiculous example of corpo-
rate punk is for the better...then...I can't think how to finish that line with something clever. Ei-
ther way, what a joke  (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2002). 
  
ok, for one: davey havoc and the rest of afi have a contract with hot topic. hot topic gives them 
free clothes/makeup/blowjobs/whatever...i read it in an interview with davey. so that's probably 
why the album is there. doesn't make it any cooler, in fact, it makes it 10x lamer. think about it, 
it has nothing to do with dreamworks - it has everything to do with afi…isn't it funny to see all 
the davey lookalikes nowadays at the shows? black clothes, fishnets, makeup, devil locks or 
davey bangs, and ALL of them either wearing afi or misfits shirts (Anonymous Punknews.org 
user, 2003). 
 
  
 Each of these posts can be taken to indicate a burgeoning subculturalist concern with both 
the character of the distribution channels that the band elected to employ in disseminating the 
336 record and the types of adherents the band is catering to in doing so. The first post speaks 
volumes on the specific types of consumers he or she believes to frequent Hot Topic locations in 
referring to the retailer as ‘the goth topic’. The author characterizes the chain as a site that spe-
cifically caters to inauthentic subculturalists such as his ‘poser little sister’. In professing to be an 
authentic subculturalist in implying that he or she has not (and would not) set foot in the estab-
lishment themselves, the fact that AFI has elected to establish a distribution deal with the retailer 
is taken as proof that they are ‘corporate slime balls’ by virtue of having taken brazen initiative 
of marketing their artistic output directly through an outlet that primarily caters to ‘goths’ and 
‘poser little sisters’. The second post, on the other hand, invokes reference to the band’s personal 
statement regarding the Dreamworks recording contract in regarding the Hot Topic distribution 
deal as further evidence of the group’s facetiousness. In taking position as a defender of punk 
morality (and, by extension, that of an authentic subculturalist), he or she characterizes Hot 
Topic as ‘the most ridiculous example of corporate punk’ in trying to highlight the overarching 
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gravity of a direly problematic possibility: that a major label recording contract might now be 
taken to necessitate exclusionary distribution agreements with ‘illegitimate’ retail outlets. By this 
line of logic, signing with a major label might now be taken to signal that subcultural artistic 
producers will be forced into forging alliances with corporate merchandise retailers or, perhaps 
worse yet, can be taken to signal the artists’ willingness to forge such alliances. The final ex-
cerpt, which might be taken in partial response to the former, strives to place blame for the Hot 
Topic distribution deal solely with the band itself in referencing a presumed interview in which 
Havok concedes authorship of the arrangement. What is most interesting about this case is the 
manner in which the author derogatorily characterizes AFI as a band who are willing to co-opt 
their own punk values for the sake of procuring free clothing, make-up, and sexual favours; they 
have, in other words, not only sold out their ideals in exchange for free stuff, but stuff that will 
only further inflate their implied concern for their own image (and tantalize the sexual pleasure 
that they purportedly derive from doing so). In essence, then, this post can be taken to strive to-
ward characterizing the band as either prostitutes or predators who extract sexual gratification 
from the power that their emergent fan base confers unto them. The poster also takes pains in 
subtly problematizing this fan base in denoting, first of all, their tendencies toward replicating 
Havok’s image (the ‘black clothes, fishnets, makeup, devilocks or daveybangs’) and, second, 
their proclivity for conforming to very specified styles of dress (AFI and Misfits shirts, each of 
which might be assumed to have been purchased at Hot Topic locations) while attending the 
consecrated space of the live concert experience.   
 Alas, it can be said that choice selections from the subcultural response to the release of 
the 336 record denote the gradual emergence of a discourse serving to identify and explicate a 
multiplicity of problematic initiatives that might threaten the sanctity of the established subcul-
tural field. There is the threat as posed by major record labels that might force their artists to en-
ter working relationships with illegitimate corporate entities or, worse yet, the threat posed by 
artists who might willingly construct working relationships with illegitimate corporate entities. 
There is, of course, the pressing problematic posed by corporate entities like Hot Topic; compa-
nies seemingly intent on mass-marketing those cultural products long used as marks of distinc-
tion – of being ‘in the know’ in regards not only to ‘underground’ cultural producers, but ‘under-
ground’ merchandizing outlets - within the subcultural field to inauthentic populations of mall 
shoppers ostensibly taken to be less interested in their subcultural significance than their aes-
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thetic value as fashion accessories.44 Finally, there is the concern surrounding the fact that this 
union between subcultural artists and corporate forces has likely bolstered the ranks of problem-
atic ‘outsider’ populations; those who might buy products once used in denoting a keen subcul-
tural awareness at any major shopping centre and utilize the concert as a sphere in which to as-
sert their fanaticism for particular artists by altering their appearances in like manner. 
 
 6.2.3 The Sing the Sorrow Review: Devaluation on the Basis of Orthodoxy Offended 
  When AFI finally released their Dreamworks debut, Sing The Sorrow, on March 11th
 Though it cannot be substantively argued that the band’s affront against subcultural or-
thodoxy might have subconsciously served to taint the manner in which the reviewer approached 
the album, I do wish to draw attention to how reference to these affronts frames the remainder of 
a review that primarily serves to bemoan the dissolution of the band‘s ‘edge’ and, with it, their 
, 
2003, Punknews.org celebrated the occasion by posting a review as compiled by ‘theunder-
groundscene’ (2003). Once having asserted authority in granting the album a credible review - 
admitting to being a fan of their back-catalogue, and especially those albums released after gui-
tarist Jade Puget joined the band in 1997 - the reviewer elects to offer a brief paragraph that 
serves to explicate his personal situation in approaching the album,   
 
If you weren’t on your knees, crying, holding your head in your hands when you first heard 
that AFI had signed to a major label, you’re a liar. None of us wanted to believe it, but we fig-
ured that they deserved it, for being such a hardworking band, releasing great CD after great 
CD continuously. When the songs “Now The World” and “Reiver’s Music” were released on 
the Internet and on vinyl only available at Hot Topic (::shudder::), it was a shock, at least to 
me, how bad this band sounded. Their music was boring, and vocalist Davey Havok, an amaz-
ing vocalist in the past, never sounded worse. The songs were just...bad. So now it’s a little 
over a month until this CD which I am currently reviewing comes out, and my expectations for 
it have severely dropped. When I finally got my hands on it, my subpar expectations proved to 
be correct. This isn’t the AFI that I knew. This isn’t the AFI that I wanted to hear. This AFI 
sucks.  
  
                                                          
44 The term ‘mall punk’ has long served as a means of stigmatizing those who would purchase the merchandise of 
‘underground’ artists at mainstream retail shopping centre locations.  Though I am not aware of any attempt to 
provide a history of the term, I personally became aware of it by virtue of the band Jughead’s Revenge and their 
1996 album, Image Is Everything.  The title-track of the album, which heralds “fashion punk [as] the latest thing”, 
serves to problematize those “plastic as hell” punk subculturalists, complete with “new store-bought punk wear”, 
who render themselves “a billboard” for those corporate entities so identified as rendering ‘punk’ a superficial 
trend by virtue of their initiatives to exploit the subculture.  
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authenticity. 45   
 Curiously, the majority of those among the Punknews.org community who professed to 
harbour a considerable distaste for the album very rarely did so while citing the Dreamworks 
deal as their primary grievance. In judging from a considerable portion of the eighty-six user re-
sponses posted on the 11th of March (a number that would swell to 144 by the end of March 
13th
 Taken together and with those statements having come before in regards to the 336 album 
review, one can gather that the vocal contingent of subcultural traditionalists were well on their 
), one of the most popular routes of criticism lay with characterizing the particularistic nature 
of those listeners who expressed, or were assumed to exude, a pronounced fondness for Sing The 
Sorrow and, now, the band themselves, 
 
It's ok...not bad by any means...but nothing special...very "controlled". Hearing my 18 year old 
little sister and 13 year old little brother blasting it in their rooms kind of detracts from me 
really taking it seriously. I guess that' just my problem, not AFI's. (Anonymous Punknews.org 
user, 2003). 
   
There are many times on this album in which davey havok manages to sound like a girl…i've 
realized what is lacking about the new direction AFI is constantly headed. This music isnt hon-
est at all… [Havok is] going out of his way to be "goth" because he thinks that "goth" is cool 
and it will make the kids like him more, and it works, in its own little creepy way. This music 
is so unenthusiastic and overproduced to fit some image that they've created for themselves. 
The first time I saw the "days of the phoenix" video, I honestly thought it was Orgy, and theres 
something fundamentally wrong with that. (Punknews.org user ‘Dubar’, 2003) 
  
 what happened if dave became a woman? you know, a transsexual? would all his fruity male 
fans with their black nailpolish and goth girls still swoon over him during shows? (Anonymous 
Punknews.org user, 2003). 
  
 I give this baby a "10" because it is the funniest CD I've heard all year….my basic contention 
with AFI was their tendency to take themselves waaaayyyy too seriously and their use of over-
flowery Edgar Allen Poe meets Jim Morrison purple prose that although it sounds nice and 
pretty it doesn't really say anything and isn't really all that relevant now is it?…That having 
been said, I'm glad goth fashion and music exists because it gives me something amusing to 
laugh at. Angsty teenagers across the globe can play dress up and pretend that they have magi-
cal powers and mope around the malls while bemoaning the fact that they didn't grow up in the 
17th century and why doesn't anybody like them? I guess their just so far advanced from the 
"herd" that no one can understand them. It is their blessing and their curse to know so much 
more about the universe than the pathetic mortals down below. (Punknews.org user ‘fuckarma-
geddon77’, 2003). 
  
  
                                                          
45 It is important to note that this review, and the negative comments which followed it, inspired the creation of a 
glowing counter-review from Punknews.org contributor ‘Jonathan’ (2003). The gross majority of this review con-
cerns itself with lambasting those contributors and users who took factors beyond the actual worth of the music 
into consideration in constructing unsavoury positions. 
150 
 
way to characterizing AFI as a band who had not only tailored their image and musical output 
toward amassing success with extra-subcultural listeners, but a particularly problematic cross-
section of listeners. The first poster discriminates against the band on the basis of the fact that 
they have found favour with his eighteen year old ‘little sister’ and thirteen year-old little 
brother; cultural consumers who presupposedly deplete the value of the artistic work on the sheer 
basis of the fact that they are an eighteen year old female and a thirteen year old, respectively. 
The second poster, likewise, bases their criticism regarding the fact that the music isn’t ‘honest’, 
in large part, on the fact that it facilitates an image meant to appeal to the same ‘creepy’ goth 
‘kids’ who, it is insinuated, supported Orgy during their brief tenure as a popular act.  The latter 
pair of responses are considerably more pointed in their characterization of the contemporary 
wave of AFI fanatics. The third poster suggests that, should Havok become a transsexual (with 
the insinuation being that he already acts like one), it would prove to have little impact beyond 
rendering the ‘fruity male fans’ who ‘swoon’ over Havok during shows heterosexual and, by ex-
tension, the ‘goth girls’ who do the same homosexual. The latent implication of this comment 
would seem to posit that the band now exclusively cater to a fan base who solely gage an artist’s 
merits on their aesthetic attractiveness or, to put it bluntly, gravitate toward the live performance 
as a means of indulging in a queer sexual thrill.  
  The final response rather eloquently pulls on a number of the stereotypical traits evoked 
in identifying, and stigmatizing, the subcultural other having emerged in the wake of AFI’s suc-
cess, and it does so in a manner best forecasting the emo kid folk-devil representation as yet to 
emerge. By this account, the band are proclaimed guilty of taking themselves too seriously while 
blatantly endorsing tactics meant to exude the impression that they are creating ‘gothic’ art of a 
substantive value and, thus, producing art of no value at all. By the author’s estimation, that 
pocket of cultural connoisseurs most likely to buy in to the illusion that AFI’s artistic output is 
substantive does not extend past that global population of ‘angst-ridden’ teenagers endowed with 
proclivities tailored toward ‘playing dress up’ and ‘moping around the malls’ (where, it is 
vaguely implied, they are likely frequenting the Hot Topic). The remainder of the effort that the 
author exudes in stereotyping the quasi-vampiric, adolescent AFI fanatic who has taken to sur-
facing amongst the subcultural spheres would almost seem to insinuate that they are, in fact, the 
greatest threat facing the consecration of the sub-field of restricted production and the subculture 
having long functioned to facilitate it.  
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  It is prudent to note that the subculturalist discourse emerging in response to the release 
of AFI’s Sing the Sorrow album can be taken, in various instances, to constitute the gradual con-
struction of a stereotypical representation of another subcultural ‘other’. Though it shares many 
of the attributes correlated with the ‘emo kid’ stereotype as developed in response to the Seven-
teen article of August 2002 - in each case, these stereotypes focus on alleged-to-be emotionally 
imbalanced adolescent populations who threaten the legitimacy of various subcultural conven-
tions - the specified target of the March, 2003 representation harbours some decidedly unique 
features. The subcultural ‘other’ that the latest stereotype targets purportedly draws one’s inspi-
ration in dress and musical taste less from illegitimate reservoirs of subcultural knowledge than 
from the traits expressed by one specific band and the merchandise offered by one specific retail 
chain. In considering the ‘emo kid’ representation as facilitated by the subculturalist discourse 
emerging in the wake of the “Am I Emo?” photo-spread in chorus with the ‘emo kid’ representa-
tion as problematized by the collection of newscasts we considered at the onset of this thesis, the 
obvious question might stand as follows; how did the representation so granted constitution in 
August of 2002 merge with the representation coming into formation in March of 2003? I would 
suspect that this transition might be better explicated and understood if we, once again, concern 
ourselves with the continuing evolution of Alternative Press Magazine and, more specifically, 
the nature of both the magazine’s content and the character of those bands which the publication 
would aspire to ‘invest’ in.  
  
 6.3 The Evolving Character (And Function) of Alternative Press Magazine 
  According to Mike Shea, the unprecedented success that Alternative Press had managed 
to garner in 2002 inspired the publication to strive toward forging a deeper relationship with its 
devout readership in a concerted effort to allow that “that same sort of intimate connection be-
tween fan and musician would be felt within the pages of AP” (Shea, 2005: 54). By his account, 
the most crucial stage of the process of fostering such a connection demanded that the editorial 
staff, 
 
Let go of the reigns…usually, music editors single out what they perceive to be ‘quality music’ 
(oddly most of their picks echo what the music-publicity hype machine happens to be selling at 
the time), while the majority of readers are on a different page altogether. In a relationship like 
this, the critics are the ‘experts’, while the readers are just the poor, huddled masses that don’t 
know any better. So, instead of telling our readers we knew better, we turned over the maga-
zine to our readers and let them give the orders…you see us say within these pages all the time 
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that this is your magazine, and it really is (Shea, 2005:54). 
  
  
 It is not entirely clear, however, whether Shea speaks of handing the ‘reigns’ over to the 
Alternative Press readership in terms of coverage or content. In regards to the latter, it is perhaps 
of note to mention that, in charting the evolution of a number of Alternative Press Magazine’s 
monthly features, the publication appears to have begun catering to a decidedly adolescent audi-
ence during this time period. The AP Readers Poll, for one, provided an opportunity whereby the 
magazine would post a series of questions concerning themselves with a particular topic on their 
website and provide readers the opportunity to appear in the magazine should they take the time 
to submit their responses. Though earlier incarnations of the featured question could be consid-
ered to reflect issues appearing pertinent to a broad audience of more mature subculturalists - 
such as,  “Have Independent Record Stores Become Obsolete?” (Simon, 2003a: 25) or “Once An 
Addict, Always An Addict?” (Simon, 2003b: 31) - subsequent polls, such as “Is It Harder to be 
Dumped or Do the Dumping?” (Simon, 2004a: 29), “Have You Ever Cheated In School?” 
(Simon, 2004b: 23) and “Does Abstinence-based Sex Education Work?” (Heisel, 2005: 22-24) 
might lead us to deduce that Alternative Press had come to perceive itself as a publication cater-
ing to a decidedly adolescent audience. 
  Late 2003 also marks the onset of a period in which Alternative Press began experiment-
ing with a number of fashion-based features. The October, 2003 edition included a picture spread 
(Alternative Press, 2003: 54-57) wherein the band The Sounds effectively garnered coverage 
from the magazine by modelling products from clothing manufacturers such as Dickies Girl, 
E.C. Star, Hot Topic, Hurley, and others. Curiously, similarly themed spreads would not resur-
face until July and August of 2004, wherein the bands Tsunami Bomb (Alternative Press, 2004a: 
71-76) and Sugacult (Alternative Press, 2004b: 55-60) would likewise donate their modelling 
prowess before the feature was seemingly abandoned altogether. It was replaced, however, with 
a number of features - like the September, 2004 edition’s “Back To School (2K4) Gear Up” (Al-
ternative Press, 2004c: 61-65) and the December, 2004 issue’s “We’re Totally Stocking You!” 
holiday gift guide (Burgess and Simon, 2004: 81-86) - which provided a plethora of images of 
clothing, fashion accessories and technological goods, the identity of their manufacturer, and 
their retail price. It might also be prudent to note the shifting nature of the magazine’s advertis-
ers: whereas the average 2003 edition typically featured up to five advertisements for shoe and 
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clothing companies (namely, Vans, Dickies, Atticus, Role Model, and Made),  issues toward the 
latter portion of 2004 consistently feature additional advertisements from clothing companies of 
the likes of Level 27, Strhess, Vision Street Wear, Ordinary Clothing, Clandestine and Pitchfork 
Hardwear.     
 Given Alternative Press magazine’s perceptible shift toward serving as a site of subcul-
tural knowledge that not only predominantly catered to ‘problematized’ adolescent crowds, the 
fact that it exuded an apparent resolve to serve as a willing channel through which clothing com-
panies might attempt to cater to this ‘market’, I wish to speculate that those pre-established 
anxieties concerning the co-optation (and marketization) of the subcultural field, and the particu-
larities of those populations that might be gravitating toward it, encountered some degree of sub-
tle aggravation and reinforcement during this period.  Nevertheless, I must admit that, were Al-
ternative Press magazine’s developing role as a medium through which clothing companies 
might affiliate their brand with subcultural position-taking to have been explicitly denoted by vo-
cal subcultural traditionalists (and I’ve found no evidence to suggest that it was), it would have 
been well overshadowed by the development of a trend that was explicitly deduced as being ex-
tremely problematic throughout reservoirs of subculturalist discourse:  namely, that of the pro-
cession wherein a significant number of highly revered subcultural artistic producers began sign-
ing deals with major record labels. 
   
6.3.1 The Iconic Exodus and the Reinforcement of the Multiplicity of Crises 
 Alternative Press Magazine’s choices in coverage granted those artists who would come 
to be affiliated with the emo pseudo-genre their first instance of notable press exposure (and 
served to foster their affiliation with the emo pseudo-genre in the first place); a secondary initia-
tive would appear to have positioned long-established artists amidst the punk and hardcore un-
derground. In an apparent effort to aspire to once again becoming a “punk rock fanzine” (Shea, 
2005, 46), a significant proportion of its 2002 era cover slots were granted to such pop-punk acts 
as Sum 41 (AP #165), Good Charlotte (AP #172), A Newfound Glory (#173) and, in a shared 
cover appearance, Blink-182 and Green Day (AP #167); one and all being inarguable ‘punk’ acts 
who had already committed to major label deals long prior to their esteemed cover appearances. 
However, as this trend continued into 2004 - with cover features on the Distillers (AP #176) and 
Rancid (AP #180) - a burgeoning trend whereby esteemed punk artists featured prominently 
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within the magazine began to sign major label contracts, which attracted growing subculturalist 
concern. Beginning with the July announcement that Rancid had come to a curious ‘distribution’ 
agreement with Warner Records (Punknews.org, 2003a) and in closing with the December an-
nouncement that Dreamworks had signed political punk band Rise Against (Punknews.org, 
2003), the Punknews.org online community became rife with discussions concerning both the 
climate of artistic integrity within the punk subculture and the sense that attempts were once 
again being made to render punk rock a mainstream genre:  
 
 All of these bands signing to majors has made me wonder, these are bands that people think 
typify punkrock in our time, they're held up as icons. If bands like RA who are supposed to be 
what the scene is all about are selling out (and they are selling out to a major) what does that 
say about the scene? The fans make such a thing of selling out but most of the bands will jump 
at it when they get the chance, its all so false. Serves anyone idiotic enough to worship rancid, 
RA, AFI right though. The scene is a sinking ship (Punknews.org user ‘sincerely me’, 2003b). 
  
  
WHATEVER TO THESE GUYS! I guess cuz hypocrites like AFI and Rancid sellout it be-
comes okay for the rest of the scene to turn their back on the ideals at the core of the punk 
movement. These guys will now be making money for one of the BIGGEST corporations in the 
world. A corp. that spends many of it's resources on ill deeds. Oh they'll candy coat any way 
they want, but the fact is that they're a part of a machine that is not aligned with the way that 
most punks feel. Now they want to cash in on us...Thanks again to hypocrites like AFI for mak-
ing selling out an acceptable option (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2003b). 
  
  
[Quoting a Rise Against lyric] "You're the new revolution/The angst filled adolescent/You fit 
the stereotype well" These are the kind of kids that'll see you guys on MTV, buy your album at 
Hot Topic and start beating up people at your shows, mistakenly thinking that they're attending 
a Korn show. You never were my favorite band, but I garuntee I cannot stand behind this act. 
Here's to the memories. Fuck off, you capitalist pigs (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2003b) 
  
  
i don't know what to say. dreamworks is out to sign every band ever referred to as punk it 
seems. i guess we're gonna hafta drop the major label pretention eventually cuz it looks like 
punk is going mainstream…(Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2003b) 
  
  
 Once again, these posts denote a climate of anxiety concerning the integrity of the punk 
subculture’s foundational ideals and the suspected presence of an initiative by which mainstream 
forces are orchestrating the co-optation of the subculture. The subculturalist reaction, in this case, 
would appear to boil down to discursive initiatives that strive to identify and stigmatize those 
artists perceived as rendering ‘selling out’ acceptable (most notably, in these cases, AFI) while, 
simultaneously, constructing a representation of the type of problematic subcultural ‘other’ that 
might be expected to gravitate toward the subcultural field as result; namely, the ‘kinds of kids’ 
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who might see Rise Against in MTV, procure their albums at Hot Topic, and poison the conse-
crated sphere of the live performance by ‘mistakenly thinking that they’re attending a Korn 
show’ and, thus, engaging in mindless violence.  
  
6.3.2 The Rise of the ‘New School’ and the Emergence of the ‘Metalcore’ Pseudo-genre. 
  Meanwhile, and in assumed correlation with Alternative Press’s initiative to hand its 
‘reigns’ over to readers, the October 2003 issue (AP # 183) offered dual covers (one featuring 
the longstanding pop-punk band MxPx, the other the relatively new Drive-Thru signing, The 
Starting Line) meant to symbolize the magazine’s commitment to offering more coverage on the 
‘new school’ of emerging musical acts. Though the magazine had continued to grant the cover 
space to fresh-faced ‘investments’ for the better part of that year - debut AP cover appearances 
had already been awarded to such acts as Taking Back Sunday (AP # 176.1) and the Used (AP 
#176.2); it would appear that the October, November and December 2003 issues were uniquely 
tailored toward asserting Alternative Press magazine’s reputation as the definitive source on no-
table, fledgling underground acts. However, as this particular era also marks the point at which 
Greenwald’s Nothing Feels Good arrived on the auspices of being the authoritative text on the 
emo pseudo-genre, it must be recalled that Alternative Press has been shown to take pains to as-
sert their claims to such a reputation without invoking the term ‘emo’ and beckoning all of the 
negative connotations that the term now carried with it. Alas, the articles concerning the maga-
zine’s cover artists for November and December - namely, Thursday (AP # 184.1), Thrice (AP # 
184.2) and Brand New (AP # 183) - refrained from mentioning ‘emo’ altogether (save for the 
case of Bayer’s (2003) Thursday article, which did so only for the sake of submitting the term 
‘screamo’ to degradation). Whether or not it would be fitting that we interpret Alternative 
Press’s aforementioned utilization of the term ‘post-hardcore’ as an alternative to ‘emo’ to be 
evidence of an escalating initiative whereby the magazine might annex an untainted pseudo-
generic signifier into its lexicon; it is nonetheless of note that the publication began “testing the 
waters” with features focusing on a number of supposedly burgeoning sub-genres during this 
same period. The November, 2003 issue, for example, featured Jason Bracelin’s (2003) expose 
on the current state of the Goth music subculture; a piece to be soon thereafter followed by 
Downey’s (2004c) brief February, 2004 feature on a pre-supposedly emergent genre coming to 
be known as ‘metal core’. 
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  In the context of the coverage that Alternative Press had extended to such bands as 
Avenged Sevenfold (McHugh, 2003), Bleeding Through (Downey, 2004a) and Atreyu (Downey, 
2004c), ‘metalcore’ was described as a sub-genre which fused heavy metal, melodic hardcore, 
and punk elements into a broad-ranging musical style. In judging from the photographs offered 
to complement coverage of each band, however, it would have been very curious were readers 
not to consume each article with the impression that metal core also denoted a specific fashion 
that seamlessly fused the more sensationalistic tropes associated with punk and ‘metal’ dress 
(such as the devilock and the ‘fauxhawk’) with the neo-gothic aesthetic around which AFI had, 
to this point, inspired something of a trend. In essence, before having developed anything resem-
bling a sonic identity, the term ‘metalcore’ quickly came to be used to denote bands who uni-
formly dressed entirely in black, took conscious care in attending to their hair styles and - seem-
ingly without exception - indulged in applying black nail-polish and eyeliner; traits that would 
appear to factor heavily in the manner in which sections of the Punknews.org community would 
react to their subsequent ‘breakthrough’ albums (Punknews.org contributor ‘FortyMinutesWest, 
2003, 2004; Punknews.org contributor ‘Aubin’, 2003).  
  It is amidst the user replies to one of these albums - Atreyu’s second, The Curse (2004) - 
in which we find a collection of user comments aiding in the construction of a pejorative pseudo-
conceptual signifier meant to suffice as a derogatory label. I might argue that the term in ques-
tion - ‘fashion-core’ - sufficed as a means through which subcultural traditionalists might strive 
to corrode any claims to subcultural ‘authenticity’ that these bands or, more importantly, their 
fans, might assume themselves to possess. I consider a number of them here in chronological or-
der:  
  
 wake the fuck up people ... these guys are not hardcore ... i repeat ... they ARE NOT hardcore 
they are fashionXcore at it's best ( Punknews.org user Mikeinflames, 2003). 
  
 Let's just end this, okay? *The "fashion" "core" kids look stupid. White studded belts, painted 
finger nails, girl jeans, and stupid ass haircuts.Lots of songs about suicide and girls by bands 
who must have a member with at least ONE nautical star tattoo (Anonymous Punknews.org 
user, 2003). 
   
couldnt have said it better myself whoever you are. 'punk' and 'hardcore' these days is all fash-
ion. the kids are fucking dumb. I remember going to suicide machine/less than jake shows and 
shit back in the day. NO ONE cared about their hair except for the few dipshits that would dye 
their or have a mowhawk. i get sick at shows now (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2003). 
   
[quoting a previous post] "By the way...what in the fuck is fashion core?...forgive me for not 
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putting the X in between but i dont know what the fuck the x stands for in the first place" Fash-
ionxcore or however you want to write it is more to describe kids than music. You know all 
those kids who listen to hardcore like Atreyu and all dress the same (tight pants, black stylized 
hair, eye liner, tight hardcore band shirt, pink, jack purcells or all black converse)? Those are 
fashion core kids (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2003). 
  
  
 One might note the process through which the concept of ‘fashion-core’ is built upon and 
expanded with each subsequent instance of subculturalist discourse. The first post merely func-
tions to state its case, however devoid of any elaboration it might be, that Atreyu is a ‘fashion-
core’ band and classifying the group in any other manner is a misguided exercise. The second 
post builds upon the preceding statement by explicating the unique properties of fashion-core 
bands (they have ‘lots of songs about suicide and girls’ and exhibit a taste for trendy-cum-cliché 
tattoo designs) and the stylistic particularities of the ‘fashion-core kids’ - replete with ‘white 
studded belts, painted finger nails, girl jeans and stupid ass haircuts’ - who support them. The 
third post, crucially, extends a comment concerning the manner through which the subcultural 
field has been detrimentally altered (‘punk’ and ‘hardcore’ these days is all fashion’) by the pres-
ence of such ‘fashion-core kids’ and the bands alleged to have inspired their practices; and we 
are to take it that their numbers have so swelled (and practices become so unseemly) as to move 
this ‘authentic’ subculturalist to illness. Finally, the fourth post is careful in advancing the decla-
ration that ‘fashion-core’ is a term less used in meaning to describe bands than an identifiable 
block of adherents who support certain bands. While this Punknews.org user is careful to grant 
Atreyu the credit of being a ‘hardcore’ group, he or she ultimately locates ‘fashion-core’ in those 
patterns of uniform dress that their adherents endorse; ‘tight pants, black stylized hair, eye liner’ 
and so on. 
  I wish to dispel any suspicion that these threads of subcultural discourse could not have 
been suspected to herald any bearing on the manner in which those beyond the discussion boards 
of the Punknews.org community conceptualized this wave of ‘metalcore’ bands in noting the 
manner in which the issue of ‘fashion-core’ factored into a 2004 Alternative Press interview 
(Downey, 2004: 94-96) with Atreyu vocalist Alex Varkatzas. The article, entitled “Core Values” 
and tagged with the by-line “Hardcore! Metalcore! Fashioncore! Whatever you want to call 
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it…”, vies to assert an air of subcultural legitimacy in citing the burgeoning debate between tra-
ditionalism and this new wave of aestheticism within its opening paragraphs,46
 I would argue that the significance of this passage rests with the manner through which 
Varkatzas, albeit off-handedly, assumes the role of being a concrete representative of the alleged 
‘fashion-core’ movement. Over the course of his response, the subject essentially accuses the 
established hardcore scene of being irrelevant (the fact that the subculture would heatedly con-
demn such a ‘non-issue’ as fashion illustrates that it lacks any grounds on which to discuss any-
   
 
 And so the metalcore debate of style-versus-substance continues, with Atreyu (and fellow 
Southern Californians Eighteen Visions, Bleeding Through and Avenged Sevenfold) right in 
the centre of it. Back in the day, the dudes in Slayer wore Jams and ripped T-shirts while hard-
core kids rocked Champion hoodies and Krishna beads. The new breed fuses both styles, looks 
slick and hip, attracts more fans and pisses the diehards off (Downey, 2004: 94).  
  
  
 That portion of the interview in which Downey probes Varkatzas into discussing 
Atreyu’s declaration as a ‘fashion-core’ band is also of note, as it cites (or, perhaps, strives to 
incite) a climate of hostilities between the Atreyu faithful and those subcultural traditionalists 
serving as the band’s critics:  
  
Lately, a few bands have made it their stance to preach that styled hair, nail polish and 
make-up have no place in the hardcore scene. 
  
  
I think the fact that people are talking about it means they’ve lost things to talk about. Its such a 
non-issue. All right, you wear athletic shoes, bootie socks, camouflage shorts and a hoodie 
from your favourite band from ‘98 who wasn’t that good to begin with - that’s not a style of 
dress? That’s just ‘keeping it real’? But if you wear tight jeans and give a fuck about your hair, 
that’s ‘fashioncore’?…if you’re going to talk shit on us because we wore make-up on two 
tours, then great, we’re a ‘fashioncore’ band…As far as the make-up thing, I’m over it. Some 
of us wear it, some of us don’t, but you can’t really talk shit about it, because Motley Crue 
wore make-up! (Downey, 2004: 94). 
  
  
                                                          
46 It is perhaps also important to note that one cannot help but cull the impression that Downey himself is largely 
critical of Atreyu’s credibility; the article’s introduction closes with an explication of the interview-to-follow that 
reads “Ryan J. Downey rounded up singer Alex Varkatzas (admittedly ‘three sheets to the wind’ before sound 
check’) for a little chat about vampires, make-up and why Black Sabbath sucks, but Pantera rules. Go figure”. The 
insinuation here is that the shallowness of Varkatzas’s art and image finds reflection in his inability to appreciate 
substantive metal legends like Black Sabbath while attesting fandom for Pantera; a band largely looked upon as 
inauthentic and morally questionable at the time. This consensus would, of course, change following the 2004 
murder of Pantera guitarist ‘Dimebag’ Darrell Abbot.  
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thing of actual significance), of being hypocritical (in pointing out that those hardcore tropes 
centring around a lack of discernable fashion constitute a fashion in and of themselves) and - 
perhaps most importantly - of possessing an inability to adequately deter Varkatzas and his band 
from endorsing their chosen means of practicing self-expression through the practice of affixing 
them with this derogatory signifier (as evidenced in the albeit begrudging acceptance of the 
‘fashion-core’ label). 
  Thanks in large part to this interview, and doubtless others like it, the ‘fashion-core’ rep-
resentation - and by extension, the ‘fashion-core kid’ representation - comes to be granted a 
measure of reification as a substantiated subcultural force. That which began as a derogatory 
stereotype amidst select reservoirs of subculturalist discourse (the Punknews.org website) is ef-
fectively absorbed and used as a topic point by a niche-mediated cultural knowledge producer 
(Downey, writing for Alternative Press) who frames the discursive construct as referencing a 
tangible force with the aid of the testimony of one of the movement’s alleged progenitors (Var-
katzas). Not unlike Greenwald, then, Downey frames the ‘fashion-core’ movement as a self-
actualized contingent of fledgling subculturalists being endowed with a pronounced distaste for 
the orthodox conventions governing the subcultural field, a critical stance regarding the means of 
‘position-taking’ promoted therein, and an implied agenda to change the nature of the ‘game’ 
through the active practice of operating in accordance with alternative ‘rules’. It is also worth-
while to mention that, in the interview excerpt supplied here and elsewhere throughout the piece, 
positive references to glam-metal icons such as Motley Crue and Poison effectively serve to give 
the reader a sense as to the identity of that long-past subculture of music connoisseurs from 
which the ‘fashion-core’ bands might pull their dispositional inspiration.  
 
  
6.4 The Rise of My Chemical Romance and the Fusion of the ‘Emo Kid’ and ‘Fashion-Core 
Kid’ Stereotypes.  
  
 To this point, then, it might be said that the ‘fashion-core kid’ stereotype had supplanted 
the ‘emo kid’ as the most significantly problematic construction of a subcultural ‘other’ threaten-
ing the consecration of the subcultural field. Whereas the latter served to problematize the erro-
neous niche-mediated reinvention of an established subcultural pseudo-genre and the ‘mindless 
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population’ of ‘sensitive’ adolescents that such coverage was ascertained to be catering to, the 
‘fashion-core kid’ served to reference a convergent force of subcultural threats: the mainstream 
music industry’s colonization of the punk ‘underground’, the co-optation of certain tropes of 
homogenous subcultural style and the reinvention they were undergoing, and the popularization 
of a bevy of artists who either implicitly or explicitly sufficed in transgressing, challenging and 
restructuring the longstanding conventions of orthodox subcultural practice. However, until June 
of 2004, there was no pretence under which these diverging representations might slowly begin 
to conjoin and, in doing so, take on an increased aura of representational force. I would argue 
that such an environment came to reveal itself with the rising popularity of My Chemical Ro-
mance, a band that best harboured the widest range of those shared qualities - aesthetic and oth-
erwise - of which both manifestations of subcultural stereotype were constructed for the sake of 
condemning. 
  On August 31st
 
 of 2003, Punknews.org contributor ‘katie4213’ (2003) submitted a news 
bulletin meant to notify the online community of a message having been found on the My 
Chemical Romance website, 
Dear friends, Let this be a declaration and a threat. This is how I wanted to write this, just hav-
ing played a show, with everything on fire. My insides, my brain, and in the pit of my heart it 
burns…something is happening. There is a change. Not in music but in ourselves and in you. 
There are bands that have more to say to you than selling t-shirts from their personal clothing 
company. So frequently, especially when a band signs to a major label, they say “I want to 
change music. This is going to be the next Smells Like Teen Spirit.” This is bullshit. People 
cannot change music, its music that changes people. It is bigger than you and me put together. 
It's a neutron bomb with the detonator set on “kill” waiting for you to push the button. This is 
an evolution and you can be part of the change or stuck eating your own shit on a quest for fire. 
About respect: We were never on an endless search for it, like some Holy Grail or Noah’s 
fucking Ark. If I wanted respect I would be a father. I would have children and raise them to 
take care of me when I’m old and hooked up to machines that keep me alive. Music is a mes-
sage. The message is more important than the messenger. People ask us what we have to say 
and my answer is to find out for yourself. This is not a copout. If you find out for yourself it 
means more to you. About elitism: If for one minute you think you’re better than a sixteen year 
old girl in a Green Day t-shirt, you are sorely mistaken. Remember the first time you went to a 
show and saw your favorite band. You wore their shirt, and sang every word. You didn’t know 
anything about scene politics, haircuts, or what was cool. All you knew was that this music 
made you feel different from anyone you shared a locker with. Someone finally understood 
you. This is what music is about. Things are about to change for us…for all of us. From the 
kids who supported us at the start to those that are here now. We will always be an Eyeball Re-
cords band. The support, dedication, and love from that label got us where we are right now – 
and we did it as a family. I wanted to be the first to tell you before the gossip and the hearsay, I 
want to shout it from the street-lamps to the coils, in every fucked up slum, where every seedy 
club lives and breathes. We are coming to your town. We are taking back what’s ours. We’re 
all in this together…And by the way…we’ve signed to Reprise and we are fucking ready for 
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the world to hear us scream. Xoxoxo, My Chemical Romance (Punknews.org, 2003). 
 
  
  It goes without saying that this statement aspires not only to announce the band’s major 
label signing, but also to frame it as a conscious movement to offend the subcultural aristocracy 
and berate the manner in which it had moved toward marginalizing blocs of subcultural ‘others’. 
It serves as something of a decidedly sensationalistic manifesto asserted by a group of artists 
who would admittedly appear to be aspiring to eradicate the hierarchy having long structured the 
field of subcultural participation through operating as a band that invites its listener to foster an 
unconditionally intimate relationship with their art - assuming they do not stand amongst those 
‘elitists’ having lost grasp of what music is truly ‘about’ by virtue of minding such trivialities as 
‘scene politics, haircuts, or what was cool’. Though posted mid-2003, in other words, this state-
ment condemns the elitism having emerged in symbolically marginalizing the proverbial ‘sixteen 
year-old girl in the Green Day t-shirt’ while simultaneously foreseeing - and condemning - the 
preoccupation with aesthetics that would soon after prove to emerge. 
 We might suspect that the manner in which this statement extends its forewarning of an 
‘evolution’, or the onset of a force through which the band might ‘take back’ what is ‘theirs’, 
might inevitably read as more than a mere ‘threat’ for the subcultural traditionalist against whom 
it would appear to be directed. It furthermore reads like a text meant to self-actualize and cele-
brate the contingent of subcultural others to whom it refers while indulging in some of those 
taken-as-unsavoury dispositional traits having been affiliated with the ‘emo kid’ stereotype. With 
quips like ‘my insides, my brain, and in the pit of my heart it burns’ and ‘We are coming to your 
town. We are taking back what’s ours. We’re all in this together…’, the band might have been 
perceived to be indulging in the pseudo-poeticism and self-aggrandizement elsewhere problema-
tized in both the subcultural responses to AFI’s lyrical turn47
                                                          
47 See comments regarding the Sing The Sorrow album review (Punknews.org contributor ‘theundergroundscene’, 
2003) for examples. 
 and Tyangiel’s depiction of the 
typical ‘emo’ band; thus providing grounds for eventual debate as to whether My Chemical Ro-
mance strove to empower that marginalized population of ‘emo kids’ or that marginalized popu-
lation of ‘fashion-core kids’. Inevitably, and by virtue of the subcultural discourse which would 
be generated around the band’s first major label album, Three Cheers For Sweet Revenge (2004), 
each of these representational constructs would come to be congealed as if they constituted one 
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unitary entity. 
 Curiously, the hostility that the contingent of subcultural traditionalists had developed in 
regards to the group did not surface until a review of the album, by ‘colin’ (2004), appeared on 
Punknews.org on the 11th of March, 2004. The unflattering review - which describes the album 
as, “very hooky (in a dark, Hot-Topic-sellable way)…shallow, unoriginal, overproduced and yet 
fun in a disposable and commercial way” (Punknews.org contributor ‘colin’, 2003) - holds the 
distinction of being one of the few album reviews to inspire a significant number of user re-
sponses even years after its release.48
 It is important to note how the author of the first excerpt, another assumed subcultural 
traditionalist of the opinion that the mainstream co-optation of the sub-field of restricted produc-
tion has effectively ‘ruined’ the ‘scene’, affiliates My Chemical Romance with both the ‘pop-
post-hardcore-emo crap’ style of music and the ’fashion defines status in a scene where status 
shouldn’t matter trend’ or, in so many words, both the ’emo’ movement and the ‘fashion-core’ 
movement. The second post is unique (to those excerpts provided here, but not in the context of 
the majority of derogatory posts made amidst the Punknews.org discussion threads) in that it vies 
 It is amidst these user-generated responses wherein the 
‘emo kid’ stereotype and the ‘fashion-core kid’ representation, slowly but surely, converge and 
intertwine:  
 
 kids these days are getting blindsided by all this pop-post-hardcore-emo crap that it's like the 
explosion of drive thru records/pop punk of 5 years ago, but this time it's on major labels and 
really starting to ruin anything left of the 'scene.' i totally blame bands like this for the "fashion 
defines status in a scene where status shouldn't really matter" trend. thursday, okay, good band, 
stop ripping them off already and do something new (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2004). 
   
This album is so awesome because ummm ok, we're emo and we have cool song titles. If 
you're 14 and have a hard time understanding why you have no life other than a close-minded 
view of music and lifestyle, then surely this is for you. No doubt this may be catchy, but you 
lose on the originality battle. No originality whatsoever on this. Vampires, bats, and heart-
breaks. All good topics idiots (Anonymous Punknews.org user, 2003). 
   
[Quoting a pervious comment] "Colin u jerk, don't review music u don't understand idiot..." i'm 
going to be a little biased on this comment and say you're probably under the age of 17, i have-
n't met anyone over that age who substitues 'u' for 'you.' it's an extra two characters. and, be-
lieve it or not, i 'understand' it, if what you are referring to is one of teh following things: a) the 
emo / post core / screamo trend b) the concept album c) the faux goth post punk yet singalong 
song ( Punknews.org contributor colin, 2003). 
  
  
                                                          
48 At the time of this writing, the last response to have been posted was added to the running discourse on the 29th 
of June, 2008. 
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to ridicule the band’s supporters by facetiously framing portions of itself as being authored by 
one of their own. While this poster serves to mock those who support the group on the basis that 
they are ‘emo and have cool song titles’ - particularities of taste that are purportedly becoming 
for a fourteen year-old - he or she ultimately identifies the band’s use of themes more becoming 
of those neo-gothic ‘fashion-core’ bands in debasing their utilization of themes such as ‘vam-
pires, bats, and heartbreaks’. The final example is especially unique, and might be perceived as 
carrying the most weight in framing the manner in which the band (and their fans) are conceptu-
alized by fellow subcultural traditionalists, because it is authored by none other than the very 
critic having written the original review under discussion. Aside from chastising the poster to 
which he is replying (in large part for being suspected of being ‘under the age of 17’), ‘colin’ 
also succeeds in reinforcing the band’s affiliation with both ‘the emo / post core /screamo trend’ 
and ‘faux goth post punk’. In doing so, this micro-mediated subcultural knowledge producer ef-
fectively reinforces the perception that My Chemical Romance represent a group who have  
merged the unsavoury elements of the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre with the unsavoury aesthetics having 
become popularized within the ‘fashion-core’ movement. 
 Shortly after Three Cheers For Sweet Revenge was released, and just as it had done with 
AFI and, years previously, Nine Inch Nails, Alternative Press began ‘investing’ heavily in My 
Chemical Romance; first with a generous interview with vocalist Gerard Way in the August edi-
tion (Simon, 2004c: 68-70) and, with the December edition of that same year, the band’s first 
cover appearance - and a rare nine page feature article (Simon, 2004d: 128-38). By this point, the 
band had begun to undergo something of a quasi-gothic ‘aesthetic’ shift that the band’s docu-
mentary film, Life On The Murder Scene (2006), would eventually attribute to the want of a 
quasi-theatrical image denoting the band’s determination to exude the aura of being a unique, 
and unified, cultural force. Nonetheless, a number of the problematized ‘fashion-core’ tropes re-
emerge in this December 2004 feature; uniform black dress, some attention to hair stylization,  
and the utilization of eye-liner - by Gerard Way - are all present and accounted for. 
 Unlike the bands that I have heretofore considered in this chapter, however, My Chemi-
cal Romance quickly evolved into a bona-fide mainstream cultural phenomenon.  The band’s 
video for the second single from the Three Cheers record, “Helena”, appeared to have struck a 
 
164 
 
Fig. 6.2:  My Chemical Romance; Summer 2007.  Photo courtesy of Ryan Jackson. 
 
 
chord with the video consuming public and music video broadcasters alike with its depiction of a 
funeral which essentially dissolves into a ballroom dance.  Shortly thereafter, Spin magazine 
granted the band a cover appearance – and a glowing article penned by none other than Andy 
Greenwald (2005) – for its June, 2005 edition.  The band would soon later go on to dominate 
2005 Spin reader’s poll, and thus granted accolades for being ‘band of the year’, having the ‘song 
of the year’ and standing as the ‘best live band’ of the year (Anderson, 2005).  By the dawn of 
2006, in other words, that group having come to be recognized as the epitome of all that was in-
authentic in the sphere of subculturalist music – by virtue of their aestheticism, the content of 
their art, and the make-up of their decidedly devoted fan-base – were very quickly beginning to 
resemble a force that was entirely capable of making good on its threat to upset the logic of hier-
archization within the subcultural field; a growing consensus perhaps best explicated in the fol-
lowing Punknews.org post,    
Okay. Here we go. I liked My Chemical Romance. I thought there music was good, the sound 
wasn't oh so emo, and it was just...well, really good. It was alt. at it's best....during that time. 
But then they hit TRL and people began to watch...lots of people. I hate when this happens to 
good bands. Now we are forever doomed to see 13-15 year old males and females alike dress 
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in all black wearing red ties and/or bullet-proof vests. You're not 50 Cent, no one's going to 
shoot you or Gerard whatever-his-last-name-is. Last night MCR played a sold out concert here 
in St. Louis, and may I say that it was god awful. MCR is the boyband of this time frame. In-
stead of ditzy pop/prep girls, you've got ditzy pop punk/"goth"/whatever they call themselves 
girls that want to marry the lead singer and love him forever and screaming as loud as possible 
trying to fight their way through a half-assed mosh pit. Did I mention that there were parents at 
this concert telling lots of the children not to move around so much so they could keep an eye 
on their kids? Yea fucking right. N.O. Okay, so the first thing we noticed was the obvious: 
Reggie and the Full Effect and Alkaline Trio were way better. Simply because people don't 
know them as well, and because the mob of the newly formed 14 year old teeny bopper punk 
girls didn't stampede the floor yet...In short, the concert was god awful. And to sum up, 
Punk/Rock/Alt/Emo/Screamo/Metal.....it's all the new pop [and] it's gotten to the point where 
it's not enjoyable anymore in almost all aspects. It's been flooded by bi-sexual 14 year old girls 
who are looking for a high school identity, and it sucks. big time. (Punknews.org user Angel-
Jin, 2006) 
 
 This excerpt is notably significant in that, above and beyond alluding to the ‘multiplicity 
of crises’ and reinforcing the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representation, it comes perilously close to 
granting the symbolic economy of subcultural capital explicit mention.  In so many words, ‘An-
gel-Jin’ would seem to lament the fact that the band’s appeal for ‘thirteen to fifteen year olds’ 
with a predilection towards engaging in decidedly deplorable practices (by the author’s account), 
in pairing with the band’s aesthetic turn, has effectively ‘spoiled’ the ‘investment’ of fandom that 
they had extended to My Chemical Romance before they became popular.  In many ways, then, 
this post can be taken to allow that its’ author ‘save face’ not only in subjecting My Chemical 
Romance and its adolescent fan-base to discursive degradation by asserting that she or he still 
possesses the subculturalist ‘aesthetic disposition’ – and therefore some claim to subcultural au-
thenticity – in testifying to the fact that the opening acts ‘were way better...simply because peo-
ple don’t know them as well’. 
 It might be pertinent to note the prospect that the overarching conventions of subcultural 
practice and the significance implicitly granted to the symbolic economy of subcultural capital 
entail something of a curious disciplinary power.   If one might recall my brief overview of Fou-
cault’s postulations (this volume, Chapter 3) regarding the processes wherein a power, largely 
dispossessed of any grand architect or cognizant orchestration, might facilitate dispositional 
normalization within a given population by virtue of processes wherein ‘subjectified’ actors will 
enact a normalizing, disciplinary power upon themselves as well as each other; the prospect that 
fields of subcultural participation, though spheres dedicated to the resistance of normalizing 
powers by the account of some theorists, are nonetheless spheres in which different manifesta-
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tions of normalizing powers are simply given precedence, might warrant further analytical atten-
tion.  
 
6.5 From Subcultural Problematization to Wider Ridicule: The ‘Emo Kid’ Folk-Devil 
Transcends the Subcultural Field  
 
 To this point, I have considered instances of subcultural discourse that serve to indicate 
the presence of a subcultural folk-devil in reference to which anxieties concerning the multiplic-
ity of forces that potentially endanger the sanctity of the subcultural field could be referenced 
and problematized. I have shown that a large contingent of Punknews.org community users made 
pejorative reference to the ‘emo kid’ and ‘fashion-core kid’ stereotypes in reinforcing the valid-
ity of concurrent narratives regarding those subcultural producers having renounced orthodox 
patterns of subcultural practice, the mainstream co-optation of the subcultural sphere, and the 
fact that an insurgent population of subcultural ‘others’ had effectively succeeded in devaluing 
the ‘authentic’ subculturalist’s live concert experience and, by extension, the sanctification of the 
subculture itself. Furthermore, I have highlighted instances of niche-mediated and micro-
mediated reportage through which the subcultural traditionalist might have been extended the 
impression that this contingent of problematic artists and fledgling subculturalists might have 
been undertaking conscious initiatives through which to offend and devalue both the traditional 
conventions of position-taking through which subcultural authenticity had been determined, but 
the symbolic hierarchization that such authenticity claims had functioned in facilitating. In so 
many words, then, I have characterized the emergence of two antagonistic forces within the sub-
cultural field, with the first striving to marginalize an identifiable bloc of emergent subcultural 
adherents in a likely bid to preserve the manner in which subcultural capital (and, with it, power 
over the field) had traditionally been distributed. The other might be conceptualized as a force 
striving to empower those marginalized subculturalist populations through challenging, or cir-
cumventing, the established ‘symbolic economy’, and the significance of ‘authenticity’, in either 
refusing to conform to its expectations or threatening to incite their revision and replacement. I 
have, in essence, explicated the presence of a struggle over the power to demarcate the nature of 
the field as primarily engaged in by ‘orthodox’ subcultural traditionalist and ‘heretical’ artistic 
producers; a struggle in which the former strove to deter the progress of the latter by means of 
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constructing a derogatory representation meant to identify and marginalize that subcultural 
‘other’ through whom these ‘heretical’ actors contracted their means of amassing momentum. I 
have, furthermore, conceptualized this representation as a folk-devil by virtue of its implicit 
function of promoting hegemonic allegiance to traditionalist ethos while stigmatizing those prac-
tices attributed with their transgression. 
  There is a great wealth of subculturalist discourse that succeeds in demonstrating that 
hostilities regarding this population of subcultural ‘other’ increased exponentially49 as the suc-
cess of My Chemical Romance not only increased,50
 To be frank, there is no ‘commonsensical’ explanation for the relative synchronicity with 
which ‘underground’ artistic producers began depicting different variants of the ‘emo kid’ repre-
sentation within their works.  I would posit that, as the ‘emo kid’ representation took on a greater 
notoriety beyond subcultural spheres – and, at the same time, garnered recognition as a represen-
tation denoting both cultural inauthenticity and emotional instability – artistic producers in 
search of a means of increasing their profile within their respective circles might have deduced 
the presence of an existing audience for artistic works that might further contribute to their deg-
radation.  I now wish to explicate the process through which the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representa-
tion began to find depiction in a number of such noteworthy cultural products whose authorship 
cannot be explicitly traced back to the field of punk subcultural production, and which thus only 
 but paved the way through which a contin-
gent of other groups resolved with endorsing similar aesthetic traits (such as Fall Out Boy and 
Panic! At The Disco) and proclivities of artistic content (like Aiden and From First to Last) 
achieved comparably notable success. It is also of interest to note that, as the aesthetically and 
dispositionally unique bloc of music fans which the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representation was de-
signed to assail garnered recognition by spectators beyond the borders of the subcultural field, so 
too was the representation itself warranted the ability to become an extra-subcultural discursive 
force; a pre-designed ‘body of knowledge’ that might be used in framing the manner in which 
this burgeoning population of aesthetically unorthodox adolescents might be perceived. 
                                                          
49 Notable Punknews.org discussions that lend credence to this exponential increase can be found in considering 
‘crazytoledo’s’ (2005) review of Aiden’s Nightmare Anatomy album, ‘colin’s’ (2006)  review of My Chemical Ro-
mance’s The Black Parade, and the increasingly derogatory nature of those negative comments posted in response 
to those annual announcements concerning themselves with the bands features on the Rockstar Taste of Chaos 
tour (Punknews.org, 2004; 2005; 2006).  
50 The Three Cheers For Sweet Revenge album went platinum in America at some point during 2005, a sales 
achievement far outstripping any of the other groups that we have encountered thus far. 
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reference a limited number of the internal crises that the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil referenced when 
utilized in the subcultural context. The remainder of this chapter focuses on a selection of the 
cultural products through which the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil representation came to be granted sen-
sationalistic depiction, the assignment of an additional number of unsavoury traits, and dissemi-
nation throughout populations exterior to the field of subcultural participation. In making the 
transition from an entity largely contained within subculturalist discourse to a multi-modal repre-
sentation designed to attract the derision of wider audiences, I argue that the subcultural rendi-
tion of the emo kid evolved into a representational construct suitable for annexation into the 
wider program of ‘representational politics’ against unconventional adolescent populations. I 
would thus wish to grant my preliminary focus to Steve Emond’s Emo Boy graphic novel (2006; 
2007), Adam and Andrew’s “Emo Kid” song (2005), and the process through which the latter’s 
Youtube.com video equivalent (2006) inspired something of a trend wherein the ‘emo kid’ arche-
type was subjected to lampoon by way of a rash of derogatory internet parodies.     
  
 6.5.1 Emond’s “Emo Boy”: The ‘World’s Saddest Saviour’  
  
Poor Emo Boy -- he's unpopular. Unloved. He has no family. Not only does he need to deal 
with things like pondering suicide and questioning his sexual identity, but on top of that he's 
got these emo super powers that only seem to bring destruction and disaster, causing everyone 
to hate him more than they already do. His first love suffers a head explosion, the football team 
wants him dead, and he got an F in English. No wonder he's so depressed! (SLG Website, 
2009).  
  
  
 In June of 2005, San Jose’s SLG Publishing began circulating issues of Steve Emond’s 
Emo Boy, a graphic novella concerning the exploits of a socially awkward fifteen year-old high-
school student problematically endowed with “unpredictable emo powers” that, as the back-
cover of the first volume of collected works explicates, serve to “confound his enemies and sabo-
tage his own happiness” (Emond, 2006). In discussing his title character, Emond rationalizes his 
adoption of the term ‘emo’ in noting that, “[the character’s] highs are real high, and his lows are 
real low. He over analyzes and just feels too damn much. As you'll see in the comic, there's a 
constant monologue running in his head, the world is a bad poem” (Adams, 2005). The twelve-
issue comic-book format run of the series was subsequently compiled into two anthological col-
lections - the first of which was rather tellingly entitled, Nobody Cares About Anything Anyway, 
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So Why Don’t We All Just Die? - in 2006 and 2007.  
  In terms of appearance and musical taste, Emo Boy might predominantly be taken to bet-
ter represents the original ‘emo kid’ stereotype as constructed in response to the Seventeen arti-
cle. The character is endowed with thick rimmed glasses, tight-fitting clothing and - in better 
keeping with the emo-kid/fashion-core kid mutation - tendrils of hair meant to obstruct one half 
of the face. He is obsessed with such bands as ‘Cheezer’ (an obvious parody of Weezer) and 
‘Sad Eyes’ (a take on Bright Eyes; an acoustic project by Desperacacitos Conner Oberst harbour-
ing similarities to Dashboard Confessional), is depicted as “painstakingly choosing every color 
and font face” in designing his website (Emond, 2006: 136), and recounts a melodramatic gene-
sis story - revealed to be facetious, mind you - in which his entire family perishes by means of 
drowning, illness, or bear attack (2006: 26). Over the course of the series’s story arch, Emo 
Boy’s predilection to ‘feel too damn much’ manifest in powers that suffice in decapitating the 
recipient of his first kiss, assailing the front-man of ‘Cheezer’ - his favourite “indy-nerd-core-
screamo-geek-punk band” (Emond, 2006:34) - with projectile vomit (in the midst of an im-
promptu competition to see who can ‘out-emo’ the other), indirectly inspiring a classmate to 
commit suicide in utilizing an English poetry assignment as an opportunity to announce his own 
plans to do so, and inciting a plague of “emo zombies” (Emond, 2007: 44) through the potency 
of his tears. The stories are punctuated by excerpts of Emo Boy’s internal narrative - the afore-
mentioned ‘bad poem’ of which Emond speaks - that serve less to propel the overarching themes 
than simultaneously disparage the character’s self-absorption and utilization of the stereotypical 
tropes so affiliated with ‘emo’ lyrics. To quote Emo Boy in the series’s first issue, “I retreat 
[from a failed band practice] and I look to the stars, as I so often do. My mind throbs and aches 
and pulses, my skin burns…infinite stars kiss my soul, each one healing an ache, a wound, a 
scar. Damage. And while my soul weeps the pain away, my body continues to hurt. While the 
stars kiss my soul…there’s no one here to kiss me” (Emond, 2006: 17).  
  Emond raises an interesting point of note in regarding the curious fact that, while he “fig-
ured the indie kids would love [the series] because of the subject matter [while] the comics 
crowd wouldn't get it…instead the emo kids are trashing it without reading it, and comics people 
totally get it” (Adams, 2005). One might be so bold as to correlate this unexpected climate of 
reception to the fact that, though the “Emo Boy” text harbours qualities serving to reflect its rela-
tion with the subcultural ‘emo kid’ stereotype - such as his fashion sense and his taste in artists - 
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the work predominantly invokes and recycles tropes most commonly associated with a more 
generalized representation of the anti-social, overly-sensitive adolescent archetype. In essence, 
while the recipient possessed of a previous familiarity with the ‘emo kid’ representation might 
find their conceptualization subtly amended and revised in light of this ‘emergent information’ 
(this might be the first instance in which the ‘emo kid’ is explicitly affiliated with suicidal fanta-
sies, for example), those unfamiliar with the pre-existing representation (and the subcultural 
power dynamics in the context of which it was constructed) might come to conceptualize the 
‘emo boy’ as a new variation of that longstanding cultural narrative concerning the mentally im-
balanced adolescent. In other words, we might posit that the introduction of the Emo Boy text 
served as a juncture at which the subculturalist narrative concerning the ‘emo kid’ stereotype, 
and more prevalent cultural narratives concerning emotionally unstable youth, were allotted a 
space in which to incite, interact with, and fundamentally alter one another within their respec-
tive spheres of primary pertinence. The subculturalist ‘emo kid’ representation was effectively 
broadened to now insinuate depression and a predilection toward self-harm; the wider represen-
tation of the socially awkward and superficially depressed adolescent was granted semantic revi-
sion as the ‘emo kid’. 
  It is interesting to note the presence of some evidence serving to suggest that, though 
Emond’s conceptualization of the ‘emo-kid’ primarily referenced that stereotype constructed in 
the wake of the Seventeen piece, a considerable number of SLG fans had already come to en-
dorse the conjoined ‘emo kid/fashion-core kid’ representation by the time the Emo Boy series 
debuted. On the first of June, 2005, subscribers to SLG’s Livejournal bulletin page were invited 
to compete for a copy of the series’ first issue by taking photographs of themselves “at their most 
emo” and posting them as a reply to the announcement (SLG Publishing, 2005). Those photo-
graphs posted in reply constitute a bevy of submissions which reveal the persistence of two con-
trasting understandings as to what types of aesthetic traits the term ‘emo kid’ should be meant to 
imply; some participants conform to a number of the more ‘traditional’ tropes in emo fashion 
(the thick-rimmed glasses and unkempt hair); others mimic the use of facial-obstructing tendrils 
and the quasi-gothic application of facial cosmetics. In considering the subsequent release of 
Adam and Andrew’s “Emo Kid” song, a cultural product that solely references the ‘emo 
kid’/‘fashion-core kid’ hybrid and to which I now turn my attention, it would appear as if the ini-
tial ‘emo kid’ representation had predominantly been subsumed into its subsequent counterpart.  
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 6.5.2 Adam and Andrew’s “Emo Kid” and the Popularization of Web-Based Parody  
  There is, unfortunately, little in the way of information about Adam Christensen and An-
drew Portner - collectively known as the comedic musical duo Adam and Andrew - beyond that 
which is offered on their Myspace.com page: that the duo have been self-producing and dissemi-
nating albums dedicated to their personal brand of ‘college humour’ and pop-cultural parody 
since 2005, and that they would appear to have garnered some notoriety by virtue of offering 
their work through such channels as Myspace.com and Youtube.com. We can also surmise that 
the group independently released their debut album, Music Pimp$, in August of 2005 and, in do-
ing so, offered what is perhaps the quintessential artistic product through which the post-hybrid 
‘emo kid’ representation was to be granted equal measures of reinforcement, revision, and popu-
larity. I speak here of “Emo Kid”,51
                                                          
51 As of January 11th, 2009, The song and its corresponding lyrics can be previewed in their entirety, at the duo’s 
MySpace page: 
 a song doubling as a cultural text that, I would argue, is de-
serving of extensive analysis.  
  The lead-off track of the Musical Pimp$ album, “Emo Kid” alternates between spoken-
word passages - so fashioned as to be perceived as excerpts from a fictional web-diary entry, and 
enunciated with a pronounced lisp - and verse/chorus components delivered in a rap styling. Fol-
lowed by a brief instance in which the prototypical ‘emo kid’ narrator seeks to establish the ap-
propriate setting - “[Spoken] Dear Diary: Mood: Apathetic…” - the text proceeds to advance a 
caricature that, though pulling some inspiration from the derogatory stock of subcultural dis-
course, primarily associates participation within the ‘emo culture’ with homosexuality, superfi-
cial self-absorption, and tendencies toward self-mutilation. Below, I dissect the text and consider 
each portion in turn:  
   
[spoken] My life is spiralling downward. I couldn't get enough money to go to the Blood Red 
Romance and Suffocate Me Dry concert. It sucks 'cause they play some of my favorite songs 
like "Stab My Heart Because I Love You" and "Rip Apart My Soul" and of course, "Stabby 
Rip Stab Stab". And it doesn't help that I couldn't get my hair to do that flippy thing either. 
Like that guy from that band can do.  
  
  
http://profile.myspace.com/adamandandrewmusic. 
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 This spoken introduction would appear to mirror the subculturalist discourse concerning 
the homogenous nature of perceived-to-be inauthentic ‘emo’ artists. ‘Blood Red Romance’ is 
almost certainly a thinly veiled allusion to My Chemical Romance, and the run-down of simi-
larly themed song titles - “Stab My Heart Because I Love You”, “Rip Apart My Soul” and 
“Stabby Rip Stab Stab” - reflect upon the longstanding line of discourse concerning the oft-
replicated artistic themes common among the bands propelling the ‘emo/fashion-core kid’ 
movement. The subcultural discourse finds further reflection by virtue of the fact that the speaker 
is resolved with contending that his ‘life is spiralling downward’ not only because of his inability 
to attend the performance, but because he has failed in ‘getting his hair to do that flippy thing 
like that guy from that band can do’ and, thus, emulating the aesthetic tendencies as endorsed 
within the pool of (largely indistinguishable) ‘emo’ artists. 
 In sum, the ‘emo kid’ is here characterized as one so inclined to base the personal valua-
tion of his own life on his ability to mimic adequately the artists whom he covets and, thus, a 
representative of a youth culture that is based entirely around fanaticism, aesthetics, and - as the 
second spoken-word excerpt demonstrates - extending narrative concerning the dour state of 
one’s life,  
 
 [Spoken] My life is just a black abyss, you know, it's so dark. And it's suffocating me. Grab-
bing hold of me and tightening its grip, tighter than a pair of my little sister's jeans...which look 
great on me by the way.  
   
 The dichotomy presented here - wherein the ‘emo kid’ indulges in an over-
sensationalistic, quasi-poetic overview of how his life constitutes a ‘black abyss’ and, within the 
same statement, comments on how ‘great’ his sister’s jeans make him look - can be taken to ad-
vance the notion that, though ‘emo kids’ dutifully work toward asserting their status as existen-
tially-minded ‘deep thinkers’, their true attraction to the ‘culture’ is derived from one’s ability to 
indulge in the adoption of (decidedly effeminate) aesthetic tropes. As far as the spoken narrative 
of the song is concerned, this latent commentary regarding the prospect that effeminate ‘emo 
kids’ are, in fact, latent homosexuals finds fruition in the final spoken passage,  
 
[Spoken] My parents just don't get me, you know. They think I'm gay just because  
they saw me kiss a guy. Well, a couple guys. But I mean, it's the 2000's. Can't two - or four 
dudes make-out with each other without being gay? I mean, chicks dig that kind of thing any-
ways. I don't know diary, sometimes I think you're the only one that gets me,  
you're my best friend. I feel like tacos…  
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 In lieu of merely reinforcing the ‘emo kid as latent homosexual’ subtext, this passage 
would almost appear resolved in striving to suggest that the ’emo culture’ is so sexualized as to 
constitute a quasi-incestuous entity wherein it is typical for ‘two or four dudes to make-out with 
each other’ under the justificatory auspices that ‘chicks dig that kind of thing anyway’. Alas, one 
interpretation of the text might take it as suggestive of the prospect that the primary reason as to 
why the ‘emo kid’ feels misunderstood by his parents (a detail that also suggests that the speaker 
is an adolescent) stems from the fact that, unlike the speaker himself, they are cognizant of the 
overt homoeroticism evident in considering ‘emo kid’ fashion and cultural practice.  
  The manner in which the ‘emo kid’ inevitably looks to his online diary - or, the site so 
allowing that the speaker engage in a lengthy discourse regarding themselves - as the ‘only one 
that gets them’ and their ‘best friend’ can also be taken to offer an interesting comment on the 
narcissistic tendencies of ‘emo kids’: it subtly suggests that the popularity of web-logging stems 
from the opportunity simultaneously to self-insulate and self-explicate in an inherently facetious 
manner. What I mean by this is that, taken in sum, the ‘diary’ portion of the lyrics depict a char-
acter who, though seemingly in the process of explicating his innermost private thoughts, is actu-
ally advancing a self-narrative through which his fellow ‘emo kids’ will come to formulate their 
understanding of him and, hopefully, come to empathize with his life crises, commend his ability 
to express his mordant life philosophies in a poetic manner, and relate to the persecution he has 
suffered by virtue of his parents’ unsavoury judgement. In essence, then, the speaker might look 
to the diary as his ‘best friend’ because it suffices as a channel through which he can disseminate 
a characterization of himself to others without the requisite need to socialize with others and, by 
extension, encounter the self-narratives of others. It allows the ‘emo kid’ to foster a depiction of 
himself without running the risk of encountering conversation that does not concern himself, and 
thus facilitates the textual commentary regarding the fact that ‘emo culture’ revolves around the 
triplicate themes of aestheticism, homoeroticism, and self-obsession.52
                                                          
52 It is arguable that a fourth theme - consumerism - briefly emerges with the final reference to the speaker’s sud-
den compulsion to consume tacos: a food imbued with a great deal of cultural significance in its native countries, 
but rendered an inauthentic approximation in the context of the North American fast-food industry. The subtext in 
this case: the ‘emo kid’ proclivity for mindlessly consuming inauthentic commodities runs straight through his 
tastes for artistic works, fashion, and cuisine. Suffice it to say, assuming such might be extending this text a little bit 
too much credit…  
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  Finally, there is the case of the song’s actual lyrics; a weighty collection of pointed de-
rogatory comments serving to reinforce those aforementioned themes while, haphazardly, intro-
ducing additional themes alluding to considerable emotional instability and self-mutilation,   
 
I'm an emo kid, non-conforming as can be / You'd be non-conforming too if you looked just 
like me / I have paint on my nails and make-up on my face / I'm almost emo enough to start 
shaving my legs / 'Cause I feel real deep when I'm dressing in drag / I call it freedom of expres-
sion, most just call me a fag / 'Cause our dudes look like chicks, and our chicks look like dykes 
/ 'Cause emo is one step below transvestite / Stop my breathing and slit my throat / I must be 
emo / I don't jump around when I go to shows / I must be emo  
I'm dark, and sensitive with low self-esteem / The way I dress makes every day feel like Hal-
loween / I have no real problems but I like to make believe / I stole my sister's mascara now 
I'm grounded for a week / Sulking and writing poetry are my hobbies / I can't get through a 
Hawthorne Heights album without sobbing / Girls keep breaking up with me, it's never any fun 
/ They say they already have a pussy, they don't need another one / Stop my breathing and slit 
my throat / I must be emo / I don't jump around when I go to shows / I must be emo / Dye in my 
hair and polish on my toes / I must be emo / I play guitar and write suicide notes / I must be 
emo / When I get depressed I cut my wrists in every direction / Hearing songs about getting 
dumped give me an erection / I write in a live journal and wear thick rimmed glasses / I tell my 
friends I bleed black and cry during classes / I'm just a bad, cheap imitation of goth / You can 
read me "Catcher in the Rye", and watch me jack off / I wear skin tight clothes while hating my 
life / If I said I like girls, I'd only be half right / I look like I'm dead and dress like a homo / I 
must be emo / Screw XBox, I play old school Nintendo / I must be emo / I like to whine and 
hate my parentals / I must be emo Me and my friends all look like clones / I must be emo 
(Adam and Andrew Myspace page, 2005; italics meant to denote choruses).  
 
  
 As the majority of these lyrics are self-explanatory - or, to put it another way, seemingly 
difficult to misconstrue - I wish to highlight a number of the assumptions that might be drawn in 
considering the references and correlations suggested throughout. First, it is arguable that that the 
content referencing suicide and self-mutilation - such as ‘cut my wrists and slit my throat’ and 
‘when I get depressed I cut my wrists in every direction’- stems, first of all, from the manner in 
which the text draws a correlation between ‘emo fashion’ and ‘goth fashion’ (as ‘emo’ is de-
scribed as being ‘a bad, cheap imitation of goth’) and, subsequently, upon what we might de-
scribe as those generalized cultural stereotypes concerning the Goth subculture.53
                                                          
53 It is certainly the case, however, that some notable songs from the likes of AFI (“The Last Kiss”) and Avenged 
Sevenfold (“I Won’t See You Tonight, Part 1”) contain first-person narratives that explicitly concerning themselves 
with cutting and suicide, respectively.  
 Nonetheless, 
whereas it is arguable that cultural representations of the Goth subculture insinuate a sincere in-
fatuation with death, the ‘emo’ kid suffices as a ‘cheap’ imitation by virtue of the fact that these 
tropes are merely used to assert one’s facetious proclamation of being ‘dark and sensitive, with 
low self-esteem’. Within the sphere of the ‘emo culture’, it is thus insinuated, adherents are 
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prone to feign (or truly attempt) suicide not only on the basis of one’s emotional instability, but 
because it is the most drastic means of being ‘non-conforming as can be’.  
 The run-down of the typical ‘emo kid’ traits also grants us a curious mixture of practices 
most easily affiliated with the pre-hybrid ‘emo kid’ stereotype and the post-hybrid, neo-gothic 
‘fashion-core kid’ stereotype. Though the aesthetics, the declaration of hobbies such as ‘sulking 
and writing poetry’ and the obsession with Halloween reference the latter,54 the reference to 
Catcher In The Rye and a preference for ‘old-school Nintendo’ over ‘X-Box’ (i.e., ‘vintage’ 
gaming systems over their contemporary counterparts) succeed in referencing ‘emo kid’ traits as 
characterized by the “Am I Emo?” photo-spread in Seventeen Magazine. In any event, we might 
deduce that these qualities serve to reinforce the likelihood that the text culled some degree of its 
inspiration from the subculturalist discourse surrounding the ‘emo kid’ folk-devil; a postulation 
that perhaps garners its greatest amount of credence in the allusion to the practice whereby ‘emo 
kids’ ‘don’t jump around when they go to shows’ - meaning, of course, that these lyricists had 
either attended shows in which they witnessed this (lack of) practice personally or, otherwise, 
foresaw grounds on which to frame this as a particularly unsavoury tendency.55
                                                          
54 There are a number of particularities strongly meant to suggest that the duo are predominantly referencing AFI 
followers here; as all aesthetic traits can be found to have been endorsed by Davey Havok, the band demonstrated 
a particular affinity for Halloween with the release of the All Hallows EP (1999), and “Bleed Black” is actually a title 
of one of the songs featured on the band’s Sing The Sorrow album. 
55 This particular complaint very closely resembles that of an anonymous Punknews.org poster in attempting to 
voice his or her complaints regarding the lack of proper show etiquette demonstrated by ‘fashion-core’ kids, “I saw 
a free [Atreyu] show with these guys…and all the kids in aviator sunglasses with white belts, Nightmare Before 
Christmas gear and lip rings were eating this shit up. And not moving a goddamn inch. (Punknews.org contributor 
‘FortyMinutesWest’, 2003b: p. 64 from bottom; my italics) 
 Nonetheless, we 
might presume that one would need not be a subculturalist to construct a befittingly derogatory 
conceptualization of the ‘emo kid’ population should the “Emo Kid” song have sufficed as a cul-
tural text through which to compose one’s first impression: from homosexuality to sexually am-
biguous trends in youth fashion, and from manic depressive tendencies to an unwarranted pro-
clivity to affront a faux-sophistication, this text spares little effort in touching upon a multiplicity 
of those devices through which, one might attest, antagonistic groups have striven to stigmatize 
and disempower one another over the ages.  
 
6.6 The Aftermath: Youtube.com and the Outbreak of Representational Politics 
  Though Adam and Andrew did not begin promoting what has arguably become the quin-
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tessential ‘unofficial’ “Emo Kid” music video until October of 2006 (Adam and Andrew 
Myspace.com Blog, 2006), 56 June of 2006 marks the debut of the infamous Youtube.com-based 
‘fan video’ of the “Emo Kid” song, as posted by Youtube.com user ’hillcrestswimmer’ (2006). 
An ‘unofficial’ video that the duo would later post on their personal Youtube.com page (You-
tube.com user ‘adamandandrewmusic’, 2006), the feature boasts itself as having been compiled 
by a duo known only as ‘BatWingedFaery’ and ‘Pyramus0264’.57  Without exception, the videos 
follow the song narrative by presenting a succession of web-based photographs of ‘emo kids’ 
(discovered by virtue of a google photo search under the descriptor, as the end credits attest) and 
various other images - including such items as a poster for the film Rocky Horror Picture Show, 
images of self-inflicted wounds and males kissing - where and when relevant. By the end of 
2006, a multitude of Youtube.com users - including ‘silkfire’ (2006), and ‘beccarmagie’ (2006)58 
- had posted additional visual companions to the song, each of which was identical in narrative 
faithfulness and execution.  
  Though the most widespread means through which to publicly ridicule the ‘emo kid’ 
movement, the construction of unofficial “Emo Kid” videos was far from the only means 
through which select Youtube.com users sought to parody the movement in 2006. Two of the 
most popular examples of derogatory ‘emo kid’ centred media to have arisen during this time 
period are the mock-documentary “How To Be Emo” (2006) and the “Lars the Emo Kid” skit 
(2006). As the pair have attracted a combined number of viewings well beyond the six million 
mark between the date of their posting and the time of this writing (1,269,537 for the latter, and a 
staggering 4,903, 188 for the former as of January 13th
                                                          
56 This version was, in fact preceded by at least two previous versions, endorsing similar stylistic presentation and 
content, as posted by Youtube.com.com users ’Cheshirecat632’ (2006) and ‘nonjumpingrabbit’ (2006) on January 
21st, 2006 and June 1st, 2006 (respectively). However, as the rate of viewing that the ‘hillcrestswimmer’ version 
dwarfs that of both combined at the time of this writing - 1,321,504 viewings as compared to a cumulative 546,945 
- I feel that there are grounds on which to regard the ‘hillcrestwimmer’ version the best representative of the 
trend. 
57 Or, these are the identities of the video’s architects as best as I can tell, as the ‘credits’ are provided on a poor 
resolution scroll of red text on a blue background and, therefore, considerably difficult to decipher. 
58 It is also of note that this particular rendition also prominently features photographs of AFI and My Chemical 
Romance, and might thus be taken as evidence that, though predominantly fashioned in a manner meant to be-
smirch the character of ‘emo kids’, these videos also aspire to subject those cultural producers so affiliated with 
the trend to derision in select cases.  
 
, 2009), we might safely assume that their 
content indicates what themes and representational tropes were popular at this time. In addition 
to offering a brief synopsis of each submission, I wish to highlight the curious manner in which 
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each piece - not at all unlike the Emo Boy comic in contrast with the “Emo Kid” song - extends a 
sensationalistic depiction that either pulls primarily from the pre-hybrid or post-hybrid ‘emo kid’ 
representation.  
  
 6.6.1 Billy and Lars: Contrasting Representations Toward a Unified End 
  Posted on the 31st of January, 2006, the “How To Be Emo” video, a considerably well 
crafted parody of a 1950s instructional video as produced and directed by Christian Andrew 
Bretz, was posted on the Youtube.com website. The piece concerns itself with Billy, a nonde-
script high school student who is obsessed with another classmate named Kyle’s ability to suc-
cessfully court women even though he dresses “like a square”. Of course, the film’s disembodied 
Narrator notifies Billy to the fact that Kyle is, in fact, ‘emo’, and will aid Billy in becoming 
‘emo’ himself by offering a run-down of the music’s history, the culture’s etiquette, and the sig-
nificant particularities of the style. In concerning itself with the evolution of the emo pseudo-
genre, this text would seem to pull primarily from the Greenwald genesis narrative while subtly 
serving to criticize its legitimacy. As with the account extended by Nothing Feels Good, the 
“How To Be Emo” video identifies Rites of Spring as the pioneers of the emo sound and Sunny 
Day Real Estate as the band most representative of its contemporary nature. However, in lieu of 
paralleling Greenwald’s abrupt transition from mid-1980s Washington to early-1990s Seattle, the 
video bridges the gap in stating that, “of course, there were also a slew of other bands between 
1984 and 1992...but they’re all forgotten, so we’re skipping ahead”; a statement that might be 
meant to critique the claims-to-legitimacy of those having pulled their ‘cultural knowledge’ from 
Greenwald’s (in effect) inadequate ‘authoritative text’. Shortly thereafter, the piece goes on to 
depict a conglomeration of South Park animation-style youths better representative of the post-
hybrid ‘emo-kid’ representation while the voice-over narrative contends that ‘emo‘ has gone 
mainstream, “[and] most emo kids see this as the end of the genre and will do all in their power 
to not let that happen”. Immediately following the statement, every depiction amidst the group 
swiftly engages in some form of suicide - some reveal razorblades and begin mutilating them-
selves, some self-immolate, one descends into the shot dangling from a noose - before the narra-
tive continues, “…and this is how emo continues to march along”. The portion of the text so fo-
cusing on ’emo’ music essentially suffices in ridiculing the expertise of the most widely heralded 
genesis narrative and successfully reinforces the correlation between emo fandom and self-harm; 
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two accomplishments rendered somewhat curious as the remainder of the text would seem to 
suggest that its primary directive lays with ridiculing the ‘symbolic economy’ that arose amongst 
those adhering to the pre-hybrid tropes of emo fashion and disposition. 
  According to the narration, Billy cannot truly become an ‘emo kid’ until possessed of the 
proper mindset, range of fashion particularities, and cognizance of emo ‘etiquette’. The Narrator 
impresses upon Billy that one’s identity is, “not based on how you perceive yourself, [but] more 
based on how others perceive you outwardly” before adding, “emo kids are supposed to be sensi-
tive, open-minded individuals. Now, with that in mind, don’t do that”. Instead, Billy is instructed 
to survey his local thrift-store for authentic emo fashion accessories (best that they “smell old”), 
wear thick-rimmed glasses despite the fact that he doesn’t need glasses (the narrator posits, 
“most emo kids don’t”), and mind the Narrator’s assertion that, “no emo kid would be caught 
dead without his or her trademark dyed black hair”. Billy is also forewarned that his transforma-
tion into an authentic ‘emo kid’ demands that he avoid logical thinking (as it “tends to take away 
from some of your sensitivity”), extroversion (because it threatens to “make you look interested 
in something”) and “above all, avoid happiness - happiness is a cardinal sin in the emo culture”. 
It is furthermore suggested that Billy learns to “solve [his] aggression the emo way - through po-
etry”, practice slouching, replace his compact disc collection with vinyl, learn the proper concert-
going etiquette of crossing his arms and looking disinterested and - once again - reverting from 
the X-Box back to the first incarnation of Nintendo. The piece closes upon the revelation that 
Billy harbours qualms in conforming to the final demand of emo authenticity: “[crossing] the 
boundaries between straight and gay,” as has his initial role-model Kyle. In essence, and in cho-
rus with striving to mock emo fashion - primarily as depicted in the Seventeen photo-spread - the 
“How To Be Emo” video can be taken to parody the insinuation that ‘emo kids’ are a largely 
vapid collectivity who strive to construct ‘authentic’ images in a largely manufactured, homoge-
nous, and therefore inauthentic manner. Along the route, those correlations between the ‘emo 
culture’ and a number of problematic dispositions and traits - feigned disconsolation, homosexu-
ality, and suicidal tendencies among them - are all drawn and reinforced despite the fact that the 
“Am I Emo” takes the pre-hybrid emo kid stereotype as its primary muse.  
  Subsequently, on March 12th of the same year, Youtube.com user ‘killjoy192000’ (2006) 
posted “Lars the Emo Kid”.  Self-described as a dramatic skit as written by Paxton Gilmore and 
concerning itself with “A Gay emo kid's story as he stumbles through his house trying to find the 
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meaning of his existence” (ibid., 2006), “Lars the Emo Kid” depicts the character of its title - 
clad entirely in tight, black clothing and possessed of an overstated speech impediment - as he 
aimlessly parades through his home while indulging in a detailed explication of his innermost, 
and largely mordant, feelings and compulsions. Shortly after admitting that he’s “just so compli-
cated” that the viewer could “never understand” him, ‘Lars’ pulls a toy handgun into frame, 
points it at his head, and professes that, “sometimes I like to pretend this is a real gun so I can put 
it to my head and kill myself because…its so emo” - after which he, naturally, simulates fellatio 
with the gun’s barrel. From thereon, the caricature boasts of his popularity on Myspace.com, of-
fers a run-down of his favourite bands (unsurprisingly, Dashboard Confessional and My Chemi-
cal Romance warrant mention) and prances throughout his home in a manner that - curiously - 
mimics the stage personality of the Rolling Stones’ Mick Jagger. While depicted as engaging in 
an online conversation with a fellow ‘emo kid’, Lars responds to a question pertaining to his 
evening plans with, “I don’t know…Prolly just gonna sit at home and…cut myself” - to which 
his chat partner replies, “That’s cool - us emo kids are so deep that its unbearable”. The climax 
of the first instalment (indeed, it would be followed by two subsequent editions) essentially ar-
rives when Lars cannot successfully log in to his MySpace page.  
  
 6.7 Concluding Thoughts: Fused Representations Fit For Network News Debut 
  Though “Lars the Emo Kid” is somewhat unique in the context of those videos consid-
ered alongside it in that it does not appear to harbour any implicit purpose beyond assassinating 
the character of those perceived-as-being emotionally unstable ‘emo kids’ alleged to be prone to 
utilizing web-based communication channels. What these videos do share in common would ap-
pear to be an overarching initiative - on the part of cultural producers and consumers alike - to 
representationally disempower, or de-authenticate, the ‘emo kid’ population on two distinct 
bases: their tastes in popular (read: co-opted) music and fashion, and the effort that they are be-
lieved to expel in appearing as if authentic possessors of the ‘aesthetic disposition’; those natu-
ralistic proclivities of ‘legitimate’ taste that Bourdieu identifies as that through which the field of 
cultural consumption reifies intrinsic difference and, thus, enforces hierarchical stratification. 
However, above and beyond depicting the process through which the ‘emo kid’ offends subcul-
tural conventions of legitimate practice - such as proper concert-going etiquette, transplanting the 
subculture from physical spaces to cyberspace, supporting artists rendered ‘illegitimate’ in hav-
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ing migrated to the sub-field of large-scale production, and generally perpetuating the co-
optation of the subcultural field - these depictions also cater to the lowest common denominator 
in infusing their caricatures with a number of tendencies widely identifiable as traits that offend 
the conventions of cultural normalcy. By virtue of these depictions and those akin to them, the 
‘emo kid’ folk-devil transcends its status of sufficing to denote a mere subcultural heretic; it also 
becomes a self-obsessed manic depressive (or a potential narcissist pretending to be manic de-
pressive) and sexually deviant.  
  Stripped of any subculturalist cognizance as pertaining to the fact that post-hybrid ‘emo 
fashion’ is problematic primarily because it symbolises initiatives toward corporate co-optation, 
the popularity of the artists having offended (or exploited) the conventions of the field, and 
serves as the established practice through which to contrast between inauthentic insurgents and 
legitimate traditionalists, the inclusion of these traits ensures that these media products simply 
reinforce the gradual amendment of those culturally pervasive, and similarly derogatory, repre-
sentations of problematic youth populations when exposed to non-subculturalist audiences. It is 
thus of little surprise that excerpts from the “How To Be Emo” piece, and a number of the ‘fan-
made’ “Emo Kid” song videos, would warrant inclusion in a number of those news reports con-
cerning the pressing dangers posed by the ‘emo movement’ in early 2007.  
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Chapter Seven: Concluding Remarks and the Further Exploits of the Emo Kid Representa-
tion.  
 
7.1  An Overview of the Analysis 
 In arguing in favour of the possibility that the ‘emo kid’ representation, as depicted by the 
WDAZ, Fox, ABC and CBS news broadcasts of early 2007, might not merely be conceptualised 
as a representation having been constructed for the sake of aggravating public anxieties concern-
ing a problematic new manifestation of youth subculture, this thesis has investigated the potential 
validity of two central hypotheses.  The first hypothesis regarded the possibility that the emo 
pseudo-genre, and its corresponding culture, were largely constructed by a bevy of cultural 
knowledge producers in aspiring to ensure their survival – while improving their positioning 
within - the highly competitive field of niche-mediated publishing.  I have substantiated this line 
of inquiry in charting the process through which Alternative Press magazine annexed the notion 
of the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre from the lexicon of subculturalist discourse – where it had been util-
ized as both a means of discursively denying ‘authenticity’ and denoting it over the course of its 
history – whilst reinventing itself as a niche-mediated resource on notable ‘underground’ artistic 
producers.  I have argued that the increased success that both the magazine and the artists it had 
‘invested’ in succeeded in not only attracting the attention of the cultural ‘mainstream’, but 
popularizing a poorly-defined ‘buzz-word’ that subsequent media entities – including the maga-
zines TIME and Seventeen, but most notably Spin alumni Andy Greenwald – would attempt to 
grant further constitution.  In so doing, I argued that each contributed to an emergent ‘body of 
knowledge’ serving to identify – or, in the latter’s case, self-actualize – a corresponding ‘emo 
culture’ of ‘sensitive’ adolescents; a ‘movement’ ostensibly based around a homogenous fashion, 
a shared taste in music, and the ability to foster an ‘authentic’ connection with the artists cele-
brated within.   
 In conceptualizing music-based subcultures as Bourdieuian ‘fields’ wherein one’s claims 
to authenticity are predicated on the perpetuation of certain conventions of practice – conven-
tions that might abruptly mutate should a considerable influx of competitors enter into the 
‘game’ without a proper cognizance of its inherent ‘rules’ – I have advanced a second hypothesis 
concerning the prospect that the derogatory ‘emo kid’ representation, as featured in the ‘emo re-
ports’, was granted genesis by virtue of the emergence of a micro-mediated subculturalist dis-
course which strove to problematize a number of forces so perceived as endangering the sanctity 
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of the field of subcultural participation and the perpetuation of those conventions adhered to 
within.  Having considered instances of comparable precedence wherein both the Washington 
hardcore community and the national punk subculture reacted to perceived ‘heresy’, in part, 
through the creation of pejorative pseudo-generic designations (‘emo-core’ and ‘neo-punk’, re-
spectively), I have demonstrated that choice excerpts of subcultural discourse, as provided by the 
Punknews.org micro-media website, are suggestive of a process whereby the niche-mediated 
constitution of the ‘emo’ pseudo-genre - and perhaps, more pertinently, the emo culture - in-
voked comparable trends in reactionary subculturalist discourse.  It is this discourse through 
which a derogatory representation of a problematic population of subcultural ‘others’ – those 
perceived-to-be ‘inauthentic’ subculturalists who might threaten the consecration of the subcul-
tural field by virtue of their sheer participation within it - began to warrant construction under the 
‘emo kid’ designation.   
 I have charted the process through which this representation perpetually took on addi-
tional traits as an increasingly broad range of practices and consumption patterns came to find 
affiliation with those forces perceived to be endangering the sanctity of the subcultural field.  I 
have noted how the subculturalist discourse serving to problematize the ‘emo kid’ population 
simultaneously serves to problematize the corporate forces of the mainstream culture and con-
sumer-item industry; the major record labels so striving to expose a considerable contingent of 
noteworthy subcultural artists to wider audiences and the retail chains – like Hot Topic – intent 
on rendering their merchandise available in mall-based outlets across the United States.  I have 
noted how the emo-kid representation underwent an aesthetic evolution in response to the man-
ner in which choice subcultural artists – such as AFI and My Chemical Romance - seemingly 
resolved themselves with defying the conventions of the sub-field of restricted production in not 
only aligning themselves with these corporate forces, but subtly initiating the emergence of a 
movement wherein the adoption of a quasi-gothic aestheticism came to be perceived as a central 
component of fledgling subcultural practice. Combined, these forces threatened to initiate the 
corporate colonization of the subcultural field and thus threaten a movement whereby the tradi-
tional methods of procuring and deducing subcultural legitimacy might disintegrate, a series of 
processes that might not only irrevocably alter the overarching structuration of the field, but 
usurp the standing hierarchy of positions within.   
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 In light of the implicit function of this ever-evolving representation, I have argued for its 
conceptualization as a subcultural ‘folk-devil’ in that it implicitly promotes field orthodoxy in 
condemning dispositional heresy; it functions to promote ‘proper practice’ and reinforce one’s 
allegiance to the subcultural ethos while, concurrently, serving as a weapon through which to 
instigate a program of representational politics against the problematic population as so desig-
nated.  Finally, I have argued that this representational folk-devil inevitably came to be infused 
with a number of highly sensationalistic particularities that might be perceived as less a reflec-
tion of pertinent subcultural concerns than evidence pertaining to the emergence of initiatives 
whereby the ‘emo kid’ representation was allocated characteristics granting such currency as an 
extra-subcultural stereotype that might draw the condemnation of a broader palette of antagonis-
tic populations onto this aesthetically homogenous adolescent collective.  
 In the process of explicating the process wherein the ‘emo kid’ made the transition from a 
niche-mediated construct to a subcultural folk-devil, this thesis has implicitly concerned itself 
with the creation and dissemination of knowledge and the power that these processes of knowl-
edge construction impart upon those that would orchestrate them.  We might posit that, in at-
tempting to utilize their expertise in constructing a ‘body of knowledge’ on the emo pseudo-
genre and its correlative culture, those niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers who so par-
took in their representational creation did so, in part, with mind duly paid to those power dynam-
ics and hierarchical principles that functioned to shape the sub-field of cultural knowledge pro-
duction.  Whether one pulls from the work of Bourdieu or Foucault, it would appear to me as if 
creating and popularizing a pseudo-genre over which one might claim dominion as the sole 
source of ‘legitimate’ knowledge – and thus jurisdiction over the creation of truth, the dissemina-
tion of authenticity claims, and the sole ability to shape the ‘aesthetic disposition’ – is an exer-
cise of power tailored toward ensuring the accumulation of additional powers, be that power 
manifest in economic, cultural, symbolic or social capital (and the authority that each might grant 
its possessor within the wider field).  I would not, however, go so far as to extend the argument 
that this constitutes a cognisant initiative as undertaken by niche-media producers assumed to be 
duly aware of their ability to revise and reconstruct the character of those subcultural pockets to 
which they cater their information; Thornton’s deductions regarding the creative capacities of 
media coverage, though credible in my opinion, are crafted from the perspective of an outsider 
looking in.  It might nonetheless be the case that those initiatives centered around accumulating 
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the manifestations of capital and, by extension, the authority requisite in assuring competitive 
competence in regards to the ‘game’ of improving and defending ‘positions’ in one field of so-
cial space can suffice in incurring unforeseen (and largely detrimental) effects in another.  In 
sum, then, one might deduce that knowledge created as a means of achieving one end might un-
wittingly contribute to the emergence of a force – of a power – that flows through any and all of 
those fields which, though seemingly independent, are in fact intrinsically interrelated.  This 
power, over which no one holds definitive possession or can wittingly claim authorship, can 
threaten to alter the power dynamics functioning to structure this network of fields in a number 
of decidedly curious ways.  In reference to the case study at hand, this power was granted the 
capacity to migrate – from the sub-field of cultural knowledge production through to the sub-
field of restricted artistic production and, concurrently, the field of subcultural participation – by 
virtue of the former’s role as the primary centre through which ‘privileged’ knowledge is granted 
consecration and dissemination.    
 As the ‘multiplicity of crises’ serving to endanger the sanctity of the subcultural field 
came to emerge by virtue of the creation of an emergent ‘body of knowledge’, so too it was 
through the creation of a reactionary ‘body of knowledge’ through which the subcultural tradi-
tionalists mounted a movement toward countering its ill-effects.  The subcultural micro-media 
centre on which I have focused contains innumerable instances of discourse explicitly directed 
toward revoking the ‘legitimacy’ of the ‘buzz-word’ through which the sub-field of restricted 
artistic production was being extended mainstream attention:  artists having undertaken initia-
tives to facilitate their further penetration of the mainstream, and subcultural ‘others’ attracted to 
the field by virtue of an artist’s success in doing so.  Above all else, however, the excerpts of 
subcultural discourse that I have detailed herein share one subtle, but prevalent theme:  the fact 
that the subcultural field was undergoing a number of unsavoury changes – as defined by and 
denoted in the processes through which the corporate mainstream was successfully colonizing 
the subcultural field - and those possessed of the ability to appreciate the resulting dissolution of 
subcultural sanctity were effectively rendered powerless in preventing its continuation. It is in 
this sense that the construction of the ‘emo kid’ folk devil may best be conceptualized as the 
product of a struggle - less a struggle between that bloc of subcultural traditionalists and those 
actors having either willingly or unwittingly endangered the sanctity of the subcultural field, 
however, than a struggle between actors vying for stasis (at least in regards to the longstandingly 
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dominant principles of subcultural hierarchization) and against a palette of forces of change.  
Nonetheless, it would appear as if the representation of the problematic subcultural ‘other’ was 
derived of context as its popularity grew, and it is ultimately difficult to deduce whether cultural 
products like Adam and Andrew’s infamous “Emo Kid” song and those Youtube.com videos cre-
ated to accompany it suffice as subculturalist initiatives through which to further disseminate the 
stereotype or evidence meant to suggest that the subcultural field had already been revoked of 
their sole jurisdiction over its utilization. 
 It is also curious, and worth noting, that the vehemence of the subcultural traditionalists 
appears to have been directed at ‘traditional’ scape-goats – those subcultural ‘others’ so gravitat-
ing toward the field, the mainstream culture industry that so informed them of it, and thoses art-
ists having further facilitated both of these processes in having resolved themselves with ‘selling 
out’– as opposed to either the niche-mediated cultural knowledge producers who began granting 
the sub-field of restricted artistic production increased attention or, for that matter, the infrastruc-
ture of the sub-field of (sub)cultural production that - in some cases - explicitly welcomed (and 
extracted benefit from) the increased attention without committing the cardinal sin of forging 
major label alliances (or, at the very least, trying to conceal the fact that they had done so).  
Might one speculate that the directionality of these resistance initiatives serves to indicate that 
the subcultural field is largely oblivious to the constructive powers of the sub-field of cultural 
knowledge production?  Or is it equally, if not moreso, likely that the nature of the targets of the 
phenomena detailed herein suggest a willing subcultural ‘obliviousness’ to the fact that the gross 
majority of ‘underground’ labels, promoters, publicists and artists sincerely aspire to achieve – 
and actively work toward attaining – some measure of commercial success and monetary profit?  
It is quite likely that directing criticism serving to question the ‘authenticity’, or covert inten-
tions, of the entire sub-field of restricted production might, as Bourdieu ascertained, bring the 
presence of the ‘game’ of amassing symbolic capital (and, by extension, reinforcing the posi-
tional stratification therein) perilously close to the level of public consciousness; a potentially 
fatal prospect in a ‘game’ that might only survive should its operation be tactically denied by all 
involved.  So too might attention then be granted to the distinct possibility that those corners of 
the sub-field of restricted cultural production from which music-based youth subcultures pull the 
artistic works that inform, reify, and shape their conventions is, in fact, not as divorced from, or 
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as fundamentally opposed to, the wider field of power as the subculturalists themselves would 
like to believe.  
     
7.2 After the ‘Emo Reports’: Initiatives Meant to Quell the Panic. 
 One might deduce that the ‘emo kid’ folk devil’s transition from a largely discursive con-
struct to a popular target of web-based parody ultimately facilitated the process whereby the rep-
resentation might be absorbed into the mass-mediated narrative on perpetually problematic ado-
lescent populations; first with the February, 2007 WDAZ report, the Fox News and ABC reports 
the following March and, finally, with the CBS report in July. It is worth noting that, as all three 
of the mainstream network television station broadcasts featured excerpts from at least one of the 
‘unofficial’ “Emo Kid” Youtube.com videos, and the ABC broadcast contained excerpts from the 
“How To Be Emo” instructional video, it is of little surprise that a bevy of micro-mediated sub-
culturalists suddenly felt duly possessed of the impulse to circulate acknowledgment of the fact 
that the ‘emo kid’ representation was nothing more than a caricature through which select traits 
in fashion and subcultural ‘position-taking’ could be allotted ridicule and condemnation. In es-
sence, and above and beyond problematizing the duly perceived mass-mediated agenda to incur a 
‘panic’ surrounding the current state of North American adolescent culture, the subcultural re-
sponse to the ‘emo reports’ indicates a willingness to profess partial responsibility for the con-
struction of the representation in the face of overwhelming evidence sufficing to suggest that the 
joke had, effectively, gone too far. 
  In extending a similar proclamation of guilt - albeit through potentially counter-intuitive 
means - select actors within the sub-field of niche-mediated cultural knowledge production es-
sentially aspired to constitute, and thus usurp the authority in further demarcating, a decidedly 
tamer representation of the ‘emo kid’ with the publication of Everybody Hurts: An Essential 
Guide to Emo Culture. Authored by Alternative Press alumni Leslie Simon and Trevor Kelley 
(2007), Everybody Hurts is a curious text that strives to detail the particularities of ‘emo culture’ 
- such as what books, films, television programs, and fashion traits the movement covets - in a 
manner that largely lampoons that readership to whom the magazine effectively extended the 
reigns in 2002. Its first chapter, for example, declares that the culture harbours a distinct ‘ideol-
ogy’ that ensures that,  
  
Even if the wrong person did one day wake up, head directly to Diesel, pick up some black fin-
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gernail polish along the way, and then buy the entire Saves The Day catalogue online upon get-
ting home, that wouldn’t ever truly allow them to differentiate between that which is emo and 
that which is totally lame. See, emo-ness is something that you are born with, and even if emo 
fans do think exactly like every one of their friends, that’s what makes them totally different. 
Well, at least compared to the rest of the world…(Simon and Kelley, 2007: 1-2). 
  
 As the chapter also offers a list of “core emo values” - including, “depression …the foun-
dation of the entire emo ethos”, “effort(lessness) [as] being emo is all about trying really hard to 
look like you don’t really care” and “empathy [as] feeling other people’s pain is crucial to being 
part of the emo community” (Ibid, 2007: 2-3) - it is difficult not to extract the immediate impres-
sion that it is a text less resolved with laughing with the ‘emo kids’ on which it focuses than at 
them. However, the text also harbours a curious tendency toward lampooning a sizable contin-
gent of those artistic producers whom Alternative Press had ‘invested’ in since its movement to-
ward ‘heresy’ in 2001. In addition to sections dedicated to extending mildly derogatory explica-
tions regarding what “worshipping some of today’s most popular emo-band frontmen” - includ-
ing Chris Carrabba, Rivers Cuomo and Gerard Way - ‘says’ about a listener (Ibid, 2007: 155), a 
number of illustrations, credited to Rob Dobi, caricature these same ‘emo-band frontmen’ 
throughout the entirety of the text. At first glance, the inclusion of illustrations of members of 
Fall Out Boy (p. 63), Avenged Sevenfold (p. 178) and a caricature of Davey Havok - perusing 
through the AFI merchandise provided at a Hot Topic location, no less - (p. 68) initially impart 
the impression that Simon and Kelley, not unlike that contingent of subcultural traditionalists 
before them, had developed a tendency to categorize any artist having amassed a notable degree 
of mainstream popularity as an emo artist. This tendency is, finally, granted proper contextuali-
zation with a brief, highly tongue-in-cheek passage dedicated to heralding Alternative Press as 
the “emo scene bible…one of the greatest music magazines in the world, and in the last 
five…the only music magazine that emo fans read on a regular basis” (Ibid, 2007: 143-44). I 
might posit that this passage essentially allows that Simon and Kelley admit that Alternative 
Press can be regarded as harbouring a great deal of complicity in inspiring the ostensible ‘emo 
movement’.  This reading allows one to interpret Everybody Hurts as a text that alerts those in-
terested in ridiculing the ‘emo scene’ that Simon and Kelley possess a ‘subculturalist disposition’ 
allowing them not only to appreciate that the ‘running joke’ is effectively ‘on them’, but that 
they, too, can contribute to the ‘joke’. Everybody Hurts, then, reads like an effort in self-ridicule 
that might function to extend its authors an air of ‘legitimacy’ by virtue of their willingness not 
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only to admit their role in inspiring the ‘emo kid’ manifestation, but illustrate a willingness to 
join in on its mockery. Ironically, this would appear to be the sole case in which the niche-
mediated field of cultural knowledge production is derisively correlated with the construction of 
the ‘emo kid’ representation; nowhere else are the niche-media products that so exposed those 
potentially ‘heretical’ artists to that burgeoning population of ‘problematic’ audiences delivered 
any amount of scorn comparable to the artists and audiences themselves. 
  Were it to have been published just slightly earlier, Everybody Hurts might have func-
tioned in diluting the voraciousness of the anti-emo kid movement - it primarily jests in a light-
hearted manner, and never once pulls upon those derogatory lines of representational politicking 
that correlates emo culture with non-heterosexuality and self-mutilation. Nonetheless, we might 
surmise that the fact that it was granted publication following the Fox News and ABC reports - 
and, indeed heralded as a text that ostensibly promotes self-mutilation in the CBS report - effec-
tively depleted the text’s relevance as a source through which to deduce that the ‘emo kid’ repre-
sentation was essentially a device through which to ‘poke fun’ at fledgling subculturalists who 
supported a specific bevy of artists, conformed to a sensationalistic number of aesthetic practices 
and - finally - largely culled the inspiration to do both from niche-mediated publications like Al-
ternative Press. 
 
7.3 Post-script: So...Who Are the Emo Kids? 
 Over the course of the past six chapters, I have considered the manner in which ‘emo 
kids’ came to be granted representational cohesion through their depiction in an array of cultural 
products and within a number of adjacent social fields.  Beginning in the summer of 2002, niche-
mediated cultural knowledge producers like Tyrangiel, Scwartz and, eventually, Greenwald con-
tributed toward constructing a representation meant to depict the ‘emo culture’ as a relatively 
strange subcultural reaction to the superficiality of the commercial music industry and the devel-
oping prevalence of web-based social networks.  By their deduction, ‘emo kids’ used internet 
communication and the introspective artistic works of a select pocket of cultural producers as a 
means of celebrating ‘authentic’ emotionality within the confines of a wider Western culture that 
had taken to repressing the ‘real’, so to speak.  Inevitably, as the full character of the ‘movement’ 
was explained with Greenwald’s authoritative Nothing Feels Good text, ‘emo culture’ came to be 
characterized as a collectivity which strove to locate the ‘authentic’ in practices that either re-
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volved around excavating relics from, and celebrating art comparable to, an age when culture 
was genuine (vintage aesthetics, acoustic-based musicians) or utilizing largely impersonal com-
municative technologies to forge personal connections within a sphere of cultural consumption 
that, it was presupposed, had constructed a new manifestation of symbolic economy.  Unlike that 
symbolic economy structuring the highly exclusionary punk subcultural field – wherein the pos-
session of privileged cultural knowledge and an allegiance to conventions meant to reinforce 
subcultural barriers translated into authenticity – the ‘emo culture’ distributed subcultural capital 
on the basis of one’s ability to feel ‘real’ emotions and one’s fearlessness in confessing to pos-
sess them.  Humanist authenticity, in other words, translated into subcultural authenticity within 
the confines of a burgeoning subculture that was decidedly unique in that it focused on the inher-
ent value of emotional connectivity as opposed to the dissemination of status (and the stratifica-
tion inherent to it).  By this initial niche-mediated account, ‘emo kids’ are those who collectively 
perpetuate the public celebration of the highs and lows of being endowed the human condition in 
a manner meant to facilitate an open-armed collective of unapologetically sentient followers.  
The discourse to have arisen within the field of punk subcultural participation, on the other hand, 
pegged ‘emo kids’ as the ‘mindless’ followers (and, thus, the perpetuators) of those aesthetic 
habits and consumption trends having recently been popularized by virtue of the corporate main-
streams’ insurrection into the subcultural field and that choice bevy of subcultural artistic pro-
ducers having forged allegiances with such corporate forces.  The subculturalist, micro-mediated 
discourse characterises the ‘emo kid’ as the epitome of the inauthentic subculturalist: they are the 
middle to upper-class adolescents so devoid of the subcultural ‘aesthetic disposition’ as to sup-
port those groups having ‘sold out’ their authenticity, those corporate entities to which those art-
ists have effectively sold themselves, and those mainstream retail outlets through which their 
merchandise is sold to the mass public.  Above and beyond effectively rendering the subcultural 
capital that the established subculturalists had collected in affiliating themselves with those art-
ists prior to their committing ‘heresy’ useless in asserting similar affiliations, the ‘emo kid’ de-
consecrates the sanctity of the live performance in gravitating toward it as less a site of long-
standing ritual (entailing certain conventions of practice) than a ‘stage’ on which to aesthetically 
assert their fanaticism for inauthentic groups – to ‘play dress-up’, in so many words.  Devoid of 
any appreciation of the true purpose of, and conventions guiding, the subcultural field, the ‘emo 
kid’ is essentially a representational folk-devil that doubles as a sensationalistic depiction of a 
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population of ‘others’ who are not only aware of the ‘proper’ methods of subcultural position-
taking, but threaten to corrode the value of that purpose, and those conventions, by virtue of the 
sheer number of those having penetrated the subcultural field.  In a sense, and in sociological 
terms, the ‘emo kid’ is here represented as a problematic population denoting trends wherein the 
punk subculture is taking on decidedly postmodern qualities:  fledgling participants are ‘playing’ 
with subculturalist identities and neo-gothic aesthetics for perceivably insincere reason (namely, 
superficially patterning themselves after the groups whom they idolize as opposed to substan-
tively assimilating into the established field of subcultural participation).  In the process of doing 
so, they are facilitating the growing popularity of a fashion without significance and empowering 
those force of mainstream colonization that would, inevitably, render subcultural participation 
insignificant for those having formed identities, and derived subcultural capital-stocks, inherently 
dependent on the desire that the ‘field’ of subcultural participation retain its longstanding ortho-
doxy of convention, hierarchization, and structuration. By the subculturalist account, the ‘emo 
kid’ is an inauthentic participant who is, at the same time, a dire threat to the field in that they 
denote the formulation of new ‘rules’ that disseminate subcultural capital on the basis of aes-
thetic style (as opposed to ideological substance) and further empower those forces striving to 
colonize the subculture. Finally, by virtue of a number of derogatory cultural products and some 
questionable investigative reporting, a third representation of the ‘emo kid’ came to be con-
structed.  By their combined account, the ‘emo kid’ constituted what might be construed as the 
embodiment of every middle-American parent’s worst fears: hordes of socially privileged Cau-
casian adolescents who had taken to devoting their conspicuous consumption patterns and free 
time toward endorsing sexually ambiguous styles of dress, consorting with online communities 
that promote non-heterosexual experimentation, and supporting artists who so romanticize mor-
bid emotions as to inspire a subculture in which status is derived through self-mutilation and at-
tempting suicide. 
 Might it be said, however, that any of these representations – be they highly romanticized 
caricatures or derogatorily sensationalistic stereotypes – referenced back to an actual collective 
of subcultural participants in any way, shape or form?  Less that highly fictitious representation 
as reinforced by the mass mediated news broadcasts of 2007, it might be said that, in a sense, the 
niche-mediated and punk-subculturalist representations of the ‘emo kid’ each pull a great deal of 
inspiration from archetypical conceptualizations of differing subculturalist dispositions; those 
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who sincerely do pull a great deal of their self-actualization from those cultural products in 
which they ‘see’ themselves reflected, and those who might sincerely regard fields of subcultural 
participation as a sphere in which to temporarily ‘play’ with different means of expressing self 
and identity.  As theorists aspiring to locate a middle-ground between those theories on subcul-
ture as advanced by the Birmingham school and postmodernist thinkers have subtly argued (see 
chapter two), one cannot assume that all those participants within any particular subculture were 
drawn toward, or continue to participate within, the collective for any one reason; that they, in-
deed, conceptualize the subculture, or attribute value to their acting within it, in the same way.  
We can deduce the substantiated existence of subculturalists who foster emotional connections 
with the artists whose work they relate to and, similarly, others who can relate to those same art-
ists.  We can deduce the emergence of an aesthetic trend in which tight black clothing, the use of 
facial cosmetics, and unorthodox hair stylings became popular within certain populations of ado-
lescents.  What has been decidedly absent, in the gross majority of the cases detailed herein and 
over the span of the near-decade during which I have witnessed the emergence of these new 
permutations of subcultural style and subculturalist position-taking, are instances in which those 
demonstrating a proclivity toward adopting either of these practices has self-identified as an 
‘emo kid’ or a representative of any substantive ‘emo culture’.  During that span of time with 
which this thesis concerns itself, I would opine that the ‘emo kid’ could only be said to have sub-
stantively existed in the ‘eyes of the beholder’, so to speak; depending on one’s positional situa-
tion within the subcultural field and the particularities of their subcultural habitus, virtually any 
subculturalist could have deduced an ‘other’s’ status as an ‘emo kid’, or have themselves been 
labelled an ‘emo kid’.  In the sense that ‘reality’ is a discursive construct, then, the ‘emo kid’ was 
certainly a subculturalist that existed in the sense that they could be identified and so labelled by 
external commentators in possession of that ‘body of knowledge’ concerning their inherent char-
acteristics.  At the same time, however, it would be very difficult to substantiate the prospect that 
the ‘emo culture’ was an objectively ‘real’ entity, given the pronounced absence of any consider-
able number of those willing to self-identify as members of it. 
 In the preceding paragraph, I use the past-tense in regarding the ‘emo kid’ representation 
– the emo kid ‘was’ and ‘was not’ – both consciously and very carefully.  I do so in light of the 
fact that, with the benefit of hindsight and comparatively speaking, the American news media’s 
brief initiative to spread awareness concerning the dangers of ‘emo culture’ inspired little in the 
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way of a notable cultural reaction. Beginning in early 2008, however, alarming reports concern-
ing the manner in which other cultures had taken to account for the ostensible migration of the 
‘emo culture’ began to attract the attention of the Punknews.org website contributing staff. The 
first, a post tellingly entitled “Violence against ‘emos’ sweeps across Mexico” (Punknews.org, 
2008d), redirected readers to the following blog, as authored by Daniel Hernandez (2008): 
 
A bizarre wave of mob emo-bashings is sweeping across Mexico. The movement is being gen-
erated on message boards and social networking sites by non-emo youth who highly dislike the 
emo look and attitude. The spark came first in Queretaro on March 7. An estimated 800 young 
people poured into the city's Centro Historico hunting for emos to beat the crap out of. They 
found some. The next weekend it spread to Mexico City, where emos faced off against punks 
and rockabillies at the Glorieta de Insurgents, the epicenter of emo social space in the capital. 
There's also been reports of anti-emo violence in Durango, Colima, and elsewhere (Hernandez, 
2008a). 
  
 The Punknews.org submission was subsequently modified once Hernandez, on this occasion writ-
ing for the LA Daily website (2008), better explicated his thoughts concerning the likely root of the upris-
ing, 
In Mexico, emo culture is a butt of many jokes. It is either despised intensely or generally ig-
nored. But it's only the despising sentiment that lately has been getting wide airplay. In the 
above clip, a Televisa on-air personality named Kristoff expresses a serious dose of anti-emo 
rhetoric and switches to English to say, on network television, "Fucking bullshit" to the emo 
movement. Some emos I've interviewed point to the Kristoff clip as a defining provocation of 
the current wave of anti-emo violence (Hernandez, 2008b). 
  
  The 24th
 
 of July, 2008, subsequently witnessed the publication of an equally unsettling 
post (Punknews.org contributor ‘nowah’, 2008) concerning the manner in which Russian legisla-
tors were aspiring to deal with ‘emo culture’, 
NME and The Guardian are reporting that Russia is currently formulating legislation to crack 
down on emo. The plan involves heavy regulation of emo websites and a ban on the display of 
emo and goth fashion in schools and government buildings. The legislation was first presented 
last month at a hearing held by at the State Duma on "Government Strategy in the Sphere of 
Spiritual and Ethical Education," a piece of legislation which aims to curb "dangerous teen 
trends". Among the stereotypes that are driving fears are claims that emo culture leads to de-
pression, glorifies suicide and encourages anti-social behavior. Bill sponsor Yevgeny Yuryev 
hopes to pass the legislation by the end of the year (Punknews.org contributor ‘nowah‘, 2008). 
  
  The most condemning example of foreign ‘emo culture’ coverage, however, is undoubt-
edly that which followed the suicide of Hannah Bond.  In penning a story entitled, “Popular 
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schoolgirl dies in ‘emo suicide cult’” Telegraph reporter Richard Alleyne (2008) reported that 
Bond, 
 
…had secretly chatted to “emo” followers online all over the world, talking about death and the 
glamorisation of hanging and speaking about “the black parade” - a place where “emos” be-
lieve they go after they die. She had even scratched her wrists in a form of self-harm often seen 
as a form of initiation into the popular fashion and lifestyle fad followed by young people who 
dress in black like their older “Goth” crowd. On her page on Bebo, the online networking site, 
she told friends with names like Sam Suicide, that she was obsessed with the American band 
My Chemical Romance, who hit number one with their last album The Black Parade (Alleyne, 
2008). 
   
 Though I wish to leave any deeper analysis concerning the manner in which the ‘emo 
kid’ stereotype mutated following its migration open to future analyses (and analysts), it would 
nonetheless appear fitting to conclude this research initiative in taking note of the fact that the 
‘emo kid’ representation – and ‘emo culture’ - still serves as the target of derision, problematiza-
tion, and disciplinary action (be it legislative or ‘grassroots’) throughout locations spanning the 
globe.  So too is it of note that, following the publication of both the Telegraph article and those 
reports detailing the proposed legislation in Russia, self-professed fans of the emo musicians and 
trends in emo fashion so problematized organized peaceful public rallies through which to con-
demn the unflattering manner in which these reports characterized the emo movements in Britain 
and Russia (Punknews.org, 2008e; Michaels, 2008).  Suffice it to say, whereas instances in 
which North American youth have self-identified as ‘emo kids’ are, and have traditionally been, 
very few and far between, this may not be the case in those countries wherein derogative media 
reportage concerning the ‘emo culture’ would appear to have drawn the vocal ire of bona-fide 
collectives of self-actualized – and self-referential -  ‘emo kids’.  It will, indeed, be interesting to 
note the constitution of a substantive subcultural manifestation that might have found inspiration 
less in the knowledge advanced by niche-mediated resources, but that was constructed within 
micro-mediated subcultural spheres for the purpose of preventing that any such manifestations 
might substantively arise. 
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